Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context by Wiener, Jonathan Baert
Article
Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context
Jonathan Baert Wienert
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 679
II. GLOBAL ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION ........................................... 686
A . Global Impacts ............................................................................. 689
B. Global Sources ............................................................................. 692
C. Local D iversity ............................................................................. 697
1. Costs of Abatement ................................................................ 697
2. Benefits of Abatement ............................................................ 698
3. Social and Legal Systems ....................................................... 700
D . Implications .................................................................................. 701
HI. CHOICE OF REGULATORY ToOLS UNDER UNITARY FIAT .................. 701
A. The Assumption of Unitary Fiat ................................................... 701
t Associate Professor, Law School and Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke
University; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, Spring 1999. A.B. 1984, J.D. 1987, Harvard
University. For very helpful comments on prior drafts, I am indebted to Scott Barrett, Charles
Clotfelter, James Hamilton, James Hammitt, Christopher Schroeder, Richard Stewart, Cass
Sunstein, and Michael Toman. For additional invaluable discussion, I am grateful to David
Bradford, Lawrence Goulder, Robert Keohane, Robert Stavins, and the participants in workshops
at Stanford Law School, Duke Law School, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law,
and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)IYale Center on Global Change meetings
on global climate policy. I thank Suzanne Alwan, Rachel Anderson, Michael Carey, Lisa Glover,
and Sal Karottki for excellent research assistance and Joan Ashley for superb secretarial support. I
am also grateful for a semester research leave supported by Duke Law School and the Charles A.
Cannon Charitable Trust No. Three for the Eugene T. Bost, Jr., Research Professorship at Duke
Lav School.
The Yale Law Journal
B. The Global Regulator's Toolbox .................................................. 704
1. Conduct Instruments: Command-and-Control Technology
Requirements ......................................................................... 706
2. Price Instruments: Liability Rules, Taxes, and Subsidies ...... 706
3. Quantity Instruments: Property Rules, Performance Standards,
and Tradeable Allowances .................................................... 709
C. The Optimal Instrument Under Unitary Fiat ............................... 714
1. The Case for Incentive Instruments ....................................... 714
2. The Case Against Subsidies ................................................... 726
3. The Case for Taxes over Tradeable Allowances ................... 727
D. Summary ....................................................................................... 735
IV. CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE
VOTING RULES .................................................................................... 735
A. The Range of Voting Rules ........................................................... 736
B. Participation Effi ciency ................................................................ 742
1. From Kaldor-Hicks to Pareto-Improving .............................. 743
2. Benefits and Costs of Securing Participation ........................ 747
3. From "Polluters Pay" to "Beneficiaries Pay" .................... 750
4. The Participation Efficiency of Regulatory Instruments ....... 755
a. Carrots (Subsidies) .................... : ..................................... 755
b. Sticks (Trade Sanctions) .................................................. 757
c. Taxes ............................................................................... 760
d. Tradeable Allowances ..................................................... 763
5. A Calabresi and M elamedian Analysis .................................. 768
C. Additional Considerations ............................................................ 771
1. Compliance ............................................................................ 771
2. Decisionmaking Effi ciency .................................................... 775
3. Fairness ................................................................................. 778
4. Morality ................................................................................. 779
D. Implications .................................................................................. 780
V. CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES ......................................................... 783
A. The Range of Implementation Structures ..................................... 783
B. Jurisdictional Barriers to Taxes: Fiscal Cushioning ................... 785
C. Jurisdictional Barriers to Tradeable Allowances ........................ 787
1. Interference ............................................................................ 787
2. Transaction Costs .................................................................. 789
3. M arket Power ........................................................................ 792
D. Implications .................................................................................. 796
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 798
[Vol. 108: 677
1999] Global Environmental Regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Contests to crown the best regulatory instrument have been the
ceaseless sport of environmental law. Fans of command-and-control
technology requirements' have wrestled with devotees of incentive-based
approaches such as taxes and tradeable allowances.2 Meanwhile, an equally
spirited rivalry has been pursued within the incentive-based camp, as
advocates of Pigouvian price-based tools (liability rules and taxes)3 have
squared off against supporters of Coasean quantity-based tools (property
rules and tradeable allowances).4 Seminal contributions have attempted to
1. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Unifonn Standards and 'Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985);
Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 943 (1994); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729.
2. See, e.g., BRUCE A. AcKERMAN Er AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (1974); FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 271-84
(1982); ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
69-84 (1975); CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 54 (1977); Bruce
A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333
(1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming]; Richard B. Stewart, Controlling
Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988); T.H.
Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y
17(1990).
Much environmental law enacted in the 1970s employed the technology-based approach, but
the momentum has swung in recent years toward incentive-based approaches. See generally
ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171
(1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case]; Daniel J. Dudek, Richard B.
Stewart, & Jonathan B. Wiener, Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based
Versus Market-Based Approaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1992); Robert W. Hahn & Robert
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991).
3. For the initial suggestion, see A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed.
1932). For more recent treatments, see, for example, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21-22, 29 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1988) (1975); and LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ON THE SUPERIORITY OF CORRECTIVE
TAXES TO QUANTITY REGULATION (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
6251, 1997).
4. For Coase's original proposal, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960), which advocates a property-based approach to pollution control. Others have
developed the idea further. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY - PRICES (1968)
(elaborating on the tradeable allowances approach); T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN
EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985) (evaluating an emissions trading program);
Thomas D. Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THE
ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 61, 81-84 (Harold Wolozin ed., 1966) (suggesting tradeable
pollution allowances); W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution
Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972) (providing a theoretical foundation for a
proposal to establish a market in pollution licenses); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Transferable
Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution, 56 LAND ECON. 391
(1980) (discussing the implementation of transferable discharge permits for air pollution).
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referee when the law should employ liability rules versus property rules and
emissions taxes versus tradeable emissions allowances.5
Now the Olympics of instrument choice are underway, the contest
joined at the international level. The game is to find the best regulatory
instruments to respond to global environmental problems such as
greenhouse climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and biodiversity
loss. All the regulatory instruments have entered the field,6 each with its
avid fans: technology-based requirements,7 harmonized policies (under
which international law would dictate specific policy measures to be
adopted by all countries),' pollution taxes,9 fixed performance targets,"0 and
tradeable allowances.'
5. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavel, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1996); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements:
Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); Carol
M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,
1991 DuKE L.J. 1; Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
See generally Peter Bohm & Clifford S. Russell, Comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy
Instruments, in 1 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS 395 (Allen V.
Kneese & James L. Sweeney eds., 1985).
6. For useful surveys, see B.S. Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments
for Combatting Climate Change, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 397 (James
P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter IPCC ECON. 1995]; and Robert N. Stavins, Policy
Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?,
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293.
7. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, BLIND SPOT: THE BIG THREE'S ATTACK
ON THE GLOBAL WARMING TREATY (1997) (advocating more stringent automobile fuel efficiency
standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The
Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 236-37
(1997) (describing advocacy of "variations on the theme of 'best available technology' (BAT)" as
a centerpiece of the "precautionary principle" and its embodiment in several international treaties,
including the Framework Convention on Climate Change); Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise,
Exploring a Technology Strategy for Stabilizing Atmospheric CO2 (Aug. 1, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
8. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, The Cost of Combating Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 8.
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 346-57 (1992);
WARWICK J. MCKIBBIN & PETER J. WILCOXEN, A BETTER WAY TO SLOW GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (Brookings Inst. Policy Brief No. 17, 1997); WILLIAM A. PIZER, PRICES VS.
QuANTITIES REVISITED: THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper No. 98-02, 1997); Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 66; James M. Poterba, Global Warming: A Public Finance Perspective,
7 J. ECON. PERsP. 47 (1993).
10. See Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, The Challenge: Incorporating Many Nations' Needs
into One Treaty, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1997, at Al (describing European proposals for fixed
national emissions targets).
11. Early proposals include MICHAEL GRUBB, THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: NEGOTIATING
TARGETS 41 (1989); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, A Comprehensive Approach to
Climate Change: Using the Market To Protect the Environment, AM. ENTERPRISE, Nov.-Dec.
1990, at 75 [hereinafter Stewart & Wiener, Climate Change]; Daniel J. Dudek, Marketable
Instruments for Managing Global Atmospheric Problems (July 7-11, 1987) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal); and Daniel J. Dudek, International Trading in
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Yet this debate has been conducted without much regard for whether
the comparison of regulatory instruments needs to be different at the global
level than at the national level. The question addressed in this Article is
whether differences between the legal frameworks now in force at the
national versus global levels imply different considerations for instrument
choice. More generally, the question is whether the underlying legal
framework of any polity-national, global, or local-affects its choice of
optimal regulatory instrument. This Article argues that underlying legal
institutions do matter in the choice among regulatory instruments, and that
global environmental regulation must therefore be conceived differently
from national environmental regulation. At least for the sport of regulatory
choice, the Olympic rules are different from the rules in national
competitions, and as a result the presumptive winners differ. The economics
of instrument choice are embedded in and contingent on the underlying
legal system.12
As a first principle, there is no single regulatory instrument that is
"best" for all purposes. Each instrument has its strengths and weaknesses.
Like the tennis player who performs best on clay or grass, each regulatory
Greenhouse Gas Permits (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
More recent analyses include Adam L. Aronson, From "Cooperator's Loss" to Cooperative
Gain: Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143, 2160-74 (1993); Dudek et
al., supra note 2, at 33 n.81; Alan Manne & Richard Richels, The Berlin Mandate: The Costs of
Meeting Post-2000 Targets and Timetables, 24 ENERGY POL'Y 205-10 (1996); and Richard B.
Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of
Design and Practicality, 9 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 103-10 (1992) [hereinafter Stewart &
Wiener, Global Climate Policy). Over 2000 economists, including several Nobel laureates, have
endorsed this approach. See Peter Passell, Yawn. A Global Warming Alert. But This One Has
Solutions, N.Y. TmES, Feb. 13, 1997, at D2 (discussing economists' statements on global
warming); Letter from Kenneth J. Arrow, Professor, Stanford Univ., et al., to Members of the
American Economic Association (attaching a statement by over 2000 economists endorsing
international tradeable allowances to address global greenhouse gas emissions) (Jan. 3, 1997) (on
file with The Yale Law Journal). The Economist magazine has lauded tradeable emissions permits
as "a great leap forward in global environmental thinking." The Kyoto Compromise, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 13, 1997, at 16; see also Money To Burn? Controlling Global Warming Will Be Expensive.
Emissions Trading Is an Intelligent Way To Lower the Cost, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1997, at 86
(endorsing emissions trading).
12. This Article therefore can be seen as both an extension of law and economics methods to
the global level and a reinvigoration of the "law" in law and economics-toward a partnership of
law and economics, rather than merely an understanding of law as economics. Cf. infra note 220
and accompanying text (quoting James Buchanan urging economists to take account of legal
structures). The words of Harvard economist Robert Stavins in this same context are significant:
[S]ome of the greatest barriers to progress in dealing with the threat of global climate
change are political hurdles domestically and institutional challenges internationally,
[so] we should be modest-to say the least-about the likelihood of analytical
dominance by economics.... [T]his is an area where economists can learn from their
colleagues in political science and law. Over the past several decades, legal scholarship
and political science have been significantly influenced by economics. Now, global
climate change policy-with its centrally important political and institutional
features-presents an opportunity for that favor to be repaid.
Stavins, supra note 6, at 327. In this Article, I attempt a partial repayment in what one hopes will
be a continuing exchange.
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instrument has its best policy terrain; pragmatic choice depends on
context.
13
Nonetheless, after thirty years of head-to-head competition in both
theory and practice, analysts appear to have converged on three
presumptions. The first is that incentive-based instruments such as taxes
and tradeable allowances should generally be chosen over technology
requirements and fixed emissions standards because the incentive-based
instruments are typically far more cost-effective and innovation-generating
than their alternatives.14 The second presumption is that subsidies are
inefficient because they create perverse incentives. 5 The third presumption
is that, among the incentive instruments, the price-based tax and liability
rule instruments-which set a price on emissions and let sources adjust the
quantity they emit-will typically be superior to the quantity-based
tradeable allowance and property rule instruments-which set the quantity
of emissions and let sources bargain over price. This is chiefly because the
price instruments are thought to perform better under uncertainty, to raise
valuable revenues, and to avoid transaction costs. 6 In a recent comparative
analysis, Professors Kaplow and Shavell conclude that "there is a prima
facie case favoring liability rules over property rules for controlling harmful
externalities" 17 and that likewise "pollution taxes are preferable to the
system of tradeable pollution rights." 8 Thus, the standard analysis crowns
taxes as the presumptive first choice for optimal environmental regulation.
13. The notion of "matching" and "mismatching" regulatory instruments to policy contexts
is articulated in BREYER, supra note 2, at 191-96. As Robert Stavins observes:
No particular form of government intervention, no individual policy instrument-
whether market-based or conventional-is appropriate for all environmental problems.
Which instrument is best in any given situation depends upon a variety of
characteristics of the environmental problem, and the social, political, and economic
context in which it is being regulated. There is no policy panacea. Indeed, the real
challenge for bureaucrats, elected officials, and other participants in the environmental
policy process comes in analyzing and then selecting the best instrument for each
situation that arises.
Robert N. Stavins, Introduction to PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Paul R.
Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 1999); see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra
note 3, at 3 (" [T]here exists a substantial range of policy instruments, each with its particular
strengths and weaknesses. An enlightened and effective program of environmental management
must incorporate these instruments into an integrated set of policies that draws on the strengths
and, where possible, avoids the weaknesses of the individual policy measures."); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage
Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1110-11 (1980) (noting that depending on assumptions, either
liability rules or property rules might be preferred).
14. A recent review of the literature on instrument choice proclaims "an emerging scholarly
consensus that incentive-based regulatory systems are often the superior approach." Jon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-
Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174 (1998).
15. See infra Subsection III.C.2.
16. See infra Subsection III.C.3.




As one environmental economist puts it, "[O]f all policy instruments to
accomplish environmental improvement, economists hold pollution taxes in
nearly reverential regard."' 9
This Article reevaluates these presumptions about instrument choice
when the legal context shifts from the national to the global level. The
Article shows that the presumption favoring environmental taxes depends
on the assumptions that the regulator can compel polluters to comply by fiat
and that the regulator can impose the instrument directly on polluters
without an intermediate level of government in the way.2" But neither of
these assumptions-coercive fiat or unitary regulation-is valid in the
global legal context. International treaties depend on countries' voluntary
assent and on implementation through national governments.2 Most
analyses of instrument choice for global environmental regulation neglect
these fundamental differences between national and global legal systems.
The requisite investigation is a comparative institutional analysis of
regulatory instrument choice under alternative legal frameworks.22 This
Article therefore examines the impact on regulatory instrument choice of
two basic legal parameters that differ between the national and global
settings: voting rules and implementation structures.' To explore the role
of the legal framework, I conduct an analysis of the degree to which the
relative merits of the regulatory instruments are sensitive to changes in the
underlying legal framework of government. Put another way, I test a model
in which the dependent variable is the relative preference among the
regulatory instruments and in which the independent variables include the
legal framework parameters as well as the conventionally studied policy
attributes such as cost-effectiveness. Thus, I attempt to control for the
numerous other attributes that differentiate the regulatory instruments and
to isolate the impact of the underlying legal system's parameters on the
relative performance of the regulatory instruments. In short, I test optimal
instrument choice as a function of the legal framework.
19. Frank S. Arnold, The Economist's Perspective: Why There Are No Pollution Taxes,
ENvTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 14.
20. See infra Section III.A.
21. See infra Parts IV, V.
22. This exercise attempts to compare alternative regulatory instruments in their real and
imperfect institutional contexts, rather than comparing real regulatory instruments with "nirvana"
ideals. Cf. NEAL K. KO~MSAR, IMPERFEcT ALTERNATIvES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, 5 (1994) (characterizing comparative institutional analysis as
a choice among the strengths and weaknesses of inevitably imperfect alternatives); Harold
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969)
(distinguishing the "nirvana approach" from a "comparative institution approach in which the
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements" (emphasis omitted)).
23. The voting rule and the implementation structure are certainly not the only two
parameters that distinguish the global context from the national context and the idealized world of
academic analysis, but they are two of the most important and two of the most amenable to
analysis.
1999]
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Part II of this Article describes key challenges for global environmental
regulatory design. Part III reviews the instruments available in the "global
regulator's toolbox" and summarizes the standard analysis of the choice
among these instruments, under the unrealistic but standard assumption of
"Unitary Fiat." This Part sets the baseline for the subsequent investigation
of instrument choice when the legal framework varies.
Part IV examines the choice of regulatory instruments when the voting
rule varies.24 I show that, all other policy attributes held equal, as the voting
rule becomes less coercive (moving from Autocratic Fiat to Majority rule to
Voluntary Assent), the relative attractiveness of quantity-based (tradeable
allowance) over price-based (tax) instruments rises. Without coercion,
participation must be attracted. Part IV shows that "participation
efficiency" is a crucial attribute of instrument choice at the global level,
and, as a corollary, that environmental regulation under the Voluntary
Assent rule must be based on a "beneficiaries pay" principle rather than a
"polluters pay" principle. Part IV then argues that the necessity of actual
side payments from beneficiaries to polluters under the Voluntary Assent
voting rule, coupled with the distortionary effects of such side payments,
confers a significant advantage on quantity-based instruments such as
tradeable allowances. Part IV recognizes that other attributes of regulatory
choice remain important under Voluntary Assent and could still render
another regulatory instrument superior to tradeable allowances for
protecting the global environment. Holding such other attributes equal,
however, the move from Fiat to Voluntary Assent gives quantity-based
tradeable allowances an important presumptive advantage.2
24. I take the global voting rule as given and do not argue that one or the other voting rule is
preferable for global policy. I do not argue here, for example, that the solution to global
environmental problems is to replace the Voluntary Assent rule for treaties with a coercive global
government that can enforce its regulations against dissenters. Such a move would render the
national and global legal frameworks more equivalent and thereby evade the question analyzed
here: whether the choice among regulatory instruments is affected by variations in the legal
framework. The present challenge of global environmental protection is to select the optimal
regulatory instrument to be deployed given the particular legal framework that prevails at the
global level. Whatever the merits of alternative voting rules, the Voluntary Assent rule in force at
the global level is unlikely to change quickly. See infra note 221.
25. Part IV acknowledges that the real international legal system does not employ a pure
Voluntary Assent rule (nor does the real national legal system employ a pure Majority rule). It
analyzes the choice of instruments under the Voluntary Assent rule and also addresses the
qualifications necessary to account for a more textured depiction of international law in which
some coercive pressures may be brought to bear on dissenting nations. Along the spectrum of
voting rules, the international legal system still remains far less coercive than Majority rule and
enormously less coercive than Fiat. Moreover, considerations of fairness and effectiveness
counsel against application of coercive pressures to address global environmental problems. Thus,




Part V addresses the choice of regulatory tools under different
implementation structures.26 I argue that, all other policy attributes held
equal, as the implementation structure becomes increasingly jurisdictional
(moving from unitary to federalist to fully jurisdictional), the relative
attractiveness of tradeable allowances over taxes rises. To be sure, the
jurisdictional structure poses impediments for allowance trading as well-
indeed, for any regulatory instrument-but it poses relatively more
intractable problems for taxes. Thus, I show that the jurisdictional structure
gives quantity-based tradeable allowances an additional prima facie
advantage over taxes at the global level.
Part VI presents the conclusions. First, the design of international
environmental treaties-that is, global regulatory instrument choice-must
be different from instrument choice at the national level. The Voluntary
Assent voting rule in force at the global level puts a premium on attracting
participation efficiently. At the same time, the jurisdictional implementation
structure poses obstacles, especially to global environmental taxes. Taken
together, these legal parameters imply a strong prima facie preference for
employing tradeable allowances, rather than taxes, to address global
environmental problems. This result contrasts with the standard
presumption in favor of taxes in the academic literature, precisely because
of the difference in voting rules and implementation structures obtaining at
the global level.
Second, and more fundamentally, the underlying legal framework
substantially affects the relative merits of alternative regulatory
instruments. This more general conclusion is applicable to the choice of
regulatory instruments by any polity, from the global community to the
national legislature to the local neighborhood. It furnishes a new dimension
for evaluating the merits of liability rules, property rules, taxes, tradeable
allowances, and technology requirements. Any realistic analysis of the
choice among regulatory instruments must account for the underlying legal
framework; failure to do so can generate biased policy choices. The choice
of optimal regulatory instrument cannot be universal; rather, it must be
contextual and contingent on the particular legal institutions of each polity.
In short, the law and economics of regulation cannot be all economics; legal
institutions matter.
26. I take the implementation structure as given and do not argue that one implementation
structure or the other is preferable for global policy. This Article addresses not the choice of
implementation structure, but the choice of regulatory instruments taking as given the prevailing
implementation structure. Whatever the merits of alternative implementation structures-
decentralized local regulation, unitary global regulation, or some mixed federalist system-the
implementation structures in force at the national and global levels are basic features of their
attendant legal systems and are unlikely to change quickly.
6851999]
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II. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The choice of regulatory instrument depends fundamentally on the
problem that is to be regulated. This Part describes the principal global
environmental problems and highlights three key aspects that affect
instrument choice: the global extent of environmental impacts, the global
mobility of sources of environmental harm, and the diversity of national
abatement costs and benefits. Among other points, this Part establishes the
predicate for the imperative of attracting voluntary participation, the
applications of which are analyzed in Part IV.
Choosing optimal environmental regulatory instruments at the global
level is important because global environmental concern and regulatory
activity are increasing.27  Global environmental problems such as
stratospheric ozone depletion, greenhouse climate change, and biodiversity
loss have stimulated the adoption of a growing body of international
environmental treaties."
Stratospheric ozone depletion drew attention in 1974 when two
chemists theorized that ostensibly inert chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)29 could
break apart in the upper atmosphere and react with stratospheric ozone,
thinning the ozone layer that protects the earth from solar ultraviolet (UV)
radiation.3" Increased UV-irradiance could lead to skin cancers, damage to
crops and ocean life, and other risks.3" By the mid-1980s, the accumulating
observational evidence of actual ozone depletion was a key factor leading
countries to adopt the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
27. See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental
Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 423-27 (1989); Oran R. Young, Introduction to GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (Oran R. Young et al. eds.,
1996).
28. The United Nations now lists over 160 international environmental treaties. See Register
of International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment, U.N.
Environmental Programme, U.N. Doe. UNEP/GC.16/Inf.6 (1993).
29. CFCs had been invented in the late 1920s and were employed in numerous industries,
notably refrigeration, air conditioning, and computer chip manufacturing, in part precisely
because they were thought to be inert-that is, not reactive with other chemicals. See James K.
Hammitt & Kimberly M. Thompson, Protecting the Ozone Layer, in THE GREENING OF
INDUSTRY: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 43, 45-53 (John D. Graham & Jennifer Kassalow
Hartwell eds., 1997); Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 129, 131 (Michael S. Greve &
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
30. See Mario J. Molina & F.S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes:
Chlorine Atom Catalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810 (1974). Molina and Rowland
pointed out that it was precisely the chemically inert nature of CFCs that prevented their
destruction by other processes, so that CFCs endure in the atmosphere for decades or centuries
until they ascend to the stratosphere where intense solar ultraviolet radiation can break down the
CFC molecule, releasing the highly reactive chlorine ion. See id. at 810-11. In 1995, Rowland and
Molina received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for this work. See David L. Chandler, MIT Scientist
Shares Nobelfor Identifying Ozone Damage, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 1995, at 1.
31. See Hammitt & Thompson, supra note 29, at 70-73.
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Ozone Layer.32 Shortly thereafter, the "ozone hole" was confirmed over
Antarctica, indicating much more rapid ozone depletion than theoretical
models had predicted.33 This dramatic new evidence of ozone depletion,
among other factors, spurred the adoption of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987.3' As updated, the
Montreal Protocol now requires full phaseout of CFCs and full or partial
phaseouts of several other ozone-depleting substances by industrialized
countries, and similar but less immediate controls on developing
countries.35
The greenhouse effect is an atmospheric phenomenon distinct from
stratospheric ozone depletion. Whereas ozone depletion allows more high-
frequency ultraviolet radiation to penetrate the earth's atmosphere, the
greenhouse effect traps more low-frequency infrared radiation (heat) within
the earth's atmosphere. The role of trace gases such as water vapor and
carbon dioxide (CO 2) in trapping heat near the earth's surface has long been
recognized.3 6 It is this background greenhouse effect that has made the
Earth habitable for life, keeping the planet about thirty-three degrees
32. Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (entered into force Sept. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]; see Hammit & Thompson, supra note 29, at 76.
33. Hammitt & Thompson, supra note 29, at 62-65. The more rapid depletion appears to be
associated with extremely cold polar stratospheric clouds, where solid frozen crystals of water and
chlorine can react with gaseous ozone in an unusual heterogeneous chemistry. See id. at 64-65;
Mario J. Molina et al., Antarctic Stratospheric Chemistry of Chlorine Nitrate, Hydrogen Chloride,
and Ice: Release of Active Chlorine, 238 SCIENCE 1253, 1256-57 (1987); Susan Solomon et al.,
On the Depletion of Antarctic Ozone, 321 NATURE 755 (1986).
34. Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]; see Hanmit & Thompson, supra note 29, at 76. In addition to the scientific evidence of
rapid ozone depletion, another factor apparently motivating the international regulatory effort was
the preparation of a quantitative cost-benefit study by the Council of Economic Advisers that
persuaded the Reagan administration that a phaseout of CFCs was worthwhile. See RICHARD
BENEDICK, OzONE DIPLOMACY 63 (1991). Another important factor was the 1986 judgment of
American CFC producers, who had previously opposed international regulation, that they should
now support a global phaseout of CFCs. This decision was made perhaps because unilateral
regulation by the United States seemed likely and global regulation would be painful but
preferable to unilateral measures, and because the American producers perceived that they would
enjoy a greater advantage over their competitors in selling CFC substitutes than in selling CFCs.
See KAREN T. LrrmN, OzoNE DIsCOuRsEs 106-08 (1994); Haunit & Thompson, supra note 29,
at 76; McInnis, supra note 29, at 145-50.
35. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 1275-88 (2d ed. 1996); Hammitt & Thompson, supra note 29, at 67 tbl.3.2.
36. See LYNNE M. JURGIELEWICz, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 n.29 (1996) (citing Jean Baptiste Fourier, Les Temperatures du Globe
Terrestre et des Espaces Planetaires, 7 MEMOIRES DE L'ACADEMIE ROYALE DES SCIENCES DE
L'INSTITUT DE FRANCE 569-604 (1824)); Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in
the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. Sd. 237, 237 (1896) (noting
that a "great deal has been written" on the greenhouse effect); Stephen H. Schneider, The
Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy, 243 SCIENCE 771 (1989) (noting that the background
greenhouse effect that keeps the Earth warm is one of the "most well-established theories in
atmospheric science").
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centigrade warmer than it otherwise would be.37 But concern about an
"enhanced greenhouse effect" grew in the 1970s as atmospheric
concentrations of CO.,, methane (CH,), and other gases were observed to be
rising steadily, almost undoubtedly due to anthropogenic emissions of such
gases. The extent to which these rising atmospheric concentrations will
change global temperatures, and the impact of such an enhanced
greenhouse effect on sea levels, precipitation patterns, ocean currents, crop
zones, and species habitats, remain much debated." The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide
scientific and technical advice on the issue, and in 1990 the United Nations
convened negotiations toward a Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) that virtually all the world's heads of state signed at the Rio Earth
Summit in June 1992."9 The FCCC called on industrialized countries to take
actions to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), with the
"aim" of keeping these emissions no higher than their 1990 level in the
year 2000.40 In 1997, countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, which, when
ratified, would set binding targets for industrialized countries to reduce
their emissions roughly five percent below 1990 levels by the period 2008
to 2012.4'
Concern about depletion of biological resources-and the loss of
biological diversity-has also risen. Deforestation has accelerated and the
planet's remaining forests are becoming more fragmented.42 Meanwhile,
fish populations are also under stress.4 3 As fish stocks have been depleted,
the attempt to maintain or increase the quantity of harvest has yielded a
decreasing quality of harvest, an increasing investment of capital and effort
37. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT at xiv (1990).
38. Compare STEPHEN SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING (emphasizing the risks of
anthropogenic global warming), with ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE HEATED DEBATE (1992)
(doubting risks of significant anthropogenic global warning).
39. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter FCCC].
40. See id. at art. 4(2)(a)-(b), 31 I.L.M. at 856-57.
41. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
42. See WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESoURCEs 1998-99, at 185-86 (1998); Walter
Reid. Strategies for Conserving Biodiversity, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1, 1997, at 16, 20 (" [The
current rate at which tropical forests are being lost [is] approximately 10 million hectares per year,
or slightly less than 1%."). Note that deforestation is not a modem aberration: Human societies
have cleared forests for centuries. See WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra, at 187 (noting that
humans have cleared half of the forests on Earth over the last 8000 years); Carol Yoon, Rain
Forests Seen as Shaped by Human Hand, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1993, at Cl.
43. See UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORG. (FAO), THE STATE OF WORLD
FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE (1995); WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 42, at 195-96;
Suzanne Iudicello & Margaret Lytle, Marine Biodiversity and International Law, 8 TUL. ENVrL.
L.J. 123 (1994); Lawrence Ingrassia, Dead in the Water: Overfishing Threatens To Wipe Out
Species and Crush Industry, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1991, at Al; Anne Swardson, Net Losses:
Fishing Decimating Oceans' "Unlimited Bounty," WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at Al.
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per ton of fish caught, and progressive "fishing down" of the trophic level
of marine species.' One consequence of these forest and fishery losses, as
well as of other stresses, is the loss of a great deal of the Earth's biological
diversity. The modem rate of species extinction, though difficult to
measure, appears to be significantly faster than the rate of extinctions
during prehuman geological history.45 Biodiversity conservation is the goal
of such treaties as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES)46 and the Convention on Biological
Diversity,47 and global fisheries are addressed by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 8 the International Whaling
Convention,49 and the Straddling Stocks Agreement.50
These global environmental problems share at least three common
elements that distinguish them from national and local environmental
problems: global impacts, global sources, and diversity of costs and
benefits across countries. These three elements powerfully shape the choice
of the optimal regulatory instrument for global environmental regulation.
A. Global Impacts
A primary challenge of global environmental problems is that they have
global impacts, making abatement by any party beneficial to many and thus
encouraging free riding. Consider a spectrum from local to global.5 ' Local
environmental problems involve impacts confined closely to the environs of
44. See Daniel Pauly et al., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SCIENCE 860 (1998);
Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies
and Restore the Balance in Global Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 505 (1997); Nigel Williams,
Overfishing Disrupts Entire Ecosystems, 279 SCIENCE 809 (1998).
45. Two-thirds of the 400 biologists polled in a recent survey by the American Museum of
Natural History agreed that a "mass extinction" is currently underway and that up to 20% of all
living species could disappear within three decades. See Joby Warrick, Mass Extinction
Underway Majority of Biologists Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1998, at A4. The survey ranked
biodiversity loss as a more serious problem than global warming and ozone layer depletion. See
id. The recently completed Global Biodiversity Assessment found that "the current rate of
extinction among vertebrates and plants [is] 50 to 100 times the expected rate." Reid, supra note
42, at 19.
46. Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975).
47. June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
48. Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
49. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 4228,
161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) (as amended by 10 U.S.T. 952, 338 U.N.T.S.
366).
50. Agreement for the Implementation of Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 14, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (not yet entered
into force) [hereinafter Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks].
51. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
AND HUMAN AGENDA 50-95 (1993) (distinguishing global externalities from transboundary
externalities); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rulesfor Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931,
968-71 (1997) (distinguishing local, transboundary, and global environmental problems).
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the source activity. 2 Transboundary environmental problems involve
adjacent or closely located jurisdictions where activities in one jurisdiction
(the source) cause impacts in a neighboring (victim) jurisdiction. Global
environmental problems involve the entire planet: Activities that affect a
common global resource thereby cause global impacts.
In a purely global problem, the locale of the source suffers no local
impacts from the initial activity itself, but it feels the impact of its activities
only as a fractional share of the overall global change to which it has
contributed. The causal pathway is through the globally shared
environmental medium, not through the direct effects of the source's
pollution on nearby individuals or the neighboring jurisdiction. For
example, a source of CO2 emissions and its neighboring jurisdictions suffer
essentially zero local impacts from the CO2 emissions. The effects of the
CO2 emissions are felt only as a share of the global change in climate that
the CO2 causes some years later, once it has mixed into the global
atmosphere.53 The emissions source could be located anywhere on the
planet and have the same global impact. The same applies to emissions of
substances that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer: CFCs essentially have
no local impacts, and the location of their emission is independent of their
global impact, because they only affect global patterns of ultraviolet
irradiation once they have risen over time to the stratosphere.
Thus, GHG emissions, CFC emissions, and biodiversity losses create
global environmental externalities. 4 Prevention of these global externalities
is a kind of "global public good." Global environmental quality benefits
are nonexclusive. If a thick stratospheric ozone layer or a comfortable
climate is provided, no one on the planet can be excluded from its effects;
once the ozone layer thins or the climate changes, everyone is affected to
52. Of course, seemingly local activities can sometimes have far-reaching impacts on
interconnected ecosystems. John Muir remarked a century ago that "[wihen we try to pick out
anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." Diary Entry (July 26,
1869), in JOHN MUIR, My FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 157 (1911). The modem science of
complexity theory has formalized the notion that small changes anywhere on the planet can have
important global consequences. See, e.g., DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES 7-8,
149-51, 155, 158-59 (1990); cf MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE DEMISE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM IN
AMERICAN LAW 3-7, 110-15 (1996) (criticizing the complexity premise on the ground that it
renders impossible the legal control of environmental problems by any one political system).
53. Other pollutants emitted by the same activities that emit CO--e.g., particulate matter
emitted by coal combustion-might well have important local impacts.
54. Although biodiversity is physically located in specific places, its loss can impose globally
shared damages. See Ralph C. d'Arge & Allen V. Kneese, State Liability for International
Environmental Degradation: An Economic Perspective, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 427, 433-34
(1980) (noting that the destruction of one country's biological features that harms residents of
other countries is an externality of the same kind as pollution that spills over into other countries);
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union
and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331, 1344 (1997) ("[Tlhere is no analytical
reason for treating existence values, also known sometimes as non-use values, differently from
physical spillovers.").
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some degree 5  The public good characteristic applies both spatially and
temporally: Abatement at one location generates protection benefits
worldwide, and abatement today generates protection benefits for future
generations.56
As a result, the individual is likely to receive only a tiny fraction of the
global benefits of her abatement efforts because virtually all of the benefits
accrue to others on the planet and to future generations. 7 To the extent that
abatement is costly, it is likely that private individuals and individual
countries will invest in substantially less abatement than would be desirable
from a global collective point of view. Each individual and each country
may think it better to avoid the costs of abatement while enjoying the
shared benefit of others' efforts---" free riding" on others' abatement. Even
though there may be net gains to collective action, each fears that others
may free ride rather than cooperate, and the dominant strategy for each can
be noncooperation." The result is an undersupply of abatement effort
55. See JOSEPH E. STIGLirz, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 7 (Third Meeting of the United Nations
High Level Group on Dev. Strategy and Mgmt. of the Mkt. Econ. Background Paper No. 7, 1995)
(on file with The Yale Law Journal) (describing global environmental protection as a
nonexcludable global public good); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE
STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD 131-37 (1997) (same). The protection of global biodiversity may
be less of a pure public good because some of its fruits, such as genetic resources for medical
applications, can be appropriated and privatized. But the global ecological functioning sustained
by biodiversity and the carbon sequestration service provided by forests and marine
phytoplankton are nonexclusive global public goods. See Christopher D. Stone, What To Do
About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 577,580-88 (1995).
56. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 43, 67-69 (1997). Put another way, global
environmental problems involve a global "riskshed." When airsheds or watersheds encompass
multiple jurisdictions, management by individual jurisdictions may yield interjurisdictional
spillovers and inefficiently little investment in protection of the shared public good. See Richard
L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341
(1996). For efficient environmental management, the polity or cooperating group of polities
should be coextensive with the riskshed, so that the full benefits of abatement are internalized. See
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 113 (1962) (noting
that optimal jurisdiction size should expand until the added costs of decisionmaking exceed the
added benefits of internalizing extrajurisdictional spillover effects); Herbert Hovenkamp & John
A. Mackerron I, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 720
(1985) ("As a general principle, efficient economic regulation requires a sovereign whose
territory is large enough to encompass the entire regulated market .... "). With jurisdictions
smaller than the riskshed, and in the absence of coordination among them, each jurisdiction has
incentives to externalize costs to others and to free ride on others' abatement.
57. In terms of Garrett Hardin's famous example, in a world of five billion human residents,
the average person who abates one unit of CFCs or GHGs pays the cost of doing so but reaps
(roughly speaking) only one five-billionth of the current benefits, a smaller fraction of the benefits
spread over present and future time periods, and an even smaller fraction if the benefits to non-
human life are counted. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968).
58. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-9 (1984). Measures to
increase confidence that others will cooperate, such as repeating the game into the foreseeable
future, disaggregating the choice into continuous degrees of cooperation, and linking cooperation
to reciprocity on other issues, can yield higher rates of cooperation. See Scott Barrett, Building
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compared to the collective optimum.59 Without some collective constraint
on use of the resource, it will be overused from a global point of view-
overharvested or overloaded with pollutants." A central challenge for
global regulatory design is to choose instruments that help overcome free
riding and thereby facilitate efficient collective action.
B. Global Sources
A second challenge of global environmental problems is that they arise
from sources that are globally widespread and mobile. Subglobal regulatory
coverage will omit important sources. Moreover, subglobal regulatory
coverage will encourage source activities to shift or "leak" to unregulated
areas over time. Regulatory instruments thus face the challenge of
effectively covering both present and future sources of global externalities.
This challenge is well illustrated in the climate change context. The
sources of GHG emissions are everywhere. In every country, virtually
every human activity directly or indirectly emits GHGs: fossil fuel
combustion, biomass combustion, leaks from natural gas pipelines and coal
mines, the clearing of forests and grasslands, wet rice farming, the raising
of ruminant animals such as cattle and sheep, the use of nitrogen fertilizers
to grow crops, and the disposal of wastes in landfills.61 Although GHG-
emitting activities may currently be more plentiful in the United States and
other industrialized countries,62 the geographic pattern of emitting activities
is shifting over time. Even assuming no regulation of emissions in
industrialized countries, during the next three decades, the majority of GHG
emissions are expected to emanate from developing countries, where
emissions are currently growing much faster than in wealthier countries.6
Property Rights for Transboundary Resources, in RIGHTS TO NATuRE 265, 275-82 (Susan S.
Hanna et al. eds., 1996).
59. See STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 7; Hardin, supra note 57, at 1244-45; Stone, supra note
55, at 595 (" ITlhe supply.., of biologically rich areas is doomed to be suboptimal ... absent a
concerted effort by the world community to make conservation an attractive option to those with
jurisdiction over the resource.").
60. "World peace, a sustainable global environment, a single world marketplace for goods
and services, and basic knowledge are all examples of international public goods. They will be
underprovided without conscious, concerted, and collective efforts to provide them." WORLD
BANK, supra note 55, at 131. One study finds that countries acting on their own would engage in
only 4% of the GHG abatement that they would find worthwhile to undertake under a global
cooperative regime. See William D. Nordhaus & Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-
Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 741, 762
(1996).
61. See Stewart & Wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note 11, at 112.
62. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 170-72
(1998).
63. See id. (stating that developing country emissions of CO2 will exceed industrialized
country emissions by the year 2030); C.J. Jepma, A Generic Assessment of Response Options, in
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Constraints imposed on industrialized countries alone could induce
"leakage" that further accelerates this shift of GHG-emitting activities to
developing countries.
The same is true of CFCs.' Even though the Montreal Protocol is
widely hailed as the most effective international environmental treaty ever
adopted,65 its effectiveness is being undercut by the rising production and
use of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances in less-regulated or
unregulated countries and the attendant smuggling of such CFCs back into
regulated countries.66 Similarly, although forests and fisheries are not
themselves easily mobile, harvesting activities are. Constraints imposed on
harvesting in one country can be offset by increased harvesting by another
country.67
In short, leakage is a serious problem for any subglobal constraint on
the sources of global environmental externalities. It is worth noting that
leakage does not depend only on plant closings and capital flight. There are
three main pathways to leakage: a price effect, a "slack off" effect, and a
capital relocation effect. First, the price effect operates in the short term,
without any relocation of industry. Consider a treaty among a few countries
that limits GHG emissions. Emissions abatement in country T (subject to
IPCC ECON. 1995, supra note 6, at 223, 254-56 (suggesting that developing country emissions
may exceed industrialized country emissions by 2020).
64. When the Montreal Protocol was adopted in 1987, three-quarters of all global CFC
production was concentrated in roughly 12 countries. See SANDLER, supra note 56, at 111-12. The
fear of leakage arising from unilateral U.S. regulations helped move U.S. industry in 1986 to favor
multilateral regulation by all industrialized countries. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text (discussing the history of the regulation of CFCs). The fear of leakage to developing countries
in response to the Montreal Protocol made it a high priority for the industrialized country parties
to secure the participation of China, Russia, and India. See TONY BRENTON, THE GREENING OF
MACHIAVELLI 142 (1994).
65. See Merrill, supra note 51, at 979 n.215.
66. See SANDLER, supra note 56, at 114-15 (describing the remaining challenges nations face
in protecting the ozone layer after the Montreal Protocol, including the "greatest challenge":
"policing the illegal trade in CFCs" by the Russian Federation and developing countries not
subject to the stringent CFC phaseout that governs industrialized countries); WORLD RESOURCES
INST., supra note 42, at 178 (describing illegal trade in CFCs by developed nations and the
"unexpectedly rapid rise in the use of CFCs and other ozone depleting chemicals in some
developing nations" (citations omitted)).
67. For example, if logging in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States is restricted,
world timber markets may shift to increase logging in Canada, Russia, or other countries. See
ROGER A. SEDJO ET AL., GLOBAL FOREST PRODUCTS TRADE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
DOMEsnC FOREST LAND-USE POLICY (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 94-13,
1994); Con H. Schallau & Alberto Goetzl, Effects of Constraining US Timber Supplies, 90 J.
FORESTRY 22, 25 (1992); Roger A. Sedjo, Environmental Impacts of Forest Protection: Some
Complications 3-5 (Mar. 18, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
The harvesting of fisheries is even more mobile. Any country can be the flag state for fishing
fleets operating on the open-access high seas. Thus, restrictions on high seas fishing by countries
currently involved in the industry can be offset by increased fishing under the flag of
unconstrained countries. For example, when the member states of the Northwest Atlantic Fishing
Organization reduced their allowable catch on the high seas by 8.7% from 1986 to 1992, non-
member states increased their take in this region by 27.7%. See LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY &
BRENT R. HENDRICKS, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 284 (1997).
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the treaty) would reduce the demand for fossil fuels in country T, lowering
the world market price for such fuels and thereby increasing the quantity
demanded in country Z (a country not party to the treaty). Similarly, a treaty
restricting forest clearing in country T would raise the world price for
timber, inducing an increase in the quantity of timber cut in country Z. The
price-driven leakage effect depends on the price elasticities of the relevant
economic activity in the regulated and unregulated areas.
Second, the "slack off' effect is a response to changing national net
benefits. In the absence of a treaty, country Z might undertake some
abatement, just up to the point where its (small) domestic share of the
global marginal benefits would equal its domestic marginal costs of
abatement. But once country T and the other treaty parties begin to abate
their own emissions more aggressively, some global protection would be
obtained, and the marginal benefits to country Z of its own abatement
efforts would be diminished slightly, so that its domestically rational degree
of abatement would also fall. Hence as treaty parties emit less, non-parties
would rationally emit more.6" This effect is independent of the previously
described price effect.69
Third, in the longer term, restrictions on emissions in one country could
induce emissions-intensive industries to relocate to unregulated countries,
in order to produce their products at lower cost and export their products to
wherever their consumers happen to be (perhaps in the regulated country,
but perhaps elsewhere). The extent of this relocation effect depends on the
marginal cost of the emissions constraint relative to the marginal cost of
relocating. Relocation may seem more likely for durable goods such as
fertilizers and timber than for energy services such as electricity; still, even
electricity is increasingly being transmitted long distances across national
borders from generator to user.
Cumulative leakage depends on the fluidity of these three pathways and
on a fourth variable: the relative environmental damage caused by the
activity in the constrained and unconstrained countries. Assume, for
example, that reducing fuel use in country T by two units induces an
increase in fuel use in country Z of one unit (a leakage rate of fifty percent).
But if that one unit of fuel use in country Z is associated with twice as much
(or twice as potent) total GHG emissions as the two units of fuel use in T
(e.g., because Z lets the fuel's highly potent methane (CH4) component
68. See Scott Barrett, The Strategy of Joint Implementation in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, at 15-16 & n.7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GID/10 (1995); Stavins, supra note 13, at
17 n.42; Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102
YALE L.J. 2039, 2055 n.74 (1993).
69. There might also be an opposing "technology scale" effect, in which abatement by
country T and its treaty colleagues stimulates economies of scale in abatement technologies,
which reduces the marginal cost of abatement in country Z and thereby raises the domestically
rational degree of abatement in Z.
[Vol. 108: 677
Global Environmental Regulation
escape to the atmosphere rather than fully combusting it into less-potent
CO2 as is done in country 7), then the total climatic effect of the leakage
could exceed 100%. Or if reducing timber harvesting in country T by two
units induces an increase in timber harvesting in country Z by one unit, but
the damage to biodiversity from logging in Z is twice that in T (e.g.,
because loggers in Z employ especially disruptive methods, or because the
biodiversity value of forests in Z is higher than that of the forests in Y), then
the total biodiversity impact of the leakage would be 100%.
Depending on these four factors, leakage could be large or small. For
GHG emissions control, several studies have produced a wide range of
estimates, finding that under emissions limits imposed in the EU or the
OECD, leakage would offset from 4% to more than 100% of the emissions
abatement achieved initially."
Leakage has several undesirable consequences. First, leakage at least
partly offsets the environmental effectiveness of the treaty. A subglobal
regulatory regime could be only modestly helpful in protecting the global
environment. If the three leakage pathways weighted by the relative
environmental damage factors exceed 100%, a subglobal regime would
actually make things worse. At the least, the cost-effectiveness of the
regulatory regime must be assessed in terms of its net effect on global
emissions or resource use, not just in terms of its effect on activities within
the cooperating countries.
Second, even if ex post leakage is actually unlikely, fear of leakage
may be a political obstacle to subglobal action. Of special concern to
national legislators is the fact that leakage may imply the relocation of
employment opportunities away from regulated voting districts. The Byrd-
Hagel Resolution," passed ninety-five to zero in July 1997, announced the
U.S. Senate's insistence on participation by developing countries in any
future climate treaty, on the ground that U.S. action to restrict GHG
emissions could impair the U.S. economy while driving GHG-intensive
70. Cf. B.S. Fisher et al., An Economic Assessment of Policy Instruments for Combatting
Climate Change, in IPCC ECON. 1995, supra note 6, at 424-25 (reviewing numerous studies); J.C.
Hourcade et al., A Review of Mitigation Cost Studies, in IPCC ECON. 1995, supra note 6, at 297,
341-43 (same). The studies of GHG leakage differ in the economic sectors they model and in their
representations of international trade flows. Not all the models consider all three pathways for
leakage. Most models omit the possibility of higher overall GHG emissions per unit of resource
use in the unregulated countries. For good examples of efforts to sharpen models of leakage, see
NICK MABEY ET AL., ARGUMENT IN THE GREENHOUSE: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF
CONTROLLING GLOBAL NVARMING 26, 28, 266-302, 397-400 (1997); Stefan Felder & Thomas F.
Rutherford, Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage: The Consequences of International
Trade in Oil and Basic Materials, 25 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 162 (1993); and John Pezzey,
Analysis of Unilateral CO2 Control in the European Community and OECD, 13 ENERGY J. 159,
166 (1992).
71. 143 CONG. REC. S8113-05 (daily ed. July 25, 1997).
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activities and jobs abroad. 2 The day after the Kyoto Protocol was signed,
the Clinton Administration announced that it would not submit the treaty to
the Senate for ratification until developing countries had agreed to accept
emissions limitation responsibilities as well.73 Hence, even if subglobal
action would not cause actual leakage, the fear of leakage could impede
globally desirable action.74
Third, leakage could also adversely influence the incentives of initial
nonparticipants to join the regulatory treaty subsequently. As leakage
proceeds, it shifts the regulated activity to the unregulated areas and thereby
renders the unregulated economies even more emissions-intensive (or
resource-intensive) than they had been before the treaty. This makes it ever
harder to persuade the initial nonparticipants to join the treaty later.7"
In sum, because the sources of global environmental externalities are
widespread and mobile, subglobal regulation can omit important sources
today and induce leakage of sources to unregulated areas tomorrow.
Subglobal coverage can thus undermine or even reverse the environmental
benefits of the regulation, discourage initial action, and discourage future
accession by initial nonparticipants. Effective global environmental
regulation will therefore require universal or nearly universal coverage of
72. See Climate Change: Senate Approves Resolution To Require Binding Controls on
Developing Nations, 28 Env't. Rep. (BNA) at 621 (Aug. 1, 1997). "[T]he giant developing
countries like India and China have yet to be brought on board. Until that happens, Senate
ratification is out of the question." Remember Global Warming?, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1998, at A26. Similar fears prompted enlargement of the Montreal Protocol to include large
developing countries. See supra note 64.
73. See John M. Broder, Clinton Adamant on Third World Role in Climate Accord, N.Y.
TiEs, Dec. 12, 1997, at Al.
74. Even if regulatory competition among jurisdictions to attract industry and voters would
produce optimal internal environmental quality standards within each jurisdiction (a hotly debated
proposition), it would not produce optimal global environmental regulation of interjurisdictional
spillovers. Models of efficient regulatory competition assume that all environmental quality
effects are internal to each jurisdiction. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271,307 (1997) (noting
that in a particular model of efficient interjurisdictional regulatory competition, all environmental
impacts are assumed to remain confined within each jurisdiction); Merrill, supra note 51, at 968-
70 (distinguishing regulatory competition from transboundary pollution). When internal policies
affect the environment of other jurisdictions, the case for coordinated regulation is strong. See
Revesz, supra note 56 (criticizing the "race to the bottom" hypothesis as a rationale for
overarching regulation but endorsing the interstate externality hypothesis as a sound basis for
overarching regulation). Even if industry flight to jurisdictions with less stringent environmental
regulation is unlikely today, see Stewart, supra note 68, at 2077-79, the fear of such flight could
inhibit action by countries to protect the global environment, see Merrill, supra note 51, at 969
n.186 ("[T]he perception of a possible race-to-the-bottom is widely shared by both
environmentalists and local politicians, and this.., translates into a demand for centralization of
environmental controls."), and the costs of new regulations to protect the global environment
could be sufficiently large to spur industry flight.
75. See Richard Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions, in
ECONOMICS AND POLICY ISSUES IN CLIMATE CHANGE 137, 146 (William D. Nordhaus ed.,
1998).
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present and potential source locations.76 A central challenge for global
regulatory design is to choose instruments that maximize the coverage of
sources and prevent leakage.
C. Local Diversity
A third basic challenge is that even though the impacts and sources are
global, they vary widely around the world. Local diversity is manifest in at
least three dimensions: costs of abatement, benefits of abatement, and social
and legal systems.
1. Costs of Abatement
First, although the sources of global environmental degradation are
globally dispersed and mobile, the cost of controlling these sources is not
uniform and varies considerably. The costs of abatement vary because
differences in technology, available substitutes, and economic structure,
among other factors, make avoiding future emissions or resource use much
less costly in some places than in others. For example, one study found a
fifty-fold difference in GHG abatement costs just within the membership of
the European Union.77 Variation in abatement costs across the entire world,
including developing countries, Eastern European countries, the former
Soviet Union, and industrialized countries, is likely to be much greater.
This variation in abatement costs implies that the least-cost global
protection strategy involves employing the most cost-effective options first,
wherever they may be located around the world. As with other goods and
services, there are local comparative advantages in supplying global
environmental protection services such as emissions abatement and
biodiversity conservation. Requiring every country to achieve a uniform
degree of emissions abatement would miss the opportunity to supply the
same overall global protection at lower cost. There will be mutual gains
from trade if the beneficiaries of such services can purchase them from the
most cost-effective suppliers worldwide. A key challenge for global
environmental regulation is to choose instruments that reduce global costs
by harnessing the most cost-effective pattern of abatement.
76. See MABEY Er AL., supra note 70, at 28 ("As long as international obligations to reduce
CO2 emissions are limited to a few countries the problems of carbon leakage through energy
market responses and industrial relocation will remain an obstacle to successful environmental
protection. The evolution of the FCCC into a globally inclusive treaty is therefore
imperative .... ); Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto's Unfinished Business, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug.
1998, at 54, 60 ("[A] substantial reduction in global emissions will require something close to
worldwide participation .... ).
77. See Scott Barrett, Reaching a C02-Emission Limitation Agreement for the Community:
Implications for Equity and Cost-Effectiveness, 1 EUR. ECON. 3, 16 (1992).
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2. Benefits of Abatement
Second, although the impacts of global environmental change are
spread globally and are nonexcludable once instigated, the benefits of
preventing global environmental change are not uniform and may be large
in some places but small or even negative in others. To begin with,
countries vary in the physical damage that a given increment of global
environmental change would induce. For example, some countries may be
particularly vulnerable to global warming; sea-level rise and storm surges
may be most worrisome for coastal areas and small island states,78 and
countries dependent on fragile food supplies may be more vulnerable to
changes in precipitation.79 By contrast, other countries, especially wealthier
countries, may be more resilient to global warming or better able to adapt at
low social cost.8" And some countries might even benefit--or at least
perceive, correctly or not, that they would benefit-from some global
warming. For example, colder countries where growing seasons could
expand might benefit in a warmer world, or at least they might think they
would benefit. China and Russia, two of the largest sources of GHG
emissions, could fall into this category.81
In addition, countries vary in how they value a given amount of
physical damage due to global environmental change. For example,
wealthier populations might be more inclined to invest scarce social
resources in UV, climate, and biodiversity protection than might poorer
populations struggling to address other priorities for survival and prosperity
such as education, infant mortality, clean drinking water, and sanitation.
The priority put on environmental protection is usually thought to rise with
78. See T. Banuri et al., Equity and Social Considerations, in IPCC ECON. 1995, supra note
6, at 79, 96-97.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 92.
81. See Michael Hoel, How Should International Greenhouse Gas Agreements Be Designed?,
in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMONS 172, 181 (Partha Dasgupta et al. eds., 1997)
(" [Olne could argue.. . that significant parts of the former USSR would benefit from a warmer
climate."); A.L. Hollick & R.N. Cooper, Global Commons: Can They Be Managed?, in THE
ECONOMICS OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMONS, supra, at 141, 168 ("[Slome countries may be
expected to benefit from at least a modest amount of warming (e.g ..... the [former] Soviet
Union), and this possibility may also induce reluctance to contribute to an international
[abatement] effort."); Oran R. Young, The Politics ofInternational Regime Formation: Managing
Natural Resources and the Environment, 43 INT'L ORG. 349, 367-68 (1989) (suggesting that some
areas may benefit from a warmer planet); Zhou Xin, The Benefits of Climate Change? China's
Take on Global Warming (Feb. 9, 1997) <http:Ivww.weathervane.rff.org/featuresl
feature012.html> (reporting that Chinese researchers have concluded that a warmer climate will
benefit China and other developing countries). Aronson argues that China and the United States
may be cooperative losers from global climate protection because their costs of abatement (absent
financial assistance from other countries) would exceed their gains from abatement. See Aronson,
supra note 11, at 2151-56; cf. MABEY Er AL., supra note 70, at 354-55, 368-69 (suggesting that
cooperation may be unprofitable for the United States); SANDLER, supra note 56, at 106 (same).
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income. 2 In addition, poorer populations may have higher discount rates
for future benefits. Thus, even if poorer populations would be more
vulnerable to physical climate change damages than wealthier countries,
they might also have other nearer-term priorities for public policy attention,
especially if global environmental change is a long-term risk and these
countries confront immediate threats of illness, famine, and social unrest.
Developing countries may view climate change as a problem that should be
solved by industrialized countries; developing countries may have little
appetite for making sacrifices to limit global GHG emissions.8 3 Moreover,
for countries like China and Russia, who appear to perceive themselves as
beneficiaries of global warming," GHG emissions abatement may have
very low or even negative value.




S = Sources of Global Externality
V = Victims of Global Externality (Beneficiaries of Regulation)
82. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 56, at 71 (noting that at the global level, interest in
environmental quality rises with national income); William J. Baumol, Environmental Protection
and Income Distribution, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 93, 93 (Harold M.
Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974) (noting that the demand for environmental protection
increases with income).
83. See JOYEETA GUPTA, THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: FROM CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS? at viii (1997); Cheng Zheng-Kang, Equity, Special
Considerations, and the Third World, 1 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 57, 59-62 (1990).
Based on a study of four important developing countries-India, Indonesia, Kenya, and Brazil-
Dr. Gupta finds that "although the potential climate change impacts may be serious, the problem
is not perceived as a priority by domestic actors ... " GUPTA, supra, at viii. Gupta adds that
developing countries in general "are afraid that... the FCCC might end up being a vehicle to
protect the rights of future [industrialized country] generations at the cost of current [developing
country] generations." Id. at x; see also ROBERT W. HAHN, THE ECONOMICS & POLITICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (1998) (" [M]ost developing countries do not believe that the climate-change
issue is a high priority for them and ... they fear that emission controls could slow their economic
development.").
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Because both costs and benefits vary across locales, the net benefits of
global environmental regulation will vary. Figure 1 crudely illustrates this
diversity. As one moves from left to right across Figure 1, the net benefits
of global environmental regulation rise. At one extreme, countries that are
sources (S) of global environmental externalities, but not victims, incur
strictly negative net benefits-they are pure losers from global regulation.
An example in the climate change context might be an oil-producing
country with a society that is not highly vulnerable to climate change, or a
major emitter like China if it perceives gains from allowing global warming
to occur. At the other extreme, countries that are victims () of global
environmental externalities, but not sources, incur strictly positive net
benefits-they are pure beneficiaries of global regulation. An example in
the climate change context might be the small island states. In the middle,
countries that are both sources and victims (S&V) of global environmental
externalities will bear both benefits and costs from global regulation."
Many in this intermediate group will perceive net gains from global
regulation, but some will perceive net costs.
Thus, all in Group V and some in Group S&V will be net winners from
global environmental regulation, while all in Group S and some in Group
S&V will be net losers from global environmental regulation. The point is
essentially that polluters may not find pollution control to be in their self-
interest. The relative sizes of the winner and loser groups (and the degree of
their gains and losses) depend, of course, on the environmental problem in
question, the pattern of economic activity across countries, and, critically,
the regulatory instrument chosen to address the global externality. A key
challenge for global environmental regulation is to choose an instrument
that maximizes global net benefits while achieving an acceptable
distribution of net benefits across countries.
3. Social and Legal Systems
There is also great diversity in social and legal systems across
countries. Even in an increasingly globalized economy, different countries
have widely divergent histories, wealth, economic growth rates, cultures,
systems of government, and laws.86 Such diversity has important
implications for global environmental regulation. Different countries may
have different preferences for the optimal degree of environmental
85. See BAUNIOL & OATEs, supra note 3, at 279; Scott Barrett, The Problem of Global
Environmental Protection, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y. 68, 70-72 (1990); Merrill, supra note
51, at 971.
86. See generally NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Suzanne Berger &
Ronald Dore eds., 1996) (considering the effect of national idiosyncrasies on the development of
global capitalism).
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protection and the optimal choice of regulatory instruments, based on their
own national norms and conceptions of efficiency and fairness, and their
own national experience (or lack of experience) with the regulatory
instruments in question. Moreover, global regulatory instruments may be
impeded by local diversity in implementation. This is true for all regulatory
instruments, but potentially with different problems for different
instruments. As discussed further in Part V, globally coordinated
environmental taxes would have to be incorporated into countries' national
tax systems, some of which could inhibit the effectiveness of the global tax.
And international tradeable allowance systems would have to overcome the
barriers and transaction costs of a global market segmented into diverse
legal systems.
D. hnplications
These three challenges of global environmental problems-global
impacts, global sources, and local diversity-set the stage for regulatory
choice. They imply that attracting participation-overcoming free riders,
constraining leakage, and engaging non-beneficiary sources-will be
crucial to any successful global environmental regulation.
mT[. CHOICE OF REGULATORY TOOLS UNDER UNITARY FIAT
This Part begins the analysis of global regulatory instrument choice by
summarizing the standard analysis under "Unitary Fiat." This standard
analysis sets the baseline for comparing the calculus of instrument choice
when the legal system diverges from Unitary Fiat. This comparison is
undertaken in Parts IV and V. The analysis reviewed in Part III, while
familiar to many readers, also bears reexamination because its underlying
rationales-in favor of incentives, against subsidies, and in favor of
taxes-play crucial but novel roles in the analysis of global instrument
choice in Parts IV and V.
A. The Assumption of Unitary Fiat
The debate over the normative design of environmental regulation has
generally been conducted on the premise that the choice of instrument is
made by a rational policy designer who selects the optimal instrument and
coercively dictates its imposition on sources. This assumption is deeply
ingrained in the analytic debate and is so natural to anyone steeped in the
literature that it almost goes without saying-and often does.
The theory of regulatory instrument choice has a long tradition of
assuming Unitary Fiat. Although many analysts take this point for granted,
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some examples from classic works in the field serve to demonstrate the
centrality of the assumption. Arthur Pigou's original argument for
corrective taxes to internalize externalities expressly declared the need for
"intervention" by "the State" when private costs and social costs diverge.S
7
He endorsed Alfred Marshall's suggestion that citizens be "compelled to
contribute" to the provision of public goods.8" He asserted that in cases of
externalities "the Government may find it necessary to exercise some
means of authoritative control .... It is, therefore, necessary that an
authority.., should intervene and should tackle the collective problems" of
pollution. 9
The contemporary debate reflects the same assumption. Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed describe property rules and liability
rules as instruments for collective edicts as to the assignment and valuation
of entitlements;9" they note in particular that liability rules require
"coercing compliance." 91 In his discussion of instrument choice, Stephen
Breyer repeatedly refers to the decision being dictated by "an
administrator." 92 Likewise, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell say that
assigning property rules involves the "police powers" of "the state" and
that liability rules amount to the state's "requiring" payments. 93 In a
footnote, they state their assumption that the regulatory instrument is
chosen and imposed on the parties by a court, expert agency, or other single
rational decisionmaker.94 Similarly, in their survey of instrument choice,
Peter Bohm and Clifford Russell explicitly assume that a central
government agency will adopt and enforce the regulation chosen.95 In his
Nobel Prize address, James Buchanan observed that economists tend to
"proffer[] policy advice as if they were employed by a benevolent
despot." 96
The hypothetical construct of rational design by autocratic fiat-
whether Buchanan's "benevolent despot," 97 Blackstone's "sole and
despotic" property owner,9s or a rational benefit-maximizing administrative
regulator-is the traditional device for imagining normatively optimal
87. PIGOU, supra note 3, at 192.
88. Id. at 193 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Il at 194-95.
90. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092, 1096-97, 1107.
91. Idl at 1120.
92. BREYER, supra note 2, at 266, 273.
93. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 715.
94. See id. at 723 n.28.
95. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 397.
96. James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 243, 243
(1987).
97. Id.
98. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
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policy choice.9 9 The efficiency criterion for such rational fiat is the Kaldor-
Hicks test: Aggregate benefits must exceed aggregate costs (so that winners
gain enough to be able to compensate losers, although such compensation
need not actually occur)."' Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the basis on which
economists conventionally discuss instrument choice.0 ' This perspective
enables benevolent fiat to be insulated from the messiness of distributional
politics. As Fischel and Shapiro put it, the
Pigovian model of government... assumes that government is an
unimpeachable benefit-cost machine. It does not inquire about the
distribution of benefits, nor can it be manipulated by any faction of
those governed.... [G]overnment decisions do not depend on the
will of anyone, let alone the majority.... The Pigovian
model ... is adopted in most public policy models as an innocent
ceteris paribus assumption .... 0"
To depict Unitary Fiat at the global level, one must imagine a
hypothetical global regulator. She is a "benefit-cost machine" who selects
the optimal global regulatory instrument for worldwide application. There
is no problem of "leakage" from subglobal application, because the
hypothetical Unitary Fiat regulator can dictate global regulation. There is
no need to secure nation-states' consent, just as consent by polluters would
be irrelevant to optimal instrument choice under Unitary Fiat at the national
level. The global regulator would aim to maximize global well-being and
would consider the varying interests of different societies in global
environmental regulation, described in Part H, as they cumulate in the
global aggregate benefit-cost test. Given a level of global environmental
protection to achieve, she would choose the most efficient instrument for
achieving that degree of protection-that is, the instrument that achieves
the given level of protection most cost-effectively." 3 She might also care
99. See John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International
Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of
State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 5 (1997) (describing the use of "rational design" by a
single actor as a common thought experiment for imagining optimal decisionmaking).
100. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 96 n.4; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-15 (4th ed. 1992).
101. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 14.
102. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on
Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269,285 (1988).
103. Choosing "how to" regulate can be distinguished from deciding "how much" to
regulate. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 397 (" [C]hoice of policy goal and choice of
instrument or implementation system are essentially separable problems."). Given a target level of
environmental protection-determined by cost-benefit analysis, by political compromise, by
moral imperative, or by any other method-the regulator still faces the important choice of how to
achieve that level. This is the choice among regulatory instruments. As a practical matter,
regulators often must take the degree of policy stringency as given. They then can choose
incentive-based regulatory instruments such as taxes or tradeable allowances for reasons of cost-
effectiveness, even if the desired level of protection was not determined on economic efficiency
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about fairness and morality (although, as discussed below, the standard
economic analysis of instrument choice under Unitary Fiat has paid limited
attention to these attributes).
B. The Global Regulator's Toolbox
The regulator seeking to constrain environmental externalities can
choose instruments from a well-stocked toolbox. Most or all of these
instruments employ one or a hybrid of three basic regulatory approaches:"
criteria. See Howard K. Gruenspecht & Lester B. Lave, The Economics of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1507, 1520-21
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (" [R]egulatory targets are usually set
through the political process, not through the use of some grand optimization calculus.
[Economists can help] by taking the politically set objectives as given and devising a cost-
minimizing approach to reaching them, thereby pursuing the goal of cost-effectiveness rather than
optimality."); Richard Revesz, Book Review, I1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 454 (1984) (arguing that
incentive-based regulatory instruments "can minimize the cost of achieving a level of pollution
control determined by nonmarket means [and could] be preferred by those who do not share the
view that all social allocations should be guided solely by considerations of economic
efficiency"). Conversely, regulators could choose conduct-based, command-and-control
regulatory instruments for nonefficiency reasons, even if the desired level of protection was
determined on efficiency criteria. Operational evidence for the independence of the criteria for
choosing "how much" and "how to" is offered by the fact that some important U.S. pollution
control laws employ incentive-based controls to achieve goals set on nonefficiency criteria, see,
e.g., Clean Air Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1994) (using tradeable allowances to achieve a
politically determined level of reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions), while other laws employ
technology-based controls to achieve goals set on cost-benefit efficiency criteria, see, e.g., Clean
Water Act § 304, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(b) (1994) (using "best technology" standards to achieve
reductions in water pollution set by consideration of costs in relation to benefits).
Choosing how to regulate may be irrelevant when the answer to the question of how much to
control pollution is zero (i.e., no regulation), and it may also be irrelevant when the answer
approaches infinity (i.e., a complete prohibition on the risky activity). But between these polar
cases is a vast intermediate zone in which the "how to" choice of regulatory instrument matters a
great deal.
104. For reviews of the available regulatory tools, see, for example, BAUMOL & OATES,
supra note 3, at 155-234; ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLICY 154-58 (2d ed. 1996); Bohm & Russell, supra note 5; Dudek et al., supra
note 2, at 5-15; and Fisher et al., supra note 6, at 397, 403-05. Hanson and Logue also classify
regulatory instruments into three basic types: "command-and-control rules" (i.e., conduct rules),
"performance-based standards" that might "specify the maximum quantity of pollution that a
firm may produce" (i.e., quantity rules, though Hanson and Logue omit the option of tradeable
quantity allowances), and "incentive-based systems" (by which they mean price-based
instruments, i.e., taxes and liability rules). Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1173-74. I group
taxes, liability rules, and tradeable allowances (but not fixed quantity standards) under the general
heading "incentive-based," because they all attempt to "reconstitute" markets with appropriate
incentive signals, as discussed in the text. I follow Weitzman and Calabresi and Melamed in
emphasizing the distinction between price/liability rules and quantity/property rules. See Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 5; Weitzman, supra note 5. Of course, these classifications are not based
on razor-sharp distinctions. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1263 n.422. There are also
hybrid tools, such as deposit-refund systems (a version of the price-based approach), allowance
systems with ceiling or floor prices (a hybrid of quantity and price instruments), and rules
requiring the disclosure of information to product consumers or local residents. What ultimately
matters are the outcomes produced by the different instruments.
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1. Conduct instruments: regulations specifying the sources'
technology of production (command-and-control regulations,
design standards, technology-based standards, traditional negli-
gence rules);
2. Price instruments: regulations forcing sources to pay the social
cost of the entitlement to generate external harm (liability rules,
taxes, abatement subsidies); or
3. Quantity instruments: regulations allocating entitlements to
generate or be free from external harm (property rules, performance
standards, tradeable allowances).
Conduct-oriented, "command-and-control" regulation has been a
conventional environmental regulatory approach. Courts traditionally have
based determinations of negligence liability on whether a defendant had
taken "due care," which was in turn defined as the use of certain minimally
acceptable technologies or practices. 5 Legislatures or administrative
agencies have frequently prescribed particular product designs, particular
fishing methods, and particular pollution control technologies. The "best
available technology" requirements under several U.S. environmental laws
are a prime example.
116
By contrast, "reconstitutive" or "incentive-based" regulation comes in
two basic forms: price-based or quantity-based instruments.'0 7 Under price-
based or "liability rule" regulation, government sets the price of an
entitlement (to cause external harm) and lets private parties determine the
quantity produced. Under quantity-based or "property rule" regulation,
government assigns a quantity of entitlements (to cause or be free from
external harm) and lets private parties bargain over the price.1°
105. The traditional negligence rule based liability on the failure to undertake due care,
defined as particular technical methods or practices; this continues to be the rule for certain areas
of law such as medical malpractice. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 168-69. The more modem
negligence rule, most famously articulated by Judge Learned Hand in 1947, bases liability on the
failure to invest in prevention up to the point where the marginal cost of precautions matched the
probable marginal benefits of avoided injuries (in Hand's terminology, investing up to the point
where the Burden of precautions equals the Probability multiplied by the Loss, or B = PL). See
United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947).
106. See Dudek et al., supra note 2, at 8; see also, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651 (1994) (authorizing the EPA Administrator to require a "design standard . . . which
reflects the best technological system of emission reduction" for new sources); Clean Water Act
§ 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994) (requiring "application of the best available technology
economically achievable").
107. See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 86,92 (1986).
108. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092; Weitzman, supra note 5, at 477-79; c
POSNER, supra note 100, at 375-77 (comparing design standards to negligence liability, taxes to
strict liability, and quantity standards to prohibitions backed by penal sanctions); Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 5, at 750 n.l19, 751 (analogizing taxes to liability rules and tradeable
allowances to property rules). Performance standards are a middle case: They set fixed quantity
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
1. Conduct Instruments: Command-and-Control Technology
Requirements
A global regulator could employ conduct-based regulations to mandate
worldwide practices and technologies to protect the global environment.
She might, for example, require sources to adopt automobile fuel economy
standards, similar to the "corporate average fuel economy" standards in
force in the United States, or energy efficiency standards for appliances and
industrial processes.1"9 Or she might require installation of specific
emissions control technology, such as CO2-scrubbers on all new coal-fired
electric power plants.1 ° She might also require adherence to global
standards for the practice of "sustainable forestry." 11 Or she might require
fishing fleets to adopt certain technologies, such as turtle excluder devices
for shrimp fishing,"2 or forbid certain technologies, such as setting tuna
nets around dolphins or using driftnets." 3
2. Price Instruments: Liability Rules, Taxes, and Subsidies
A global regulator could also achieve global environmental goals by
using judicially or administratively imposed price instruments to force
sources to internalize the global environmental costs of their activities.
These price instruments could be imposed ex post or ex ante. An ex post
price instrument would impose strict liability on sources of pollution for the
damages actually caused to the global environment. Indeed, strict liability
for external environmental harm is the regulatory instrument generally
understood to be provided by customary international law."4 This liability
limits on emissions. Unlike conduct instruments, they allow sources the internal flexibility to
choose compliance methods. But unlike taxes and tradeable allowances, they are less "incentive-
based" or "reconstitutive" because they set fixed limits for each source and preclude flexibility
across sources.
109. See, e.g., Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE
Region, [1990] 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 429, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 151/PC.10/Annex I
(advocating coordinated adoption of more stringent automobile fuel economy standards);
ENvIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 7.
110. See, e.g., Edmonds & Wise, supra note 7, at 6.
111. See, e.g., DAvID HUMPHREYS, FOREST POLITIcs 21, 136-45 (1996).
112. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Trade Group Strikes Blow at U.S. Environmental Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at C1 (describing U.S. requirements for turtle excluder devices and
World Trade Organization decision against such unilateral requirements).
113. See, e.g., Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South
Pacific, Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1454 (entered into force May 17, 1991); Resolution on Large-
Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's
Oceans and Seas, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(f), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/215 (1989),
29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990) (urging a moratorium on driftnet fishing on the high seas, but including no
enforcement provisions).
114. See ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 132-34 (1983);
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International
Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 61 (Daniel Barston Magraw ed., 1992);
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rule approach is buttressed by Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration, which provides that nation-states have "the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction." 1 Similarly, the liability rule finds expression in the
"Polluters Pay Principle," which holds that sources must pay the costs of
international pollution." 6  In practice, however, liability for global
environmental harm has rarely been adopted in binding international law
and has been infrequently enforced."
7
Alternatively, an administrative price instrument could employ ex ante
Pigouvian taxes to force sources to pay the estimated external costs of their
emissions of CFCs or GHGs, forest clearing, or fishing (or a system of
coordinated national taxes on these activities)."' Sources would then reduce
the quantity of harm they cause to the point where their marginal costs of
abatement begin to exceed the tax. International environmental taxes,
L.F.E. Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 283, 306-07 (1970); Merrill, supra note 51, at 934; Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary
Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 162-78 (1990); Joni S.
Charma, Note, Transnational Injury and Ultra-Hazardous Activity: An Emerging Norm of
International Strict Liability, 4 J.L. & TECH. 75 (1989).
115. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Principle 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420. The preceding phrase of Principle 21 provides that states also
have "the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies." Id.
116. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 ("National authorities should endeavour to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking
into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution ... " );
Patricia Birnie, International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs, in
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 51, 79-80 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 1992) (discussing the espousal of the "Polluter Pays Principle" by the OECD and
the EC).
117. See Merrill, supra note 51, at 957-67 (concluding that there has been a general "failure
to achieve any kind of effective regime for collective control of transboundary pollution," and
that imposition of liability for external pollution, whether by treaty regime or by adjudication, is
"essentially nonexistent"); Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1500 (1991) (" [International liability remains an empty abstraction."); cf
Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995) (doubting the effectiveness of liability rules at the international
level and advocating the development of regulatory treaty law).
118. Many countries have applied pollution taxes. See OECD, supra note 2, at 31-104; see
also MIKAEL SKOU ANDERSEN, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN TAXES (1994) (comparing pollution tax
systems in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France). A key difference between strict
liability and taxes involves who gets the revenues: the victims or the government. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 5, at 738 n.77, 751-52. Economists argue that actual payments to victims may
induce inefficient risk-taking behavior by victims. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 23-25,
29; Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 418, 434; Polinsky, supra note 5, at 16-36, 41-46. Another
difference is that the tort liability system requires the victim (or her lawyer) to incur the costs of
mounting litigation and proving facts to a jury, and the contingent fee system requires the victim
to share her recovery with her lawyer, all of which may make the tort system a less certain
internalizer of external costs than a Pigouvian tax would be. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5,
at 751-52.
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however, have seldom if ever been imposed. Some international
environmental treaties are funded by taxes,119 but these are levies to raise
revenues; they are not cost-internalizing Pigouvian taxes linked to the
externality-associated activity, such as emissions or biodiversity depletion.
In the future, it is conceivable that a global environmental tax could be
established. An international tax approach has frequently been proposed to
curb potential climate change.12
In practice, a more popular price-based approach has been global
subsidies to encourage environmental protection efforts.' This technique is
used today as part of official assistance provided to developing countries by
the United Nations, the World Bank, other international organizations, and
individual countries' bilateral development aid programs. Particular global
environmental financing vehicles have included the Tropical Forestry
Action Plan and the subsequent Brazilian Rainforest Trust, the Montreal
Protocol's multilateral fund, and the FCCC's financial assistance
requirements.122 Much of this funding has been consolidated in the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), launched in 1991 and made permanent in
1994.23 Along these lines, new global financial assistance subsidies could
be created to pay sources for abatement activities. 24
119. The World Heritage Convention, for example, is funded through a biennial tax on each
party of 1% of the party's contribution to the regular budget of UNESCO. See Barrett, supra note
85, at 78.
120. See CLINE, supra note 9, at 346-56; McKBBIN & WILCOXEN, supra note 9, at 5-6;
P1zER, supra note 9, at 2-3; Cooper, supra note 9, at 74-77.
121. Much of Pigou's original discussion suggested using "bounties" to polluters to induce
pollution control. See PIGOU, supra note 3, at 183-86, 192-95. Professor Ellickson has remarked
that Pigou's affinity for subsidies probably reflected the assumption in Pigou's era that "it was
normal to pollute." Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681, 731 (1973). In Calabresian terms, if it is
assumed that polluters begin with the entitlement to pollute, then they will have to be paid to
relinquish it.
122. See Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms for
Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 175-
82 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995).
123. See David Fairman, The Global Environment Facility: Haunted by the Shadow of the
Future, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID 55, 83-84 (Robert 0. Keohane & Marc A.
Levy eds., 1996); Sand, supra note 122, at 175-77; see also Instrument for the Establishment of
the Restructured Global Environment Facility, The World Bank, Mar. 16, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1283
(restructuring the GEF and making it permanent); Global Environment Facility, Res. 91-5, Board
of Executive Directors of the World Bank, Mar. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1758 (establishing the GEF).
124. See Stone, supra note 55, at 593-95, 613-14, 619-20 (endorsing subsidies for global
biodiversity conservation). As a complementary matter, a rational global regulator might phase
out current national subsidies that support environmentally damaging activities, such as subsidies
for coal mining and combustion, agriculture, fishing, and deforestation. Energy subsidies alone
account for a significant percentage of current global GHG emissions. See THE WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 161 (1992).
Agricultural subsidies can encourage additional CH, and N20 emissions, as well as deforestation.
Timber harvesting in many forests, including the U.S. National Forests, is government-subsidized.
Harmonizing the rollback of economically inefficient subsidies would be similar to the tariff-
reduction rounds of the GATT but would focus on domestic subsidies of environmentally
injurious sectors. Because each country would worry about its competitive disadvantage if it tried
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3. Quantity Instruments: Property Rules, Performance Standards, and
Tradeable Allowances
Instead of regulating conduct or prices, a global environmental
regulator might regulate the quantity of access to the shared global
resource, or restated, the quantity of entitlements to cause external harm to
the global environment.'" The regulator could partition the property rights
to what had formerly been treated as an open access resource, either via
geographically defined property boundaries (e.g., fishing zones), 26 or via
property entitlements to use the resource or cause harm. The sum of the
individual entitlements would equal the aggregate amount of resource use
or harmful activity deemed desirable.
Under a "pure" property rule assignment between one source and one
victim, the entire entitlement to cause harm, or to be free from harm, would
be assigned to one party. As Coase pointed out, subject to transaction costs
between them, the source and victim might then bargain over reallocating
the entitlement so that the higher-value user obtains the entitlement at a
price the parties negotiate. 27 A variant more common in administrative
regulation is a "divided" property rule in which the source is entitled to
emit a defined fraction of its current or projected emissions, and the
remaining fraction of the entitlement to emit is (implicitly) assigned to the
victim as the cap on emissions."2 The initial division of the entitlement can
be seen as an administrative effort to replicate the bargain that the parties
would have reached but for the obstacle of transaction costs.
In a world of multiple sources, the aggregate quantity entitlement to
pollute would be subdivided among sources. Such quantity entitlements
could be nontransferable across sources (that is, there could be a fixed
performance standard for each source). Such fixed national emissions limits
have been advocated for controlling GHGs, particularly by European
governments.'29 Compared to conduct-based rules, such fixed quantity
standards are more cost-effective because they give each source the
flexibility to choose among internal compliance methods.
to eliminate its own subsidies unilaterally, an international agreement may be necessary to
"disarm" these subsidy regimes in multilateral unison. Because international competition to
subsidize domestic industry leaves all countries worse off, reducing these subsidies worldwide
could increase collective economic welfare as well as provide environmental benefits.
125. On the forms of quantity standards, see generally Gloria E. Helfand, Standards Versus
Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 622 (1991).
126. See Hollick & Cooper, supra note 81, at 161.
127. See Coase, supra note 4.
128. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1078-80 (1995) (describing "activity-level"
divisions of entitlements to emit); Polinsky, supra note 13, at 1087 (describing quantity limits as
divided property entitlements).
129. See Sullivan & Jordan, supra note 10, at Al.
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Yet even greater cost-effectiveness can be attained by allowing quantity
entitlements to be transferable across sources-full property markets in
transferable environmental access rights. These access rights are usually
called marketable or tradeable "allowances." 130 Transferability gives each
source the opportunity to sell unneeded entitlements to other sources, or to
acquire additional entitlements from other sources. The aggregate amount
of entitlements remains capped, but the location of entitlements varies with
the cost of abatement. The United States and other countries have adopted
tradeable allowance instruments in several environmental regulatory
programs.
131
Internationally, the Montreal Protocol employs a quantity-based
constraint, setting phaseout targets for CFCs and related ozone-depleting
substances released by industrialized countries, and setting upper limits on
future growth in output of such substances by developing countries. Article
2(5) of the Montreal Protocol affords some flexibility to shift production of
ozone-depleting substances among countries, as long as their combined
phaseout schedules are satisfied, under the rubric of "industrial
130. One staunch advocate of free markets and property rights argues that tradeable
environmental allowances are not "real" property markets because they are simply "a function of
politically predetermined goals" instead of the result of private arrangements. Fred L. Smith, Jr.,
Conclusion: Environmental Policy at the Crossroads, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 177, 188
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992). But what Smith regards as "real" private
property is just an entitlement enforced by judicial officials as opposed to administrative officials.
All markets and all property rights depend on law. See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B.
STEvART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 68 & n.28 (1994) ("Because a developed system
of market exchange is dependent upon and structured by judicially enforced rules of property,
contract, and tort, the existence of such a market system already represents one form of
government 'intervention'. ); CASS R. SuNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5
(1997) ("Free markets depend for their existence on law. We cannot have a system of private
property without legal rules, telling people who owns what, imposing penalties for trespass, and
saying who can do what to whom.... [Miarkets should be understood as a legal construct .. ");
WORLD BANK, supra note 55, at 41 ("Without the rudiments of social order, underpinned by
institutions, markets cannot function."). And even "private" property allocation by the judiciary
can be intensely political. See ITAI SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1997). Moreover, however apt Smith's claim may be within a country that has an operating
judicial system to adjudicate and enforce private property rights, global atmospheric externalities
cannot be parceled into private hands by the judiciary (nor would most advocates of private
property be eager to entrust such rights to an international judiciary). Some administrative global
regime is necessary to create global environmental property rights.
131. Numerous national applications of tradeable allowances have been adopted in the United
States since the early 1980s, including the programs to phase out lead in gasoline, to phase out
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), to control the SO2 emissions that yield acid rain, to control air
pollution in Los Angeles, to control point and non-point sources of water pollution, to conserve
selected fisheries, and to manage the development of sensitive lands. See Dudek et al., supra note
2, at 15-17, 23-25, 29-30, 36-37, 43-45; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable
Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 366-96 (1989). Other national
programs of tradeable allowances include the New Zealand program to conserve fisheries, see
Dudek et al., supra, at 44-45, and air pollution programs in Singapore and Germany, see Roger G.
Noll, Internationalizing Regulatory Reform, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? 319, 332 (Pietro
S. Nivola ed., 1997).
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rationalization." '32 The Protocol also allows "regional economic integration
organizations," such as the European Union, to "jointly fulfill" their
phaseout obligations under a combined "bubble." 1
33
The climate change treaties also set quantitative limitations on
emissions. In 1992, the FCCC adopted a hortatory target, obliging each
industrialized country to take steps to limit its emissions with the "aim" of
returning to its 1990 level by the year 2000.13 Developing countries were
also obliged to take measures to limit emissions, but no quantitative target
was set.3 5 The FCCC authorized an informal version of transferability,
based on proposals by the United States and Norway, called "joint
implementation." '36 Through joint implementation, parties can reduce their
GHG emissions by investing in mutually agreed upon projects undertaken
in other countries' territories.'37 Joint implementation represents an
"informal" emissions trading market'38 because the international agreement
does not allocate formal quantitative allowances. Instead, emitters can
invest in abatement services in other countries, sharing the credit as they
negotiate. 139 But joint implementation was sharply limited in 1995, when
the Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted criteria for a "pilot phase" of
joint implementation (through the year 2000) under which it expressly
132. Montreal Protocol, supra note 34, at art. 2(5), 26 I.L.M. at 1553; see also Peter Bohm,
Efficiency Issues and the Montreal Protocol on CFCs, in 2 THE ENVIRONMENT AND EMERGING
DEVELOPMENT ISSUEs 308, 311, 318-19 (Partha Dasgupta & Karl-Gbran Mifler eds., 1997)
(describing flexibility provisions in the Montreal Protocol).
133. Montreal Protocol, supra note 34, at art. 2(8), 26 I.L.M. at 1553; see GURUSWAMY &
HENDRICK, supra note 67, at 164-65.
134. See FCCC, supra note 39, at art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. at 857.
135. See id. at art. 4(1), 31 I.L.M. at 855.
136. See id. at art. 4(2)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 856 ("These parties may implement such policies and
measures jointly with other Parties .. "); see also Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/AC.237/18
(Part I)/Add.1 (1992), pt. 2, 31 I.L.M. 849, 851. On the genesis of the provision for "joint
implementation," see Karin Arts et al., Part 1: Legal and Institutional Aspects, in JOINT
IMPLEMENTATION TO CURB CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 8-14 (Onno Kuik et al. eds., 1994); Jonathan B.
Wiener, Joint Implementation To Curb Climate Change, 4 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 218 (1995) (book review); and Stewart & Wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note
11, at 104-05 & nn.74-76.
137. See TASK FORCE ON THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ADDRESSING POTENTIAL CLIMATE
CHANGE 77 (1991); Gro Harlem Bruntland, Remarks at the MIT/CICERO Global Change Forum
(June 13, 1996), reprinted in Schmalensee, supra note 75, at 9 (stating that "the basic principles"
of the FCCC are "cost-effectiveness, equity, joint implementation, and comprehensiveness");
Stewart & Wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note 11, at 104-05 n.75; U.S. Dep't of State,
Materials for the Informal Seminar on U.S. Experience with "Comprehensive" and "Emissions
Trading" Approaches to Environmental Policy 7-8 (Feb. 3, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The Yale Law Journal).
138. The characterization of joint implementation as "informal emissions trading" was
advanced in Stewart & Wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note 11, at 104-05; and Jonathan B.
Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach, Greenhouse Taxes, and Informal Emissions Trading, in
OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A PRACTICAL TAX SYSTEM 163, 171-72 (1992).
139. See Groundrules for U.S. Initiative for Joint Implementation, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,442
(1994).
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disallowed the receipt of any "credits" for extraterritorial abatement
investments."4 Without credits to record in satisfaction of their own
emissions abatement obligations, the incentive for emitters to invest in joint
implementation was muted.' The pilot phase thereby created a Catch-22.
If no one participated in the pilot phase, critics would label joint
implementation a failure; but if there were substantial participation, critics
would assert that credits are unnecessary.
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in December 1997,142 makes "quantitative
emission limitation and reduction obligations" binding on industrialized
countries. It sets targets ranging from eight percent below to ten percent
above each country's 1990 level of greenhouse gas emissions (including a
six percent reduction for Japan, a seven percent reduction for the United
States, an eight percent reduction for the European Union, and increases for
some countries such as Norway and Australia), to be achieved by the
"commitment period" of 2008 to 2012. Together, these targets amount to
an overall reduction for all industrialized countries of about five percent
below the 1990 level. 43 In addition, following the U.S. proposal"
(endorsed in a statement by over 2000 economists, including several Nobel
140. See FCCC, Conference of the Parties, First Session, Berlin, Mar. 28-Apr. 7, 1995,
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1671 (1995).
141. Investors might still be motivated to use the pilot phase of joint implementation to
pursue public relations rewards, to learn about joint implementation and make international
contacts in anticipation of participating in a full GHG trading market, to satisfy non-FCCC
emissions limits such as national or state/provincial requirements that do grant credit for overseas
abatement, and to make early investments in projects that could generate real credits after the pilot
phase of joint implementation ends.
142. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41.
143. See id. at art. 3 & Annex B, 37 LL.M. at 33-34, 42 (setting quantitative emissions
limitation and reduction obligations for industrialized countries); see also Global Warming:
Rubbing Sleep from Their Eyes, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, at 38 (stating that the Kyoto Protocol
would require industrialized countries, as a group, to achieve overall emissions reductions of 5.2%
below 1990 levels by the period from 2008 to 2012).
144. See BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INT'L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS (OES), U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS TO UN FCCC (June 4, 1997). The United States viewed
the inclusion of emissions trading as crucial to the success of the Kyoto Protocol. See Climate
Change: Emission Trades, Not Joint Implementation, Likely Part of Kyoto Pact, EPA Official
Says, [Nov. 21, 1997] 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1409-10 ("Both trading and joint implementation are
hallmarks of the U.S. proposal for the new climate change deal .... "); John J. Fialka, Breathing
Easy: Clear Skies Are Goal as Pollution Is Turned into a Commodity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1997,
at Al ("The Clinton administration has made trading a main part of its negotiating position on the
treaty to prevent global warming."); Remember Global Warming?, supra note 72 ("The United
States would have rejected the Kyoto Protocol if it had not [allowed] the sale or trade of emissions
allowances among nations."); William K. Stevens, Kyoto Meeting Moves Closer to Agreement on
Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, at A2 ("[U.S. chief negotiator Stuart] Eizenstat
said the revised American target was contingent on the acceptance of a comprehensive package
that includes the 'trading' of emissions among countries and regions."); Global Warming Accord:
"Tough" or a "Farce"? (last modified Dec. 11, 1997) <http:lwww.cnn.com/EARTHI9712/11/
climate.conf.reaction.reutindex.html> ("'We got what we wanted, which was joint
implementation, emissions trading, a market-oriented approach.... [President] Clinton said [of
the Kyoto Protocol agreement].").
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laureates 41), the Kyoto Protocol authorizes a formal international system of
tradeable emissions allowances among the industrialized countries."4 For
trade with developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol created a "Clean
Development Mechanism" (CDM) that will accept contributions from
industrialized countries, invest in emissions abatement in developing
countries, and obtain "certified emission reductions" in return, which it
will credit toward the industrialized investor countries' targets. 47 The Clean
Development Mechanism can be seen as a vehicle for "joint
implementation with credit," but potentially through a centralized fund
rather than through decentralized bilateral investments.' The detailed rules
for the Clean Development Mechanism and for formal allowance trading
under the Kyoto Protocol have not yet been finalized. 4 9
145. See Arrow et al., supra note 11; see also Passell, supra note 11, at D2 (reporting on the
letter signed by over 2000 economists endorsing a tradeable allowance system to deal with global
warming).
146. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41, at arts. 3(10), 3(11), 17, 37 LL.M. at 34, 39. The
Kyoto Protocol also authorized continued joint implementation among industrialized countries. Id.
at art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35. And it authorized regional emissions "bubbles" by providing for groups
of countries to elect to "jointly fulfill their commitments" by aggregating their combined
emissions targets. Id. at art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 34. This "bubble" provision was mainly of interest to
the European Union, though it could also be employed by other groups, perhaps including the
signatories of NAFTA. I have discussed elsewhere the legal parameters of a formal international
allowance trading system, see RICHARD B. STEWART, JONATHAN B. WIENER, & PHILIPPE
SANDS, LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY A PILOT INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING
SYSTEM (1996).
147. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41, at arts. 3(12), 12, 37 I.L.M. at 34, 38.
148. There is yet the possibility that the Clean Development Mechanism will launch a
decentralized market. Article 12(9) of the Kyoto Protocol states that participation in the Clean
Development Mechanism "may involve private and/or public entities." Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 41, at arts. 12(9), 37 I.L.M. at 38. But Article 12 requires the activities of the Clean
Development Mechanism to be guided by an executive board, see id., suggesting that the Clean
Development Mechanism will be a more centralized conduit for investment in certified GHG
reductions from developing countries, in contrast to the more wide-open market for emissions
trading authorized among industrialized countries under Articles 6 and 17; see id. at arts. 6, 17, 37
I.L.M. at 35,40.
149. Quantity instruments could also be used to protect global biodiversity. A quantity-based
approach to forest conservation could involve assigning limited allowances for the annual
conversion of forests to non-forest status. Or it could involve assigning quantity-based forest
conservation obligations to countries. Both conversion allowances and conservation obligations
could be made tradeable. An informal conservation market already occurs through "debt-for-
nature swaps," in which there is no global quantity constraint on forest clearing, but the pro-
conservation tastes of consumers, shareholders, and voters motivate financial institutions and
governments to exchange discounted financial assets for ad hoc forest conservation investments.
For global fisheries, a quantity-based rule would involve limiting the allowable catch on the
high seas. Tradeable fish catch quotas (typically called "individual transferable quotas," or ITQs)
are becoming more common in national fisheries law, having been adopted by New Zealand,
Canada, Iceland, Australia, and the United States. See PETER A. PEARSE, BUILDING ON
PROGRESS: FISiERIES POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW ZEALAND (1991); Kirsten M. Batkin, New
Zealand's Quota Management System: A Solution to the United States' Federal Fisheries
Management Crisis?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 855, 864-71 (1996); Dudek et al., supra note 2, at
44-45; Carrie A. Tipton, Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of
Idividual Transferable Quotas To Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381, 400-02
(1995); A Sustainable Stock of Fishermen, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 17-18. But ITQs are
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C. The Optimal Instrument Under Unitary Fiat
To test whether differences in the underlying legal framework affect the
choice of regulatory instrument, I begin from a baseline comparison of the
regulatory instruments under the hypothetical assumption of Unitary Fiat.
This Section shows that, under Unitary Fiat, optimal instrument choice for
global environmental problems generally conforms to the three
presumptions of the standard analysis of local environmental problems: (1)
incentive instruments are superior to conduct instruments; (2) subsidies are
inefficient; and (3) taxes may be superior to tradeable allowances.
1. The Case for Incentive Instruments
After several decades of theoretical argument and practical experience
at the national level, there is now virtual consensus that incentive
instruments-taxes and tradeable allowances-are presumptively superior
to conduct-based technology standards and fixed performance standards. 5 °
This Subsection examines this presumption in the context of global
environmental problems by reviewing five key attributes that distinguish
the alternative instruments: cost effectiveness, dynamic innovation,
administrative cost, fairness, and morality. The Subsection shows that,
under Unitary Fiat, the presumption in favor of incentive instruments
remains robust at the global level.
First, incentive instruments (taxes and tradeable allowances) would be
more cost-effective than conduct instruments and fixed performance
standards. Cost-effectiveness is the ability of a regulatory instrument to
only nascent in international fisheries law. UNCLOS requires countries to limit the allowable
catch of fish within their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), to prevent over-
exploitation, and to promote optimum harvest levels. See UNCLOS, supra note 48, at arts. 61, 62,
21 I.L.M. at 1281-82. But UNCLOS leaves the determination and enforcement of allowable
catches within the EEZs to national governments; there is no international regime for limiting the
quantity of fish extracted. Fishing within the 12-mile territorial sea of each country is wholly
subject to that country's laws (without any international duty to set allowable catch limits). See id.
at arts. 2-3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. And UNCLOS allows essentially open access to fish on the high
seas, sfibject only to general requirements to conserve fish and cooperate with other countries (for
example, through setting allowable catches under regional fisheries treaties). See id. at arts. 116-
19, 21 I.L.M. at 1290-91. In practice, this approach has not been successful; the regional fisheries
agreements "have had no power to control the consumption [of fish by] non-member distant water
flagships." GURUSWAmY & HENDRiCKS, supra note 67, at 284. In response, the Agreement on
Straddling Fish Stocks adopted additional measures to prevent overfishing, including
requirements that fishing vessels' flag states must cooperate with coastal states to develop
regional fisheries conservation agreements. See Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks, supra note
50, at arts. 5, 7, 8, 34 I.L.M. at 1550, 1552-54. These regional conservation agreements may
employ catch limits, see id. at art. 7, 34 I.L.M. at 1552-53, and the Agreement adds enforcement
powers, see id. at art. 21, 34 I.L.M. at 1563-65, but there remain no quantity-based catch limits on
the high seas.
150. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 2; Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1174.
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minimize costs for a given level of environmental protection, or
alternatively to maximize environmental protection for a given level of cost
expenditure.15" ' If abatement costs vary across sources, then cost-
effectiveness can be improved by choosing a regulatory instrument that
obtains more abatement from lower-cost abaters.
Taxes and tradeable allowances can both achieve this cost-effectiveness
condition. Under taxes, each source abates up to the point that its marginal
cost of abatement equals the tax on the next unit of emissions. High-cost
abaters undertake less abatement and pay more taxes; low-cost abaters
undertake more abatement and pay fewer taxes. Under tradeable quantity
limits, the government sets a limited number of emissions allowances and
requires sources to hold an allowance for each unit of emissions. Sources
can then buy or sell emissions allowances in the market. Each source abates
up to the point that its marginal cost of abatement equals the market price
for an allowance to cover the next unit of emissions. High-cost abaters
undertake less abatement and buy more allowances; low-cost abaters
undertake more abatement and sell allowances. In principle, the price (tax)
and quantity (tradeable entitlement) instruments can achieve identical cost-
effectiveness. The tax rate set to induce a given level of emissions, say Q,
would equal the market price of tradeable allowances if the government
assigned Q emissions allowances.'52
151. Maximizing cost-effectiveness is important because it saves resources that can be used
for other important social goals, such as additional environmental protection, eradicating poverty,
improving health care, or supporting education. Lowering the price per unit of environmental
protection can also increase the equilibrium quantity of environmental protection undertaken.
Baumol and Oates note:
If we cannot achieve our professed environmental objectives in a reasonably efficient
way, it is likely that it will be these objectives, and not industrial performance, that will
have to give. Thus, the standards of environmental quality that society is willing to
accept may themselves depend upon the efficiency of the policy instruments we adopt
to achieve the standards.
BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 189. For example, with cross-source trading, the lead
phasedown apparently achieved the goal of 0.10 grams of lead per gallon of gasoline at the same
cost that a policy without trading would have reached at 0.25 grams per gallon. In this sense,
trading enabled EPA to "buy" a control level that was more than 50% more stringent than the
nontrading control level with no increase in economic cost or political resistance. See Dudek et
al., supra note 2, at 24-25 (citing analysis and views of EPA official Barry Nussbaum). Similarly,
in 1990, Congress appeared to cut SO2 emissions more stringently with trading-by 10 million
tons-for the same total cost that it would have had to spend to achieve only an eight million ton
reduction under a policy without trading. Given the implicit budget constraint imposed on the
Clean Air Act amendments debate by the Bush Administration and by Congress's own
expectations of public and industry reaction, employing the more cost-effective regulatory
instrument may have translated into substantially more stringent regulation at the same cost. Cf.
Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 318-36
(1995) (arguing that the stringency versus cost debate regarding the 1990 CAA amendments was
not explicit).
152. See Weitzman, supra note 5, at 477. This identity holds only if the government faces no
uncertainty about sources' true marginal costs of abatement. Because, in reality, there is such
uncertainty, the price and quantity instruments may diverge. See id.; see also infra Subsection
m.C.3 (comparing taxes and tradeable allowances).
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Theory and experience in the United States show that conduct rules and
fixed performance standards impose substantially higher costs per unit of
abatement than incentive-based taxes and tradeable allowances, sometimes
as much as ten times higher.'53 Substantial cost-effectiveness gains have
been achieved in practice by the allowance trading programs for the lead
phasedown and acid rain programs in the United States. 4
Because abatement costs vary considerably around the world, the cost-
effectiveness advantages of incentive instruments for addressing global
environmental problems, as compared to conduct rules and fixed quantity
rules, appear to be quite large. Several studies of policies to limit global
GHG emissions show that allowing flexibility in the location of GHG
emissions abatement would cut the estimated global cost, compared to an
153. Incentive-based price and quantity rules appear to reduce the cost per unit of pollution
control by 25%-90% compared to command-and-control rules. See T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING 38-50 (1985); Robert C. Anderson et al., Cost Savings from the Use of Market
Incentives for Pollution Control, in MARKET-BASED APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
15 (Richard F. Kosobud & Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997); Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace
E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATruRE 675, 686 (1992);
Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 103, at 1507, 1538-39.
154. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 131, at 387 (describing an EPA estimate of hundreds of
millions of dollars in cost savings from the lead trading program); Paul L. Joskow et al., The
Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 669 (1998) (presenting data showing
efficiency gains from the tradeable allowance program for sulfur dioxide emissions); Richard
Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 53 (1998) (same); see also Revised Federal Rule-Making Procedures: Hearing on S. 981
Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of C. Boyden
Gray, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Chairman, Citizens for a Sound Economy; and Former
Counsel to the Presidential Task Force on Regulating Relief) ("The acid rain program... is
producing benefits 140% ahead of schedule-at less than one-fourth the cost."). In the SO2 case,
the observed cost savings under the acid rain title of the 1990 Clean Air Act reflected the shift
from the prior command-and-control technology requirements to both: (1) intra-facility
compliance flexibility under a performance standard; and (2) inter-facility flexibility via
allowance trading. It is not yet clear how much of these cost savings should be attributed to each
of these changes in policy design. In addition, cost savings may have resulted from fortuitous
changes such as a lower-than-expected price of transporting low-sulfur coal by rail. See DALLAS
BuRTRAW, COST SAVINGS, MARKET PERFORMANCE, AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE U.S.
ACID RAIN PROGRAM (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 98-28, 1998).
GHGs and CFCs may be even better subjects for a policy with locational flexibility than
these successful antecedents. First, GHGs and CFCs involve essentially no problem of local
"hotspots" in which emissions "bunching" can escalate local damages. Second, the range of
abatement costs for GHGs is likely to be larger than the range for SO2 and other regional
pollutants. Third, including abatement options not only for energy sector CO2 but also for methane
(CH4) and CO. storage in forest sinks will open even lower-cost abatement options. See Stewart &
Wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note 11, at 83, 94 & n.45 (citing studies by DOE and the
World Bank showing that including all GHGs lowers the cost of abatement, compared to a C02-
only policy, by about 75%, while including the forest sector lowers the cost of abatement,
compared to an energy-sector only policy, by about 90%). Fourth, the global regulatory system is
largely unfettered by prior regulatory systems, whereas the application of incentive-based
programs in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s has been hindered by the need to graft these
new regulatory instruments on top of preexisting technology-based conduct rules and fixed
quantity limits. See Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air
Pollution Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1983); Stavins,
supra note 13, at 32.
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equally stringent constraint on emissions without such locational flexibility
(e.g., fixed national caps), by roughly fifty to seventy percent.' Compared
to even less efficient regulatory instruments, such as global technology
standards, the cost savings from these tradeable allowance instruments
would be greater. Allowing a market in allowance trading only among
industrialized countries without any participation by developing countries,
as provided in the Kyoto Protocol, could still yield forty percent cost
savings compared to requiring each industrialized country to control its
emissions independently. 15 6 A recent experiment conducted among four
Nordic countries with ostensibly similar abatement costs (Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden) still found a fifty percent cost saving when
locational flexibility was allowed. 57
In the global climate context, a fifty to seventy percent cost saving is
potentially huge. Several models suggest that a rough central estimate of the
total global cost over the next three decades of holding GHG emissions in
OECD member countries to twenty percent below their 1990 level by the
year 2010, without flexible policy design, would be around $2 trillion (in a
range of estimates from $1.5 trillion to $8 trillion).' Hence the fifty to
seventy percent cost saving offered by locational flexibility would amount
to approximately $1 trillion (in a range from $750 billion to $5.6 trillion) in
savings. Significant cost savings could also have been realized for global
CFC control if the Montreal Protocol had used full international allowance
trading, instead of the more limited trade it allowed in production quotas
and the fixed headroom it accorded to developing countries.'59
Second, incentive instruments would more effectively stimulate
dynamic innovation. Technology-based conduct rules are ostensibly
intended to force adoption of cleaner technology, but they often turn out to
155. See, e.g., JEAN-MARC BURNIAUX ET AL., THE COSTS OF REDUCING CO2 EMIssIONs:
EVIDENCE FROM GREEN (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 115, 1992) (finding that
emissions-trading regimes cut global costs by about 50% even once cross-country tax and subsidy
distortions are eliminated); Manne & Richels, supra note 11 (discussing the significant cost
reductions from "spatial efficiency"); Interagency Analytical Team, U.S. Gov't, Economic
Effects of Global Climate Change Policies 17-21 (May 30, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Yale Law Journal) (describing a "sizable reduction in costs" from emissions trading);
Richels et al., The Berlin Mandate: The Design of Cost-Effective Mitigation Strategies 7 (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (explaining that interregional
flexibility cuts costs by more than 50%).
156. See EDWARD A. PARSON & KAREN FISHER-VANDEN, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING SYsTEMS To DISTRIBUTE GLOBAL EMISSIONS ABATEMENT AND
FINANCE 5 & n.7 (Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs, Env't and Natural Resources
Discussion Paper No. E97-02, 1997). A different study found more modest cost savings (in the
range of 10-25%) within the G-7 group of countries if they use tradeable allowances instead of
fixed national targets. See MABEY Er AL., supra note 70, at 367-68.
157. See PETER BOHM, A JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AS EMISSION QUOTA TRADE: AN
EXPERIMENT AIONG FOUR NORDIC COUNTRIES (1997).
158. See, e.g., Richels et al., supra note 155, at flg.3.
159. See Bohm, supra note 132, at 308, 317, 325-30.
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stagnate innovation. Once the government specifies a particular required
technology, or a fixed emissions limit, sources have no incentive to devise
newer and better methods of control. And technology-based controls tend to
involve more stringent requirements on new sources as opposed to existing
sources, which discourage innovation and encourage emitters to keep older,
dirtier equipment in operation longer.' 60
Incentive-based taxes and tradeable allowances promote dynamic
innovation and diffusion because they give sources a continuous incentive
to improve abatement methods. Sources can increase their profits by
devising or adopting new abatement methods that are less costly than the
expected cost of paying the tax or allowance price.16 1 International
allowance trading would create incentives for high-cost abaters in wealthier
areas to look for opportunities to deliver new abatement methods (in return
for freed-up allowances) particularly suited to the needs of sources in
poorer areas. 62
Third, incentive instruments would not involve undue administrative
costs. Some argue that choosing and monitoring the installation of specific
technologies might be less costly than measuring marginal damages (in
order to determine where to set a price or quantity constraint) and
160. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming, supra note 2, at 1335-36; Dudek et al., supra note
2, at 13-14; Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions
Standards, 72 AM. ECON. Rnv. 328 (1982); Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 103, at 1507, 1538-
39.
161. See Fisher et al., supra note 70, at 413; Adam Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Dynamic
Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on
Technology Diffusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S-43 (1995); Wesley A. Magat, The Effects
of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1979, at 4;
Alan S. Miller, Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation, and Technology-Forcing,
10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 64, 66-67 (1995); Scott R. Milliman & Raymond Prince, Firm
Incentives To Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 247 (1989); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
162. Some have argued that international allowance trading could slow technological
innovation. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix; 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999); L.D. Danny Harvey & Elizabeth J. Bush, Joint Implementation: An Effective
Strategy for Combating Global Warming?, ENvIRONMENT, Oct. 8, 1997, at 14, 36 ("If [joint
implementation] ever became widespread, the pressure on industrialized countries to make major
emissions reductions at home would be reduced. This in turn could encourage them to postpone
immediate and necessary investments in energy research and development."). This argument is
really an assertion that if the world's least-cost abatement opportunities are undertaken first, they
would occur in developing countries. If this argument is correct, the world would be better off for
having acted cost-effectively and would be worse off if it were forced to purchase climate
protection in industrialized countries only at a higher cost. This argument may also be an assertion
that the stringency of the global emissions constraint should be tightened to force investments in
both forest conservation and new energy technologies. In neither case is this argument a reason to
oppose international allowance trading. Furthermore, this argument neglects the incentives that
international allowance trading would create to develop new technologies for deployment in
developing countries.
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monitoring actual emissions.1 63 But merely monitoring the technology
employed at each source may not be as environmentally effective as
monitoring actual emissions. Sources may increase their activity levels or
otherwise continue to emit despite compliance with the technology rule, or
sources might surreptitiously evade the technology requirement. If the real
goal of environmental protection is to control effects on the environment,
not to dictate the internal conduct of sources, then it may be worthwhile to
pay for the monitoring of actual emissions rather than to be satisfied with
the monitoring of technology."6 Further, even if one assumed equal ability
to monitor environmental effectiveness, the administrative costs of
selecting "best technology" or other conduct rules may turn out to be at
least as high as the administrative costs of setting incentive levels. If the
regulated industry typically has superior information about cutting-edge
technologies, an agency attempting to replicate that knowledge base must
invest considerable time and resources (as well as fend off industry's better-
informed challenges to the agency's choice 65), thus delaying
implementation and raising the agency's administrative costs. 6 6 And even
if the balance of administrative costs did favor a conduct instrument, the
decision to select a conduct instrument on this rationale would require a
judgment that its advantage in administrative costs would outweigh its
163. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 444; Latin, supra note 1, at 1271-73, 1331-32;
Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 1, at 745-51. But see Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case,
supra note 2, at 179-88 (arguing that command-and-control rules involve higher administrative
costs than market-based incentive rules). Note that the claimed administrative ease of technology-
based rules does not apply to fixed emissions limits; the latter, like taxes and allowance trading,
also require monitoring actual emissions.
164. Cf. BREYER, supra note 2, at 278-79 (noting that monitoring the actual environmental
performance of technology standards is quite difficult); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First:
Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277,
315-16 (1992) (noting that technology-based standards are an inaccurate surrogate for actual
effects on environmental quality).
165. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 274, 279-80; Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case,
supra note 2, at 174.
166. Advocates of conduct instruments suggest that technology requirements can
approximate the least-cost pattern of controls through such maneuvers as industry
subclassifications, variances, and other procedures for finely tailoring technology requirements to
different sources. See, e.g., Shapiro & McGarity, supra note I, at 748. But tailoring conduct rules
in this way requires the government to collect and process the vast amount of information needed
to specify the most cost-effective conduct at each individual source. See Hanson & Logue, supra
note 14, at 1264-65. The government must know what every source knows and must update that
knowledge continuously. Regulatory specification of best technologies involves the costs of
running a large expert bureaucracy. See id. at 1265 n.427 (comparing command-and-control
regulation to central planning with its attendant exorbitant administrative costs); Richard B.
Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. Ca. L. REV. 335, 356 (1990) (same); Stewart, supra note
107, at 97-104 (same). By contrast, taxes and tradeable quantity entitlements induce cost-effective
pollution control without expecting government omniscience, by using reconstituted market
incentives to induce sources to choose their own least-cost compliance methods based on
information known to the sources and continuously updated by the sources. See BAUMOL &
OATEs, supra note 3, at 160, 163-65; Stavins, supra note 13, at 3.
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enormous disadvantage in abatement cost-effectiveness (say, $1 trillion in
the global climate context).
Fourth, incentives can be just as fair as alternative instruments. Concern
is often expressed that efficiency-enhancing regulatory policies may yield
unfairness.167 Meanwhile, economists frequently urge that fairness be
ignored in the choice among regulatory instruments at the national level.
16
1
Yet fairness may be more important at the global level than at the national
level because the disparity in wealth is even greater at the global level 69
and because the fiscal mechanisms for redistribution (such as progressive
taxation and social welfare policies) are much weaker at the global level.
Developing countries worry that global environmental law may be an
unfair form of "eco-imperialism" that renews colonial exploitation by
restricting economic growth in poor countries for the benefit of wealthy
countries. They argue that fairness requires the industrialized countries to
"take the lead" in controlling GHG emissions before developing countries
are asked to make any sacrifices in this effort, and that fairness to
developing countries counsels against tradeable allowances or joint
implementation because such flexibility would let industrialized emitters
pay their way out of their fair share of sacrifice. 70 This view reflects, in
part, the fact that poorer countries have other desperate needs and tend to
put a lower priority on global environmental protection 7' and, in part, the
historically larger contribution of industrialized countries to elevated GHG
concentrations. It would be unfair, on this view, to make poorer developing
countries worse off for a problem caused by wealthier industrial
countries."'
167. See, e.g., STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONmENT 84-86 (1981); ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALrrY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG
TRADEOFF (1975).
168. A standard prescription is that "[c]oncem about the distribution of income has no
bearing on the choice between property and liability rules. Income redistribution can be
accomplished more efficiently through the use of the income tax and transfer arms of government
than through the selection of legal rules to serve distributional goals." Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 744.
169. See Revesz, supra note 54, at 1341 (noting that "the differences in wealth and economic
development are far more salient in the international community than in [national] federal
systems"); id. at 1342 (observing that "distributional consequences... ought to play a far more
salient role in evaluating [policies'] relative desirability" in the international setting).
170. See Harvey & Bush, supra note 162, at 39 ("Some believe that industrialized countries
can demonstrate leadership only by reducing [their own] emissions.... Critics contend that joint
implementation represents nothing less than a way to abdicate responsibility because it allows
industrialized countries to avoid getting their own houses in order by purchasing emission offsets
abroad."). Of course, the notion of requiring the industrialized countries to "get their own houses
in order" before seeking participation by developing countries is a category mistake: The
"house" at issue here is the global oikos, not each nation's house.
171. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
172. See Jose Vargas, RFF Weathervane Webpage (visited Dec. 1, 1997)
<http://wwxv.weathervane.rff.org> (arguing, as environmental minister of Brazil, that it is unfair
to ask developing countries to sacrifice in order to address a problem caused by industrialized
720 [Vol. 108: 677
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In order to choose among regulatory instruments, however, these
fairness concerns need to be viewed in a comparative context. Conduct
instruments, performance standards, taxes, and tradeable allowances would
all impose abatement costs on sources. Global taxes on GHG emissions or
deforestation, for example, could be highly regressive, taxing billions of
poor people in China and India to confer benefits on wealthier people
elsewhere. 173 But tradeable allowances could be structured to achieve
fairness for poorer societies. Poorer sources could be assigned "headroom"
in their initial endowment of GHG emissions allowances (while wealthier
sources would receive fewer allowances), enabling poorer societies to grow
economically and to earn substantial revenues from the profitable sale of
allowances to wealthier sources. Wealthier sources would still "take the
lead" by paying the costs of global emissions abatement through allowance
purchases from poorer sources. Poorer sources would be required to make
no uncompensated reductions in future emissions; the burden of financing
all reductions from the global baseline forecast would be placed on
wealthier sources.
This system would benefit poorer societies. They would be able to sell
extra allowances at a profit-a new and valuable asset.174 The magnitude of
financial flows to major developing countries generated by a GHG
allowance trading market could be substantial, rising from approximately
$10 billion to over $100 billion per year (in constant dollars) in future
decades' 75-easily exceeding the funding level of the GEF ($2 billion over
countries); cf. CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING ToxIc SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND THE LAW 127-28 (1993) (observing that corrective justice suggests exacting recompense
from past sources of environmental harm); JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (asserting
that it is unjust to produce social gains if doing so harms the position of the worst-off class).
Action by industrialized countries is also sometimes advocated on tactical grounds, as necessary
to provide the "moral leadership" to persuade developing countries to go along. This hypothesis
depends on whether developing countries, and international relations generally, are driven more
by strategic national interests or by moral suasion. Note that leakage under a treaty exclusive to
industrialized countries would render developing countries' economies more GHG-intensive over
time, so that developing countries' national interests would be pulled farther and farther in the
opposite direction of this hypothesized moral leadership.
173. Cf. d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 54, at 443 (noting that " [miost people would rebel at
the thought of wealth transfers from the poorest people on earth to the richest" as a result of
global taxes on deforestation).
174. See PARSON & FISHER-VANDEN, supra note 156, at 4-5; Scott Barrett, Transfers and the
Gains from Trading Carbon Emission Entitlements in a Global Warming Treaty, in COMBATING
GLOBAL WARMING: STUDY ON A SYSTEM OF TRADEABLE CARBON EMISSION ENTITLEMENTS
(1992); Manne & Richels, supra note 11, at 209.
175. See JOAQUIM OLIVEIRA-MARTINS ET AL., THE COSTS OF REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS: A
COMPARISON OF CARBON TAX CURVES WITH GREEN 39 tbl.10 (OECD Econ. Dep't Working
Paper No. 118, 1992). The size of these resource flows depends on the stringency of the overall
target, the initial allocation of allowances, and the shapes of countries' marginal cost curves. This
study examined a policy requiring a two percentage point per year reduction in the growth rate of
CO2 emissions from baseline forecasts by all countries, which approximately corresponds to
capping global aggregate CO, emissions at their 1990 levels by the year 2050, including cutting
emissions sharply in the OECD member states while letting emissions grow (though more slowly
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four years), total World Bank environmental funding (about $1.6 billion in
1991), and even total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) (now about
$45 billion). 176 This would represent only the level of financial flows from
GHG allowance trading, which could be augmented by the financial
resources leveraged under similar market-based regimes for other global
environmental issues such as CFCs, biodiversity, forests, and oceans.1 77 The
basic logic of contract-voluntary exchange-means that allowance
transactions would not occur unless the seller is made better off. Allowance
sales would bring local benefits of GHG abatement to poorer cities, such as
reductions in the high levels of local air pollution associated with coal
burning.17
Moreover, the intuition that poorer societies would gain from being left
out of any GHG abatement obligations turns out to be suspect. A regulatory
system limited to sources in wealthy countries ("Annex I" under the
FCCC) could actually be more costly for poorer countries than a cost-
effective regulatory system involving global allowance trading. This is
because the higher cost to wealthier sources will mean slower economic
growth in wealthier countries and therefore reduced purchases of goods and
services from poorer countries. In other words, developing countries could
be net losers under an emissions control rule exclusive to industrialized
countries, but net gainers-better off even than if no action were taken by
anyone-under a policy that restricted global emissions and allowed
industrialized countries to obtain abatement services worldwide from
developing countries through developing countries' sales of headroom
allowances.179
than in the baseline forecast) in developing countries. It found that CO2 allowance trading would
yield resource flows (in constant 1985 dollars) to China, India, and the former USSR of about $14
billion in 2000, about $86 billion in 2020, and about $206 billion in 2050. See id. It found that
these allowance sales would shift China and Russia, the two main allowance sellers, see id., from
net losers to net gainers, compare id. at 38 tbl.8 (Scenario II), with id. at 40 tbl.12 (Welfare). At
the same time, it found that global GDP losses and OECD-member GDP losses would be reduced
by about 50% or more, compared to a nontrading regime. Compare id. at 38 tbl.8 (Scenario II,
"World" and "Total OECD" columns), with id. at 40 tbl.12 (GDP, "World" and "Total OECD"
columns).
176. See Kenneth Piddington, The Role of the World Bank, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 116, at 212, 225.
177. See Suzi Kerr, EnvironmentalAid, ENVIRONMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 3,3-4.
178. As one measure of the local benefits of making environmental protection investments in
poorer countries, consider that a dollar spent on environmental regulation in poorer countries
saves approximately 300 to 1500 times more life-years than the same dollar spent to control
pollution under current regulations in the United States. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform:
What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIvES SAVED: GETTING
BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 208, 237 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
179. See Manne & Richels, supra note 11, at 209; Richels et al., supra note 155, at 6-7.
Trading could benefit developing countries under other global environmental regimes as well.
Under the Montreal Protocol, developing countries were afforded longer timelines to limit CFC
consumption and were entitled to consume CFCs up to a far larger number of units per capita than
their current usage rates. These provisions amount to the assignment of extra "headroom"
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Saying that industrialized countries must control their emissions at
home, not overseas, could be profoundly unfair to developing countries. It
is like insisting that rich people must only spend their money in rich
neighborhoods and must never invest in poorer neighborhoods. Denying
developing countries the revenues from allowance sales in the name of
fairness to developing countries is particularly ironic, given that many
developing countries (notably excepting small island states) may perceive
far greater economic and environmental rewards from allowance sale
revenues today than they would from global environmental protection long
in the future."O
Fifth, incentives do not represent immoral means of achieving
environmental protection. Some favor conduct instruments over incentive
instruments on the view that translating environmental protection into
entitlements to developing countries. But because these entitlements were not tradeable under the
Montreal Protocol, developing countries could not earn revenues from their sale. A formal system
of tradeable CFC consumption allowances could have made the developing countries just as well
off as this headroom, with lower total global costs, or much better off at the same global cost. See
Bohm, supra note 132, at 327.
A market-based approach to fisheries conservation would also be more fair to developing
countries. Under the UNCLOS, supra note 48, coastal nations can exercise exclusive fishing
rights within their 200-mile EEZs. The expansion of these fishing zones from 12 to 200 miles
amounts to assigning a large share of what were formerly shared global ocean resources to the
coastal nations. The coastal nations are called on to negotiate regional seas treaties to conserve
fish on the high seas outside the 200-mile EEZs, but only with "relevant" countries-that is, only
with those countries with fishing fleets operating in the relevant regional sea. This arrangement
implicitly excludes noncoastal countries without fishing fleets from rights to harvest fish on the
high seas. It also gives such countries a perverse incentive to invest in new or increased fishing in
order to gain status as "relevant"-thereby increasing world fishing capacity and further stressing
global fisheries. By contrast, an international system of tradeable catch allowances would be more
fair. It would make the initial distribution of rights transparent, thereby inviting a fairer
assignment to all countries. Nonfishing countries, including landlocked developing countries,
could then obtain initial assignments of some catch allowances and either use them for their own
fishing fleets or earn revenues by selling their excess allowances to fishing countries. Moreover,
because the aggregate global fishing allowances would be capped and assigned, this system would
avoid the perverse incentive to become "relevant" by investing in increased fishing capacity.
A market-based global forests regime would also have equity advantages. Under a treaty
restricting all countries' forest losses, developing countries would be burdened particularly
harshly if their forest clearing was rising as they developed economically, whereas industrialized
countries would be relatively unregulated if their forests were expanding after several centuries of
deforestation. But under a treaty assigning tradeable forest protection obligations in proportion to
national income, developing countries would gain substantial income from selling forest
protection services.
180. Even if developing countries considered a tradeable allowances system attractive for the
reasons just outlined, they might still be concerned that the mechanics of competing in a market
for international tradeable allowances might unfairly advantage sophisticated competitors from
wealthy countries over less experienced and less well-capitalized participants from poorer
countries. Transparency, capacity-building, and restraints on the unfair exercise of market power
will therefore be important elements of any international tradeable allowances system.
Multilateral development institutions like the World Bank, the GEF, the United Nations
Development Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, could play a significant role in
conducting training programs for public- and private-sector actors from developing countries on
how to participate successfully in global environmental allowance trading markets.
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market prices and commodities debases the moral value of environmental
protection. These critics worry that condoning the purchase and sale of the
"right to pollute" fails to condemn the actor who causes increased pollution
and thereby undermines the ethical norms that motivate environmental
protection and boost compliance with environmental laws and
regulations.'
While critics of incentives may feel the environment is too important to
leave to markets, the better view is that environmental protection is too
important to leave out of markets. Underlying this difference of views may
be a deeper divergence in approaches to law and social progress. Advocates
of conduct instruments may see environmental degradation as immoral
misbehavior that requires personal ethical reform. Advocates of incentives,
while not opposed to better ethics, may see environmental degradation as a
dysfunction of the economic system that warrants reforming markets. They
argue that failing to translate environmental protection into a market
commodity leaves environmental protection outside market transactions,
which is the reason they believe environmental protection is undersupplied
in the first place.
Further, advocates of incentive-based policy offer several responses to
the moral condemnation argument. First, all policies, except an absolute
ban, amount to licensing some "right to pollute." Indeed, conduct-based
technology requirements and fixed performance standards amount to a
license to pollute for free once the requisite technology is installed or the
quantity target is achieved. Taxes and tradeable allowances, by contrast,
force the polluter to pay for every unit of emissions, either by paying the tax
or by forfeiting the revenue from the sale of the allowance. Thus, it is
conduct rules and fixed quantity rules, ironically, that truly license a right to
pollute for free.
Rather than being amoral, price and tradeable quantity instruments may
serve a competing moral vision.'18 Efficiency can also be a moral value.
181. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Editorial, It's Immoral To Buy the Right To Pollute, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23 (arguing that "an international market in [greenhouse gas) emission
credits would... undermine the ethic we should be trying to foster on the environment" because
"turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is
properly associated with it"). See generally KELMAN, supra note 167, at 27-91 (discussing the
ethical "case for concern" about incentives).
182. Moreover, moral condemnation and incentive-based regulatory instruments are not
mutually exclusive approaches to improving compliance; they can be pursued in combination.
Moral opprobrium is deployed to discourage antisocial behavior of many types, including murder,
drinking and driving, breach of contract and fiduciary obligations, and pollution. See, e.g., David
Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 409 (1990)
(explaining that reputational interests promote contract performance); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1
(explaining that shame sanctions promote deterrence); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 638-41 (1996) (explaining that shame sanctions may
be effective deterrents of criminal behavior); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
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Critics who concede the efficiency of incentives but say that opposition is
warranted in the service of moral goals.. 3 may neglect that inefficiency is
also arguably immoral because it wastes society's resources, depriving the
needy of the benefits to which society could have put those resources.18" In
the global environmental context, eschewing incentives on "moral"
grounds would imply both moral insensitivity to poorer populations and
anthropocentric attention to ethical principles that matter only to humans,
treating as morally expendable the millions of other species who share the
Earth and would benefit from more cost-effective incentives for global
protection."' 5
Unpeeling the moral case reveals an internal irony. Because incentives
are more cost-effective, they generate more pollution control for a given
expenditure, stimulate greater dynamic innovation in new methods of
pollution reduction, and enable society to buy more environmental
protection. If the moralist's claim is that "the person who causes more
pollution is blameworthy and should be condemned," then, ironically, "the
person who causes more pollution" is the moralist who opposes the more
cost-effective instruments.
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (explaining that esteem and shame foster
compliance with social norms); Rose, supra note 5, at 38 (emphasizing the moral message
communicated by environmental law). Shame can be a useful means of enforcing compliance
with international law as well. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEv
SOVEREIGNTY 25-28 (1995). Yet society attaches shame not to all acts of a certain kind but to the
subset of such acts that social and legal institutions label as illicit. Not all killing is condemned;
self-defense is forgiven or even cheered while cold-blooded murder invokes condemnation (and
vehicular homicide falls somewhere in between). Similarly, the moral message of environmental
law should be not to condemn all pollution, from the factory smokestack to the daily routine of
human excretion, but rather to distinguish excessive pollution from acceptable pollution. If so,
incentive-based environmental law can apply shame just as well as can non-market-based law.
Most goods and services are traded in markets while, at the same time, moral opprobrium is
attached to the theft of someone else's property or unfair dealing. Likewise, using markets to
protect the environment does not displace considerations of moral condemnation. A source that
emits in excess of its allowances or without paying taxes would not only have to pay financial
penalties but would also be subject to public shame and moral stigma for its theft of the
community's shared environmental resource.
183. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 181, at A23 (noting that "[d]espite the efficiency of
international emissions trading, such a system is objectionable" on moral grounds). For the
purposes of his moral argument, he concedes that allowance trading would be "a more efficient
way to reduce pollution than imposing fixed levels for each country." Id.
184. A similar point is made by Paul R. Portney, Counting the Cost: The Growing Role of
Economics in Environmental Decisionmaking, ENVIRONMENT, Mar. 1998, at 14, 37 ("In one
sense 1] it is immoral not to take costs into account in setting environmental standards.... Failure
to consider costs makes it impossible to get the most from the available resources and ultimately
means saving fewer lives, preventing fewer illnesses, and protecting fewer species or areas than
one othervise could.").
185. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHIcs: THE CASE FOR MORAL
PLURALISM (1987); Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Moral Thought, 56 TENN. L. REV.
1, 2-4 (1988). Utilitarian theory need not exclude the interests of nonhumans. See RODERICK F.
NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 23 (1989) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 311 (Laurence J. LaFleur ed., Hefner Publ'g Co.
1948) (1789)).
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Whatever the resolution of this debate, the moral case against
incentives is far from ironclad. Given the substantial advantages of
incentives for global environmental protection on other grounds discussed
above, it is difficult to see the hard-line moral case against incentives
winning the day. Most environmental advocates have indeed given up the
"license to pollute" rhetoric over the past fifteen years, recognizing the
effectiveness of incentives at controlling pollution and seeking instead the
careful design of incentive instruments to ensure real environmental quality
improvement.
2. The Case Against Subsidies
Subsidies can in principle achieve cost-effective abatement. The
subsidy acts as a negative tax because failing to abate means incurring the
cost of forgoing the subsidy. But abatement subsidies have the crucial
drawback that they involve actual payments to pollution sources to cover
the costs of abatement. Such payments generate perverse incentives for
increased pollution. First, when polluters are paid the costs of abatement,
they may behave ex ante as if they are insured against the costs of risk-
making and increase their risk-making activities.1 16 Second, sources may
posture to secure larger subsidies by threatening to increase pollution, in
part by increasing pollution in fact. Third, capital markets may respond to
abatement subsidies by increasing investment in the polluting industry.
Whereas a pollution tax reduces pollution at each firm and reduces the
activity level of the entire polluting industry, an abatement subsidy reduces
pollution at the individual firm but increases the activity level of the entire
polluting industry. This is because the subsidy reduces the relative costs of
operating a business in the polluting industry and thereby attracts new
186. On this ground, Judge Posner criticizes the result in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb
Development, 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), in which the court ordered the polluting feedlot to shut
down on the condition that the neighboring residential developer pay the feedlot's costs of
abatement: "This is not a perfect solution, however, because entitlement to shutting-down costs or
relocation costs will reduce the incentive of feedlot owners to locate their feedlots optimally with
respect to projected development of the surrounding area." POSNER, supra note 100, at 64.
Analogously, economists argue that fully compensating victims for their injuries (under liability
rules) will induce victims to act as if insured against injury and thus to take more risks. This is the
standard problem of victims' moral hazard under liability rules. See id. at 169-75, 177; Bohm &
Russell, supra note 5, at 418, 434; Coase, supra note 4, at 42; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at
720-21, 738-39. For this reason, a corrective tax paid to the government is argued to be more
efficient than a liability award paid to the victim. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 23-25,
29. Economists' preference for corrective taxes over abatement subsidies is based on the
counterpart proposition that compensating risk-makers for their costs of abatement (under
subsidies) will induce risk-makers to make more risk.
Of course, injury victims may never think themselves fully compensated by ex post
monetary awards. And fairness or other criteria might still warrant compensating victims. Further,
real-world liability rules could actually yield undercompensation because of the costs of mounting
litigation, problems of proof, problems of enforcing judgments, and related obstacles.
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entrants and greater investment in the polluting industry. This effect can
potentially yield even more total pollution than before the subsidy was
enacted." 7  International "carrots" subsidizing global environmental
protection may likewise invite perverse behavior by sources and investors
that increases global environmental harm. l"'
Meanwhile, environmental subsidies can also be problematic if they are
administered through centralized aid institutions that enjoy market power.
The centralized environmental funds do not have to compete (much) to sign
up projects. Because each is the main or sole funding entity for a certain
kind of financial assistance (ozone projects, climate projects, forest
projects, etc.), it has fewer incentives to be cost-effective-to select good
projects, to monitor performance, and to insist on or produce results-than
if it had to compete to fund the best projects and to develop new and better
ways of investing in environmental protection. From the perspective of
potential aid recipients, the centralized fund looks like an investment
cartel-a monopsonist exercising uncontested power to choose or reject
environmental projects on behalf of its wealthy backers. It is no wonder that
the developing countries and environmental organizations view this market
power with distrust.
A final problem with subsidies is that they require the government to
find money. Revenues must be raised, with the attendant social costs of
distortionary taxes or fiscal deficits. I8 9
3. The Case for Taxes over Tradeable Allowances
Among incentive instruments, taxes and tradeable allowances can
theoretically produce identical results. But features of implementation in
187. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 211-28 (noting that abatement subsidies would
reduce emissions at each firm but increase the size of the polluting industry and observing that
using subsidies could conceivably increase net emissions); Wallace E. Oates, Economics,
Economists, and Environmental Policy, 16 E. ECON. J. 289, 290 (1990) (" [In a competitive
setting, [abatement] subsidies will lead to an excessively large number of firms and industry
output .... [I]t is even conceivable that aggregate industry emissions could go up!" (citations
omitted)). Further study has refined the Baumol and Oates "perverse subsidy" result. A perverse
net increase in aggregate pollution will occur if pollution per unit of firm output is constant. But if
abatement can reduce pollution per unit of output (i.e., change the technology of production), then
the abatement subsidy may succeed in reducing overall pollution. See Robert E. Kohn, When
Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total Emissions, 59 S. ECON. J. 77, 84-85 (1992).
Still, even the abatement subsidy that does reduce aggregate pollution remains inferior to a tax on
emissions: In general equilibrium modeling exercises, the best abatement subsidy still achieves an
aggregate emission reduction far smaller than an equivalent emissions tax, and the worst
abatement subsidy continues to increase aggregate emissions perversely. See id. at 83-84; Stuart
Mestelman, Production Externalities and Corrective Subsidies: A General Equilibrium Analysis,
9 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 186, 191 (1982).
188. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures To Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154-60 (1995).
189. The possibility of combining abatement subsidies with emissions taxes is addressed
infra Part IV.
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practice-uncertainty and revenue-recycling-may favor taxes under
Unitary Fiat. Fairness may cut the other way.
First, uncertainty may favor taxes, at least where cost escalation is more
worrisome than emissions escalation. In principle, a price instrument could
generate the same cost-effectiveness gains as a quantity instrument. If the
marginal costs and marginal benefits of abatement were known with
certainty, the regulator could either set the optimal tax, knowing that it
would induce a corresponding level of emissions, or set the optimal level of
emissions (by issuing that many tradeable allowances), knowing that it
would induce a corresponding marginal cost. The market price of a
marginal allowance would precisely equal the tax rate set to achieve that
level of emissions.
Under conditions of uncertainty about abatement costs, however, the
price and quantity instruments diverge."' Setting a tax constrains the
maximum marginal cost that sources would have to pay, but it yields an
uncertain level of emissions. If sources' true costs of abatement are higher
than the regulator predicted, the tax will generate less abatement and higher
emissions. By contrast, setting a quantity of emissions constrains the
maximum level of emissions, but it yields an uncertain cost. If sources' true
costs of abatement are higher than the regulator predicted, the quantity limit
will generate higher costs. Thus, a tax prevents compliance cost overruns
but risks emissions overruns, while a quantity limit prevents emissions
overruns but risks cost overruns. Given uncertainty, a determination of
which risk is of greater social concern is thus an important factor in
choosing between a quantity-based constraint and a price-based constraint
under uncertainty. '91
The relative importance of cost overruns versus emissions overruns,
and hence the choice between price and quantity rules, depends on the
relative slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefits curves.'92 If the
190. See Weitzman, supra note 5. For a concise summary, see BREYER, supra note 2, at 273.
A more technical review is provided in Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 103, at 1507, 1516-19.
Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 14, at 1266-70 (discussing the inability of regulators to obtain
full information about costs and benefits).
191. Uncertainty about the position of the true marginal benefits curve (the environmental
damage function) does not affect the choice between price and the quantity instruments, because it
is the sources' true marginal cost curve that determines their actual abatement in response to the
regulation. As discussed in the text, the slope of the marginal benefits curve does matter, because
it affects the size of the social losses entailed by the price or quantity instruments.
Kaplow and Shavell argue that even if the regulator is uncertain about abatement costs, price
rules are still universally more efficient than quantity rules if the regulator sets a tax schedule
equal to the marginal harm caused by each level of emissions (as opposed to a single fixed tax
rate). They argue that Weitzman and others have inappropriately limited their analysis to a fixed
tax rate. See LouIs KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, ON THE SUPERIORITY OF CORRECTIVE TAXEs
TO QUANTITY REGULATION (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6251, 1997).
192. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 57-78; Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 103, at
1516-18; Polinsky, supra note 13, at 1112; Robert N. Stavins, Correlated Uncertainty and Policy
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benefits curve is steeper than the costs curve-meaning that as abatement is
reduced and emissions grow, environmental damages rise more steeply than
compliance costs fall-then an increment of emissions overrun is more
socially harmful than an increment of cost overrun. In such cases of
relatively steep benefits compared to costs, the quantity rule is the
preferable choice. If, by contrast, the cost curve is steeper than the benefits
curve-meaning that as abatement is reduced and emissions grow,
compliance costs fall more steeply than environmental damages rise-then
an increment of cost overrun is more socially harmful than an increment of
emissions overrun. In such cases of relatively steep costs compared to
benefits, the price rule is the preferable choice. 3
Accounting for uncertainty in the global environmental context can
make a significant difference in choosing between price and quantity rules.
A recent study of global GHG abatement finds that, given significant
uncertainty about true abatement costs, a tax would yield roughly five times
greater net benefits than would a system of tradeable emissions allowances
Instrument Choice, 30 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 218 (1996); Stavins, supra note 6, at 313-16;
Weitzman, supra note 5, at 483-87.
Richard Revesz has argued that if the optimal degree of abatement-the "how much"
question-is selected not on the basis of economic efficiency calculations that seek to maximize
net benefits by setting marginal benefit equal to marginal cost, but rather on the basis of some
nonefficiency considerations of importance to political decisionmakers, then the relative slopes of
the benefit and cost curves are irrelevant and the quantity rule is "decidedly preferable" to the
price rule. See Revesz, supra note 103, at 466-67. The rationale is that if government has already
selected the socially acceptable level of emissions ("how much") on non-efficiency grounds, the
best the regulator can do is achieve that level of emissions as cost-effectively as possible ("how
to"). Tradeable quantity allowances achieve the selected level of emissions more surely than do
taxes, which could allow the actual level of emissions to deviate from the selected level when true
costs are uncertain.
The validity of Revesz's point depends on a strong assumption about the insensitivity of the
"how much" question to cost tradeoffs. Decisionmakers might be willing to tolerate some
deviation from the selected level if the cost savings were large enough, unless they truly have
inflexible deontological criteria for insisting on a particular level of emissions. Put another way,
Revesz's case asks whether the politically determined level of emissions control really
corresponds to a truly vertical marginal benefits curve, such that no decrease in cost could
outweigh a minor increase in emissions, or whether the nonefficiency criteria just steepen the
marginal benefits curve somewhat but can still be weighed against other social costs.
Meanwhile, it is also conceivable that political decisionmakers would select on
nonefficiency grounds a desired amount of social expenditure on an environmental problem,
rather than a level of emissions, in which case the price (tax) rule would "decidedly" achieve this
selected cost more surely than would the quantity rule.
193. The quantity rule may, however, have an advantage under uncertainty when dynamic
innovation is considered. See Gruenspecht & Lave, supra note 103, at 1518-19. The logic is that if
investment in innovation is driven by the volume of abatement activity to which it can be applied,
the price rule yields dynamic feedback effects that exacerbate its deviation from optimal
abatement. A tax that yields overcontrol of emissions (because true abatement costs are lower than
expected costs) will induce overinvestment in innovation, which further reduces abatement costs
and further compounds the degree of overcontrol. A tax that yields undercontrol of emissions
(because true abatement costs are higher than expected costs) will induce underinvestment in
innovation, which keeps abatement costs high and compounds the problem of undercontrol. A
quantity rule, by contrast, fixes the level of abatement and thus induces closer to optimal
investment in innovation, with no perverse feedback effects.
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intended to achieve the same level of abatement as the tax.194 This finding
depends on the view that the marginal damages from increased GHG
emissions are fairly flat and the marginal costs from decreasing emissions
rise more steeply. '
Second, instruments that raise revenue can be superior to those that do
not. Taxes raise revenue. Technology standards and fixed emissions limits
do not. Tradeable allowance systems can raise revenue if the allowances are
initially sold to sources by the government, but not if the allowances are
issued to the sources for free. If the revenues earned by an environmental
tax (or allowance sale) are used to offset and reduce a preexisting tax that is
relatively more distortionary than the environmental tax, then in addition to
protecting the environment, the revenue-raising environmental policy also
promotes social well-being in a second way, besides protecting the
environment: It shifts the tax system from taxes on "goods" like labor to
taxes on "bads" like pollution, not only discouraging the bads but also
removing preexisting disincentives to the goods. This second benefit of
revenue-raising environmental instruments, often called the "revenue-
recycling effect" or the "double dividend," improves the net benefits of the
environmental constraint in the presence of preexisting tax distortions. 1
9 6
The upshot is that in the presence of preexisting tax distortions, a
nonrevenue-recycling regulatory instrument is less cost-effective than a
194. See PIZER, supra note 9, at ii, 29.
195. See id. at 12-14, 16. Pizer compares the global imposition in 2010 of optimal price and
quantity limits and finds that an optimal global CO2 tax would yield net benefits in excess of $330
billion, whereas an optimal global tradeable allowance policy would yield net benefits of only $69
billion. See id. at 29. These estimates arise from simulations of numerous scenarios with varying
marginal costs, reflecting ex ante uncertainty about true costs. See id. at 22-29. They also depend
crucially on Pizer's view that marginal benefits of CO2 emissions abatement are fairly flat, a
premise he derives largely from the fact that global warming is induced by the stock of CO, in the
atmosphere and, because CO, has a long residence time in the atmosphere, annual emissions of
CO2 (or their abatement) affect the atmospheric stock only slightly. See id. at 11-12, 16-17; see
also MICHAEL HOEL & LARRY KARP, TAXES VERSUS QUOTAS FOR A STOCK POLLUTANT
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 29-98, 1998) (showing through a
mathematical model that taxes dominate quantity limits for GHG emissions abatement because
damages are sensitive to the change in the stock of GHGs, not the flow of emissions).
196. For detailed discussions of the double-dividend effect and its consequences, see IAN
W.H. PARRY Er AL., WHEN CAN CARBON ABATEMENT POLICIES INCREASE VELFARE? THE
FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF DISTORTED FACTOR MARKETS (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper 5967, 1997); A. Lans Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and
Distortionary Taxation, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 1085, 1085 (1994); A.L. Bovenberg & F. van der
Ploeg, Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World, 55
J. PUB. ECON. 349, 350-52 (1994); Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the
"Double Dividend": A Reader's Guide, 2 INT'L TAx'N & PUB. FIN. 157 (1995); Lawrence H.
Goulder et al., Revenue-Raising Versus Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The
Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J. ECON. 708 (1997); and Ian W.H.
Parry, Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling, 29 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. S64, S65 (1995).
But see Wallace E. Oates, Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the Tax




revenue-recycling instrument.197 One analysis of the U.S. SO2 trading
program, for example, estimates it to be seventy-one percent more costly
because of its interactions with preexisting taxes than it would be if no such
preexisting taxes were present98 and finds that if the SO2 trading system
had sold allowances at auctions instead of issuing allowances for free (or
had been an emissions tax), then the revenue-recycling effect would have
recouped over half of that seventy percent additional tax-related cost.199 A
similar analysis finds that a non-revenue-recycling constraint on CO2
emissions in the United States (i.e., allowances issued free) would impose
costs several times higher than those imposed by a revenue-recycling policy
(a CO2 tax or auctioned allowances), and that whereas the revenue-
recycling policy would be net beneficial, the non-revenue-recycling policy
could even have negative net benefits."'
At the same time, recycling environmental revenues also confronts
difficulties. The goals of revenue collection and pollution control may come
into conflict. The revenue-maximizing tax is not the same as the
externality-internalizing tax, and the two tax rates will coincide only by
accident. Pollution taxes set at rates high enough to internalize social harms
and discourage pollution might not maximize revenues precisely because
they will discourage pollution, thereby shrinking the tax base.20 1
Alternatively, pollution taxes established to maximize revenues might have
to be set at a low tax rate that does not do much to reduce pollution. Hence,
using pollution taxes for the very purpose of capturing the revenue-
recycling benefits might lead to both persistently inadequate taxes and
excessive pollution.0 2 This problem is not as severe for allowance sales,
197. See Goulder et al., supra note 196, at 726-27.
198. See id. at 721,726.
199. See id.
200. See LAWRENCE H. GOuLDER ET AL., THE COST-EFFECTivENESS OF ALTERNATIVE
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A SECOND-BEST SETTING (National Bureau
of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6464, 1998). Whether net benefits are positive or negative
depends on how large the marginal environmental benefits of CO2 abatement are. A previous
analysis found that the marginal abatement costs of the revenue-recycling policy start at $0,
whereas the marginal abatement costs of the non-revenue-recycling policy start at $25 per ton. See
id. at 3. Thus, for the latter to have positive net benefits, marginal benefits of abatement would
have to exceed $25 per ton. The magnitude of climate protection benefits is open to much debate.
Compare CLINE, supra note 9, 130-33 (finding potentially high marginal benefits), with WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 55-
59 (1994) (finding low marginal benefits).
201. See Arnold, supra note 19, at 14.
202. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 284 (suggesting that tax authorities may administer
pollution taxes "with more of an eye toward increasing government revenues than protecting the
environment"). In practice, most pollution tax systems have been adopted to raise revenue rather
than to deter pollution. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 437. Such systems have
consequently employed low tax rates that did little or nothing to diminish pollution. See
ANDERSEN, supra note 118, at 8; Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 313, 314-15 & 315 n.16 (1998)
(citing Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and
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because under such an instrument the quantity of emissions allowed is
capped ex ante; lowering the sale price cannot increase emissions further
than the total supply of allowances authorized.
Furthermore, the revenue-recycling effect may be less salient at the
global level than at the national level, because there are few, if any,
preexisting distortionary global taxes. To capture the double dividend, the
global regulator would need to use tax revenues to reduce the internal
distortionary taxes of individual nations. This would leave little revenue
available for use at the global level to assist poorer societies with abatement
costs. And a truly global environmental tax (or allowance sale) would raise
thorny questions about who collects the revenues, who controls the use of
the revenues, and by which criteria these decisions are to be made.
Third, restricting the quantity of emissions could create problems of
market power. Scarcity rents are the market power to raise prices above the
competitive equilibrium when output and new entrants to the industry are
limited. New entrants could be impeded by a conduct instrument
differentially burdening new sources, or by a quantity-based instrument
capping the total amount of emissions.2 3 As a result, supply of the
industry's product would be limited and the price of the product would rise,
reducing consumers' real net incomes.2' In addition, the efficiency of a
tradeable allowances system could be undermined if some participants
exercise market power and thereby influence prices.' 5 A monopolist
allowance seller (or a cartel of a few powerful sellers) could seek to raise
prices, or a monopsonist allowance buyer (or a cartel of a few powerful
buyers) could seek to depress prices.
Fourth, taxes may be more immune to transaction costs than are
tradeable allowances. Transaction costs include the costs of searching for
Obstacles 42 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal)). Of course, tax
authorities might also try to maximize revenues by raising tax rates above the optimal externality
tax, driving down activity levels but collecting such a high tax rate on inframarginal activity that
revenues increase. In either case, the revenue-maximizing tax is not (except by accident) equal to
the optimal externality tax.
203. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response:
Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 139, 139-41 (1975).
204. See DON FULLERTON & GILBERT METCALF, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, SCARCITY
RENTS, AND PRE-EXISTING DISTORTIONS (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 6091, 1997). Indeed, the prospect of earning scarcity profits suggests why existing industry
members might lobby in favor of seemingly burdensome environmental regulation. See Buchanan
& Tullock, supra note 203, at 146; Keohane et al., supra note 202, at 348-51; Michael T. Maloney
& Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 99, 99-100 (1982). But see John S. Hughes et al., The Economic Consequences of the
OSHA Cotton Dust Standards: An Analysis of Stock Price Behavior, 29 J.L. & ECON. 29, 29-31,
58-59 (1986) (reviewing the analysis by Maloney and McCormick with different data and finding
no scarcity rents conferred on industry).
205. See Robert W. Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 QJ. ECON.
753 (1984). Taxes can also be distorted by market power. See James M. Buchanan, External
Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 174, 175 (1969).
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partners, negotiating the transaction, securing regulatory approval,
monitoring performance, enforcing the deal (including the costs of deterring
free riding and holdouts), and insuring against nonperformance. 6 They are
important in regulatory instrument choice on two dimensions.
If transaction costs between victim and source are high, liability rules
are preferable to property rules. With zero transaction costs, the familiar
Coase Theorem holds that the parties can costlessly reallocate entitlements
to internalize externalities, regardless of the initial assignment of
entitlements among them; in this case, the liability rule and the property
rule are equivalent because the parties will contract around either one.07
But if these transaction costs are high, such Coasean deals may be
frustrated and externalities may persist.2°1 When transaction costs are high,
an initial assignment of a property rule entitlement between source and
victim may be determinative and the truly efficient reallocation of the
entitlement may be blocked; in such cases, the liability rule with damages
set equal to harm is superior to the property rule.2' On similar reasoning,
taxes would be superior to quantity instruments under high transaction
costs.
210
206. See DANIEL J. DuDEK & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, JOINT IMPLEMENTATION,
TRANSACTION COSTS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 20-21 (OECD OECD/GD (96) 173, 1996); Coase,
supra note 4, at 15.
207. See Coase, supra note 4, at 39-42; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 733-34.
208. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1094-95; Coase, supra note 4, at 15-19; Carl
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979).
209. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 57; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between
Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 236-39 (1995);
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1106-07; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability
Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 224, 231-33
(1995); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 727. Ayres and Talley dispute Posner's claim that at
low transaction costs, property rules are superior, see POSNER, supra, at 57. They argue that
liability rules are universally superior to property rules, although decreasingly so as transaction
costs decline, until the two types of rules are equivalent at zero transaction costs. See Ayres &
Talley, supra, at 238-40.
210. It is important to recall that quantity instruments such as tradeable allowances are not
pure property rule entitlements assigned to one side or the other. Tradeable allowance systems
represent divided property entitlements, in which polluters get some right to emit and victims get
the right to be free of emissions above the quantity limit. If the aggregate quantity of emissions
entitlements is set close to the level at which the sources and victims would have agreed if they
could have bargained, then tradeable allowances would not exhibit the inefficiencies of pure
property rules under high transaction costs between victims and sources. This may explain why
Kaplow and Shavell refer at one point to tradeable allowances as "closely related to liability
rules" even though they later note that "[p]ollution taxes are essentially a form of liability rule,
whereas the tradeable-rights system has property-rule-like elements." Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 748, 751 (citation omitted); see also id. at 750 n.119 (referring to "liability rules
(including pollution taxes) and property rules that regulate the amount of pollution (including
tradeable permit schemes)"). It is hard to classify tradeable allowances because they are not pure
property rules and can be designed to behave very much like taxes. Just as taxes, unlike liability
rules, do not give compensation to victims, so tradeable allowances, unlike property rules, do not
give full entitlements to either side. Taxes and tradeable allowances are intermediate price- and
quantity-based tools that can converge to equivalence. The clear difference between taxes and
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Meanwhile, if transaction costs among sources are high, the cost-
effectiveness of a market-based allowance trading system-which depends
on trades of partial entitlements among sources-will be impaired.21
Transaction costs in regulatory markets can be high when finding partners,
monitoring performance, negotiating novel transactions for new regulatory
commodities, and securing regulatory approval of trades are costly. 12 All of
these costs are likely to be higher in arranging individual joint
implementation projects than in participating in formal allowance trading.
213
Insurance against nonperformance can be especially costly in "informal"
allowance markets, such as joint implementation, where each investor bears
the full risk of project failure. In "formal" allowance markets, where
investors purchase fungible partial shares of multiple and diverse abatement
efforts, these insurance costs would be much lower.14
In contrast to these considerations favoring taxes, tradeable allowances
may be superior to taxes on fairness grounds. As discussed above, taxes
may impose uncompensated costs on poorer sources, whereas the initial
assignment of tradeable allowances can hold poorer sources constant or
even make them net gainers.1 5 The relative unfairness of taxes can be
removed by making redistributive payments to poorer sources that mimic
the favorable initial assignment of extra allowances. But using tax revenues
to make such assistance payments would deprive the tax of its revenue-
recycling advantage.2 6 A tax as fair as a tradeable allowance instrument
may thus have only the relative advantage of better performance in the face
of uncertainty.217
tradeable allowances is in their performance under uncertainty about abatement costs. See supra
Subsection 11.C.3.
211. See Robert E. Kohn, Transactions Costs and the Optimal Instrument and Intensity of Air
Pollution Control, 24 POL'Y SCI. 315 (1991); Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and
Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 133 (1995). On transaction costs in
international environmental markets, see DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206.
212. See DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206, at 26-35 (surveying transaction costs in
environmental regulatory markets); Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Constraints on Environmental
Markets, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 149, 171 (1990). An empirical study shows that regulatory barriers to
trading can stifle environmental markets and that institutional reforms to reduce transaction costs
can unleash robust trading. See Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient
Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19 (1995).
213. See DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206.
214. See id. at 36-40, 50-51.
215. See supra Subsection mH.C.1.
216. See GOULDER ET AL., supra note 200, at 22 ("If revenues from an emissions tax were
returned as lump-sum payments rather than used to reduce pre-existing tax rates, the revenue-
recycling effect would not materialize and the costs of the emissions tax in our model would be
the same as those of the (non-auctioned) emissions quota.").
217. The moral criticism of incentive instruments, see supra Subsection 1I.C.1, seems to
have less to say about choosing between taxes and tradeable allowances. Perhaps tradeable
allowances would be preferred on moral grounds because at least they limit the total quantity of
pollution, whereas taxes could conceivably allow unlimited pollution as long as sources paid their
taxes. On the other hand, taxes make the polluter pay for every unit of emissions, whereas issued




Under a legal framework of Unitary Fiat, in which a hypothetical single
rational decisionmaker chooses and imposes the optimal instrument directly
on sources of externalities, the standard analysis suggests three basic
presumptions. First, incentive instruments (taxes and tradeable allowances)
are decidedly superior to conduct instruments (technology requirements)
and performance standards (fixed quantity limits) in terms of cost-
effectiveness and dynamic efficiency. Second, subsidies for abatement are
inefficient because they perversely encourage increased aggregate activity
levels by sources, potentially exacerbating total environmental damage.
And third, taxes may be more efficient than tradeable allowances because
of uncertainty about abatement costs, revenue-recycling (if allowances are
not sold), and transaction costs.
Of course, there are numerous caveats and rejoinders; these are only
presumptions. But taken together they imply that, under Unitary Fiat, global
environmental taxes are the presumptive preferred regulatory instrument for
addressing global environmental externalities.21 In the contest to crown the
best global environmental regulatory instrument under Unitary Fiat, the
standard analysis suggests that taxes win the gold medal, tradeable
allowances garner the silver, fixed emissions limits take the bronze, and
subsidies and technology standards bring up the rear.
IV. CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS
UNDER ALTERNATIVE VOTING RULES
In contrast to instrument choice under a hypothetical single rational
actor with the power of fiat, real national and global choices among
regulatory instruments occur under more complex voting rules. Yet most
analyses of global regulatory instrument choice take no account of this
difference in voting rules across legal systems.2 '19 As James Buchanan has
avoid a visible market in buying and selling pollution rights, which may be what troubles moral
advocates the most. See Arthur Hoppe, Editorial, A License To Steal, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1971,
at 39, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 98, at 259.
218. This is the conclusion reached for control of global warming by CLINE, supra note 9, at
346-51, 369, 377, PIZER, supra note 9, at 29, Cooper, supra note 9, at 74-77, and Goulder et al.,
supra note 196, at 726-27. It is also the general conclusion reached as to all externality problems
by Kaplow and Shavell, supra note 5, at 773.
219. Advocates of international GHG emissions taxes typically have not addressed whether
the different voting rule in force at the global level affects the attractiveness of emissions taxes.
See, e.g., CLINE, supra note 9; PIZER, supra note 9; Cooper, supra note 9. In like fashion,
advocates of internationally tradeable GHG allowances have often extrapolated from the
performance of tradeable allowances at the national level, without addressing whether the
different legal framework in force at the global level affects the attractiveness of tradeable
allowances. See, e.g., Stewart & wiener, Global Climate Policy, supra note 11, at 106 & n.80
(citing the American SO2 emissions trading program as a model for international GHG emissions
1999]
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urged, "Economists should cease proffering policy advice as if they were
employed by a benevolent despot, and they should look to the structure
within which political decisions are made.... [We should] postulate some
model of the state, of politics, before proceeding to analyze the effects of
alternative policy measures.""20 This Article undertakes such an analysis of
the choice of an optimal environmental regulatory instrument across
different postulated models of the state. In this Part, I show that variation in
the actual voting rules, taken as given,22 significantly affects the choice of
optimal regulatory instrument. In particular, this Part shows that, all other
policy attributes held equal, a shift in voting rules from the coercive end of
the spectrum (Fiat) toward the non-coercive end of the spectrum (Voluntary
Assent) confers a distinct advantage on quantity-based tradeable
allowances. Although the policy attributes discussed in Part Im remain
relevant to a complete analysis of the choice among regulatory instruments,
this Part shows that a less coercive voting rule adds a new presumption
pointing in the opposite direction from the presumptions that obtain under
Fiat.
A. The Range of Voting Rules
Voting rules for the adoption of regulation range from Autocracy (rule
by one) at one end of the spectrum (labeled point A) to Unanimity (rule by
all) at the other end (labeled point G). Midway along the spectrum is
Simple Majority rule (rule by fifty percent plus one). Figure 2 illustrates the
spectrum.
trading); SO2 Trading Program Offers Answers for Other Pollution Problems, Group Says, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1408-09 (Nov. 21, 1997) (reporting on an Environmental Defense
Fund paper arguing that the American domestic SO2 emissions trading program should serve as
the model for international allowance trading to control global greenhouse gas emissions);
William K. Stevens, Meeting Reaches Accord To Reduce Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TuwEs, Dec.
11, 1997, at Al (reporting that the United States' advocacy of international tradeable emissions
allowances for GHGs is "[b]ased on its [domestic] success with trading emissions of sulfur
dioxide, a chemical implicated in acid rain").
220. Buchanan, supra note 96, at 243.
221. The condition that the voting rules are taken as given is important. See supra note 24.
The question analyzed here is not whether the prevailing voting rules should be changed but
whether regulatory instrument choice should be different at the global level because of the
different voting rule at the global level. The constraints imposed by voting rules are not an
artificial distortion that regulatory choice can ignore. They are just as real as the other constraints
analyzed in the standard literature on instrument choice, such as transaction costs, uncertainty, and
the effects of preexisting taxes. Indeed, the basic voting rule of the polity is a constitutional
parameter that is likely to be far more entrenched and immutable than these other considerations.
On the merits of alternative voting rules, see generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II
(1989).
[Vol. 108: 677
1999] Global Environmental Regulation 737
FIGURE 2. THE RANGE OF VOTING RULES
A B C D E F G
Autocracy Simple Unanimity
(Fiat) Majority
Out of N voters, number of votes necessary to enact law:
1 (N/2)+l N
The assumption of rational fiat in the literature on instrument choice
corresponds to enlightened Autocracy, or what Buchanan labels the
"benevolent despot."2 National legislation, at least in democracies,
employs a version of Majority rule,' which can be limited in various
ways-for example, by requiring compensation to losers when the majority
imposes costs via regulation.224
By contrast, the voting rule for international treaty law is Voluntary
Assent: Treaties bind only those who consent to be bound.' Unlike
222. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
223. This is, of course, an approximation. Real national law in the United States is not simple
Majority rule but often involves majority or super-majority votes in more than one legislative
chamber, plus signature by the executive and review by the courts. See Maxwell L. Steams, The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994) (describing how the
political system in the United States employs a combination of institutions that avoids the
incapacities of simple Majority rule); cf Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 404-10 (1977) (describing the Madisonian
hypothesis that larger and more complex polities are better depicted by an influence model than
by simple Majority rule). And regulation under real national law regularly involves negotiation
and compromise with polluters, rather than simple coercion, to facilitate compliance. See Daniel
A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REv. 1283, 1315 & n.161
(1997). Meanwhile, as discussed in the text, real international law is not a pure rule of Voluntary
Assent but rather exhibits some coercive pressures. The differences among real legal frameworks
are thus differences of degree along a spectrum.
224. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation").
225. See LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 162 (1961) ("[N]o State can be bound by
any treaty provision unless it has given its assent .... "); SANDLER, supra note 56, at 12-14
(contrasting the authority to tax and regulate environmental externalities at the national level with
the absence of such compulsory authority over nations at the global level); Farber, supra note 223,
at 1314 ("The basic principle of international law, after all, is that it binds states only with their
own consent."); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL
DES CouRs D'ACADEfIE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 27 (1989) (" [A] State is not subject to any
external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority."), quoted in John K.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 158 (1996); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways To Make
International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 272 (1992) ("The whole structure and
content of treaty law is based on the principle of consent .. "); Setear, supra, at 175-76 (noting
that "a centralized authority with coercive powers ... [can] produce pure public goods in a
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Majority rule, Voluntary Assent cannot impose regulation on the unwilling.
Voluntary Assent is slightly different from Unanimity because Voluntary
Assent does not require, as Unanimity does, the consent of every last voter
to become binding on those who do consent. The Voluntary Assent voting
rule could theoretically appear at any point along the spectrum in Figure 2,
with any number from 1 party to N parties consenting to adopt a regulation.
But the global environmental treaty-making process, the custom of seeking
consensus,226 and the pressure to avoid the economic costs of subglobal
coverage and leakage tend to place the Voluntary Assent voting rule near
point F in Figure 2. The fundamental requirement of consent makes it
analytically most similar (though not identical) to the Unanimity rule.
To be sure, the real international system does involve some coercive
pressures on nation-states. 7 Nation-states respond not only to the domestic
benefits and costs of joining a treaty, narrowly defined, but also to the
reputational consequences of joining (esteem) or not joining (shame);228 to
domestic special interests (and transnational coalitions of such international
groups) making use of nations' coercive majoritarian voting rules;229 to
forms of international law other than treaties that can, in theory, involve
coercion of dissenters, such as resolutions of the U.N. Security' Council,
national economy" but that "[i]n the realm of international relations, however, no world
government exists to force nations to pay taxes for pure public goods").
226. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 111, at 162.
227. See Martin List & Volker Rittberger, Regime Theory and International Environmental
Management, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 116, at 85,
108-09. List and Rittberger note that:
[T]he spread of international environmental regimes, slow and intermittent as it may be,
is part of a broader process of change in international relations. States are switching
from the predominant reliance on self-help strategies to the management of
interdependence through increased mutual and self-control .... Neither international
("world") government nor international anarchy are the poles towards which the
collective management of international environmental problems and conflicts will
direct itself. Rather, it is a changing mix of unregulated and regulated conflict
management which, eventually, will give rise to "regulated anarchy"....
Id.
228. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 182, at 27; LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND,
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 49 (1994); Alexandre Kiss, The Implications of Global Change for
the International Legal System, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 315,
331 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992); Harold HongJu Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture:
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996); James N. Rosenau, Global
Environmental Governance: Delicate Balances, Subtle Nuances, and Multiple Challenges, in
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 19, 51-52 (Mats Rol6n et al. eds.,
1997).
229. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and
International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974) (discussing the "[1]ack of control of
sub-unit behavior by top" government leadership); Henry Lee, Introduction to SHAPING
NATIONAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 14 (Henry Lee ed., 1995) (stating that "de facto
transnational coalitions" often have "enormous influence" on international diplomacy); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183, 184
(describing the disaggregation of the state into "separate, functionally distinct parts").
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"customary international law,"'" or outright arm-twisting via military
threats or trade sanctions. 23
But all things considered, international treaty law still remains much
closer to Voluntary Assent than to the Majoritarian coercion available under
national law.232 A broad definition of national net benefit is needed to
capture the multi-issue rewards to strategic decisions on individual issues in
return for reciprocity on other issues. But the basic requirement of national
assent based on national net benefit remains operative. 3 Large countries
like China, India, Brazil, Russia, and the United States will not easily bend
to coercive pressures. Notwithstanding occasional pressures on some
countries to give consent against their better judgment, the basic voting rule
230. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59
Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S. No. 993; LAKSHMAN D. GURuSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 79-80 (1994); Birnie, supra note 116, at 57-61. But
little or no effective international environmental law has emerged from this process, illustrating
again the Voluntary Assent nature of global environmental regulation. Birnie notes that it usually
takes "a considerable time for evidence to accumulate that the practice is so widely and
consistently followed" that it becomes binding customary international law. Bimie, supra note
116, at 57. Other observers argue that customary international law has so far done little to regulate
transboundary pollution. See Bodansky, supra note 117, at 117; Merrill, supra note 51, at 932-34,
958-67; Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra note 117, at 1492-
94.
231. See James Cameron, The GATT and the Environment, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL
LAW 100, 106-16 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994); Chang, supra note 188, at 2131-45.
232. See Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, Incentives To Participate in an International
Environmental Agreement, 9 ENvTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 153, 165-67 (1997) ("When global
environmental problems are at stake, no country can be forced to adhere to an internationally
announced level of abatement. Only voluntary participation in an agreement is possible."). Even
international law optimists affirm the central role of Voluntary Assent at the global level:
For many.., the absence of any central authority-the existence of anarchy between
states-is the defining principle of international relations .... Even if this image of a
Hobbesian world is rejected as overdrawn. . . ,the difficulties of inter-state co-
operation must still constitute the starting-point for any study of the prospects for
global environmental management.
Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury, The International Politics of the Environment: An
Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 116, at 1, 4-5.
David Freestone-who laments that skeptics never tire of asking "is international law really
law?" and who answers that to "the enduring chagrin of positivists, international law exists"-
agrees that
[t]here are major limitations in the international legal system... such as the
sovereignty of the national state, which results in the absence of an established central
legislature comparable to that existing in national systems [and] the absence of a
compulsory.. judicial system ....
David Freestone, The Road from Rio: International Environmental Law After the Earth Summit, 6
J. ENvTL. L. 193, 195 (1994). From the perspective of my analysis of alternative voting rules,
international law does exist; it just starts from a voting rule quite different from that under
national law.
233. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 104 (1984); Robert 0. Keohane, The
Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 146-49, 152 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that although constrained by inequalities of power and
interdependence, "international regimes should not be seen as quasi-governments-imperfect
attempts to institutionalize centralized authority relationships in world politics. Regimes are more
like contracts .... In general, we expect states to join those regimes in which they expect the
benefits of membership to outweigh the costs.").
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for effective international environmental law remains that countries can
refuse to be bound by treaties.
The fundamental difference between Fiat and Majority rule on the one
hand, and Voluntary Assent and Unanimity on the other, is thus the ability
to coerce dissenters. Under Majority rule, the adoption of a legal rule by the
requisite threshold fraction of the polity-typically fifty-one percent or
perhaps a supermajority-makes it compulsory for all, including the forty-
nine percent or less who objected. Under Majority rule, losing dissenters
never have the option to refuse to be bound by the law." Under a
Voluntary Assent paradigm, dissenters cannot be coerced; rules are binding
only on those who agree to be bound. International treaties are adopted by a
voting rule more analogous to negotiated multiparty contracts than to
national legislation.2 6
234. That international treaty law requires the voluntary assent of sovereign nation-states is
illustrated by the numerous tracts lamenting this situation and proposing that the international
legal system move toward majoritarian coercion. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF
FUTURE WORLDS (1975); RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND
PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL (1971); HUMPEREYS, supra note 111, at 171; MCNAIR, supra
note 225, at 534; WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 222-44 (1977);
William R. Moomaw, International Environmental Policy and the Softening of Sovereignty, 21
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7, 14-15 (1997); Palmer, supra note 225, at 264; A. Dan Tarlock,
Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of
Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 37 (1997). Moreover, not only is the
polity's voting rule generally an exogenous "given" for any specific regulatory policy choice, see
supra note 221, but there is a real puzzle whether the Voluntary Assent voting rule for global
environmental policy in particular can ever be dislodged. In short, if the very genesis of global
environmental externalities is that collective action problems prevent countries from cooperating
voluntarily to protect the global environment, then it is unclear how these same countries could
cooperate to establish a legal system of coercive global rules. See Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra
note 232, at 7-8; James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 325, 338 n.44 (1992); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics. Economics, and the Law of Property, in
XX1V NOMOS: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 30-31 (1982); Cf. LOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (Robert 0. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1996) (comparing
collective action problems at the local and global levels); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Economic
Role of the State, in THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE 56 (Arnold Heertje ed., 1989) (arguing
that "the Public Good is a public good"). At the very least, it could take such a long time to
establish a coercive voting rule at the global level that it would be irrelevant for addressing global
environmental issues. See Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra, at 8; see also SPRINGER, supra note 114, at
51-52 ("States remain the basic units in this system, and.., whatever erosion in their powers may
be occurring is unlikely to depose them of their privileged position on the international level in a
relevant time frame.... Any attempt to create a comprehensive framework for international
environmental law must recognize this reality.").
235. Even the modified Majority rule in which losers must be compensated only amounts to a
liability rule protection entitling the loser to market value for the forced expropriation, not a full
property rule protection entitling the loser to refuse the exchange. See Fischel & Shapiro, supra
note 102, at 276-77 (observing that the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause permits the
government to force involuntary sales and thus is less protective of property rights than would be
a rule that prohibited takings "without the consent of the owner").
236. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 56, at 280 (stating that a Voluntary Assent rule
is equivalent to market exchange among voluntary political actors); Keohane, supra note 233, at
146-48 (stating that international regimes are like contracts). But see EVANGELOS RAFTOPOULOS,
THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF TREATIES (1990).
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The Fiat, Majority, and Voluntary Assent voting rules also differ in
their costs of decisionmaking. As the number of participants who must be
consulted increases, the cost of multiple negotiations and the chance that a
nation will act as a holdout, insisting on satisfaction of its interests as the
price for its assent, rise as well. 7 Even if all countries would reap net
benefits from the treaty, uncertainty about others' likely cooperation may
induce strategic noncooperation (free riding)." Each party's perception of
its own gain in turn depends partially on its perception of whether other
parties are likely to keep their end of the deal; cooperation is thus
endogenous, delicate, and potentially difficult to arrange.239 Even after
becoming parties to the treaty, nation-states can withdraw or decide not to
comply. Although such withdrawal or noncompliance might be made illegal
under the terms of a treaty, the practical question is whether any
enforceable sanctions could be brought to bear against the defector. The
threat of withdrawal or noncompliance gives the nation a continuing ability
to exact concessions from other parties to the treaty.2'
Thus, although the Voluntary Assent voting rule inhibits the tyranny of
the majority-the ability to coerce dissenters-it also makes the adoption of
new regulations more difficult to achieve.24' The costs to the entire group of
negotiating a consensus treaty can be high in terms of the time and effort
needed to craft a successful consensus, the side payments extracted by
dissenters, and the collective gains forgone when individual countries delay
or block action on parochial strategic grounds.242 The Voluntary Assent
237. Richard Epstein calls the holdout under a Unanimity rule the "single pervert" who seeks
to "block the state." RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS 333 (1985). The Voluntary Assent rule can
involve lower decisionmaking costs than a Unanimity rule because under Voluntary Assent the
treaty proponents need not secure the assent of every last holdout. For example, the United States
did not agree to the 1997 Landmine Ban Treaty, but it was adopted by many other countries. See
Raymond Bonner, Land Mine Treaty Takes Final Form over U.S. Dissent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
1997, at Al. This could not have occurred under a Unanimity rule. Indeed, a Voluntary Assent
rule can involve even lower decision costs than a Majority rule, because a treaty can involve less
than 50% of all parties. But, again, the consensus rule followed at the Rio Earth Summit and other
recent global environmental treaty negotiations renders the Voluntary Assent rule a close
approximation of a Unanimity rule. See Humphreys, supra note Il1, at 162.
238. See ScoTr BARRETT, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 10-11 (Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 43-98, 1998); W. KIP Viscusi ET AL., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 737-40 (1995); Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra note 232, at 5.
239. See Todd Sandier & Keith Sargent, Management of Transnational Commons:
Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation, 71 LAND ECON. 145, 146-51 (1995).
240. Put another way, the challenge of deterring free riding encompasses the deterrence of
subsequent noncompliance as well. See BARRETT, supra note 238, at 20-26.
241. See generally BUCHANAN & TILLOCK, supra note 56, at 63-91 (illustrating the tradeoff
between the costs of coercion and the costs of decisionmaking as the voting rule changes).
242. I have not mentioned a well-known source of high decisionmaking costs under Majority
rule, the problem of indeterminate vote-cycling identified by Condorcet and Arrow. First, the
Condorcet-Arrow theory of majority-vote cycling is subject to much debate: Although simple
models of Majority rule depict endless cycling, real Majority rule exhibits considerable stability.
See MUELLER, supra note 221, at 58-95; Steams, supra note 223; Gordon Tullock, Why So Much
Stability?, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 189 (1981). Second, cycling problems may apply to Voluntary
19991
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voting rule does avoid the special decisionmaking problem under absolute
Unanimity that the very last strategic holdout can extort large concessions
and delays from the would-be cooperators. Under Voluntary Assent,
decisionmaking costs will be less than under Unanimity to the extent that
some (small) number of holdouts can be ignored by the cooperating group.
But if "leakage" of sources of the global externality is important, there will
be powerful incentives for countries to seek nearly universal assent.243
B. Participation Efficiency
The Voluntary Assent rule in operation at the global level creates quite
different conditions for regulatory instrument choice from those obtaining
under Fiat. Under Voluntary Assent, participation by sources of the
externality must be attracted rather than compelled. Attracting participation
at least cost-what I term "participation efficiency" -becomes as
important as cost-effectiveness, incentives for innovation, performance
under uncertainty, revenue-recycling, and the other attributes that make up
the standard analysis reviewed in Part I1. In this Section, I show that
tradeable allowances are likely to be decidedly more participation-efficient
than subsidies, taxes, and other instruments.
Assent voting as well, at least as long as the number of assenting participants is not fixed (as it
would be under a strict unanimity rule) but can grow or shrink as the candidate rule to be adopted
changes. Third, to the extent that vote cycling is actually more of a problem under Majority rule
than under the Voluntary Assent rule, this only suggests that both voting rules have high
decisionmaking costs. This does not help much in distinguishing among the available regulatory
instruments.
By contrast, the ability to coerce dissenters is a sharp difference between the two voting rules
with direct implications for the choice among regulatory instruments. At least for this purpose,
coercion is a far more important attribute of Majority rule than is cycling. "[TIhe central problem
for democratic theory is not that we cannot figure out what majorities want, but that when we give
majorities what they want, we may have some very upset minorities!" Bernard Grofman, Public
Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice"
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1587 n.210 (1993).
243. A corollary of the lower decisionmaldng costs facing government under Majority rule
than under Voluntary Assent is that government institutions will tend to be larger and more
powerful under Majority rule than under Voluntary Assent. The ability under Majority rule to tax
the population, to require information disclosure, and to enact statutes and issue regulations, even
over the objections of dissenters, gives Majority rule a greater capacity to fund and equip an
administrative bureaucracy. See JAMES BucHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DFiOCRAcY IN
DEFICIT (1977); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 364-66
(1988). A more unitary implementation structure may also facilitate a more potent administrative
state. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BuCHANAN, THE POWER To TAX: ANALYTIcAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FiscAL CONSTITUTION 33 (1980) (stating that interjurisdictional competition
restrains expansionary tendencies of central governments).
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1. From Kaldor-Hicks to Pareto-Improving
Under Fiat or Majority rule, conduct rules, taxes, and quantity limits
can be imposed on sources without the sources' consent. As noted above,
under Fiat, the rational regulatory decisionmaker's efficiency criterion
would be Kaldor-Hicks: Aggregate benefits must exceed aggregate costs, so
that winners gain enough to be able to compensate losers, but such
compensation to losers need not actually occur.2" This is the basis on which
economists conventionally discuss instrument choice.245 Under simple
Majority rule, a policy could be adopted as long as the gains exceeded the
losses sufficiently to garner one more than half the votes.246 The key point is
that, whether the Fiat and Majority rules actually achieve net social gains or
not, they can and typically do coercively impose uncompensated costs on
the dissenters. As Buchanan and Tullock have noted, "the essence of the
collective-choice process under majority voting rules is the fact that the
minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot prevent
and for which they cannot claim compensation for damages resulting.'
247
By contrast, under the Voluntary Assent voting rule, regulation cannot
be imposed on sources without the sources' consent. Regulation therefore
requires achieving Pareto improvement among participants, which means
that as some are made better off, no one is made worse off.248 Under
Voluntary Assent, international regulation of global externalities must be
Pareto-improving. It must be an arrangement that "in fact, makes all parties
better off. Otherwise, any agreement is unlikely.... Such policies must
244. See BAUOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 96 n.4; POSNER, supra note 100, at 13-15.
245. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 14.
246. If all interests were effectively and equally represented in the voting body, Majority rule
would correspond to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 383-84 (1983) (theorizing
that competition among interest groups fosters Kaldor-I-Iicks efficiency because it increases the
likelihood that the least inefficient regulations will be adopted). If all interests are not effectively
and equally represented in real majoritarian rule-because, among other things, of the transaction
costs of exercising political voice-then real Majority rule may adopt policies that benefit
politically active groups to the net detriment of society and that therefore do not satisfy even
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See MUELLER, supra note 221, at 244-45; MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE
AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 41-47 (1982); Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of
Politics, 2 J. THEORErIcAL POL. 355, 362-63 (1990); see also Robert W. Hahn, Economic
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: Not Exactly What the Doctor Ordered, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 131, 173-77 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 1989)
(doubting Becker's hypothesis in light of the empirical evidence of inefficient instrument choice
in U.S. environmental regulation).
247. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 56, at 89-90.
248. See id. at 92 (stating that the Pareto criterion is strictly satisfied "only if all persons
agree, that is, only if there is the unanimous consent of all members of the group"); id. at 95 ("All
less-than-unanimity decision-making rules can be expected to lead to nonoptimal decisions by the
Pareto criterion."). Richard Posner notes that Pareto improvement requires that any adversely
affected parties must be "actually compensated." POSNER, supra note 100, at 14. Posner also
notes that "the criterion of Pareto superiority is unanimity of all affected persons," id. at 13, or
"something that only a voluntary transaction can create," id. at 14.
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constitute a Pareto improvement for all nations concerned." '249 An
international environmental treaty must be not only collectively attractive
(improving net global well-being), but individually attractive to every
signatory (improving each country's net well-being). No party will agree to
the regulatory regime unless it reaps net gains from joining (or at least is
made no worse off)." A party may reap net gains directly from the shared
protective effects of the environmental policy. Or it may receive net gains
by being compensated via side payments from the direct beneficiaries." If
a regulation would impose net costs on a party, those net costs must
actually be compensated to attract that party's assent. 2
The Voluntary Assent rule means that global regulatory treaties are
cooperation games. A chief obstacle to cooperation is that, for each player,
free riding on others' efforts may be preferable to acting alone, even though
mutual effort would be collectively preferable to mutual inaction.23 The
249. BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 279; see also SANDLER, supra note 56, at 14
("Successful collective action [to address global problems] requires that all participants receive a
net benefit. This simple realization is often forgotten."); Carlo Carraro & Domenico Sinscalco,
The International Protection of the Environment: Voluntary Agreements Among Sovereign
Countries, in THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSNATiONAL COMMONS, supra note 81, at 192, 197 ("The
minimum requirement [for an international environmental treaty] is that the welfare of each
country signing the co-operative agreement be larger than its welfare under no cooperation."
(emphasis added)).
250. See Keohane, supra note 233, at 147, 152, 167; Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahtoranta,
The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 77, 80-81
(1994). Gains and losses need not be defined rigidly here. Parties' gains could include, for
example, net income, improved reputation, esteem for being a leader, improved environmental
quality, the value of altruistic contributions, and other factors. Losses could include net payments,
impaired reputation, shame for being recalcitrant, diminished environmental quality, and other
factors.
251. See BucHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 56, at 90-91. Buchanan and Tullock note that
"[t]he unanimity test is, in fact, identical to the compensation test if compensation is interpreted
as that payment... which is required to secure agreement [to the policy]." Id at 91.
252. Strictly speaking, the Voluntary Assent rule differs from a full Unanimity rule as to the
costs imposed on dissenters (nonparticipants). The Unanimity rule ensures zero real
uncompensated costs to anyone because a policy cannot be adopted unless it obtains the assent of
all affected persons. The Voluntary Assent rule can yield real uncompensated costs to
nonparticipants because there can be a treaty imposing external costs on those that do not ratify.
See Keohane, supra note 233, at 152. For example, industrialized countries could agree to a treaty
to restrict GHG emissions, benefiting the signatories but imposing uncompensated costs on
nonsignatory countries that would benefit from a warmer world. Such costs are analogous to the
externalities imposed on nonparticipants by voluntary private market transactions that do not
involve all affected persons. Still, the "consensus" rule followed at the Rio Earth Summit and
other major environmental treaty negotiations renders the Voluntary Assent rule a close
approximation to a Unanimity rule. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 111, at 162.
Moreover, to attract assent a treaty need only make each signatory net better off compared to
that party's not joining the treaty, not compared to there being no treat)' at all. A country could
rationally assent to a treaty given that others are going to assent-because being left out would be
worse than joining--even though the best result for that party would be no participation by any
country. Thus, the requisite side payment need only cover the dissenter's marginal costs of
joining, not its total costs of the treaty's occurring. I am grateful to Jim Hammitt and Scott Barrett
for discussion of this point.
253. In a standard two-player cooperation game, often called a "prisoner's dilemma," the
benefits of cooperation are shared reciprocally by cooperators. To illustrate, assume the benefits
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challenge of global environmental regulation in such cases is thus to create
institutions that raise the benefits of collective action, raise the costs of free
riding, raise players' confidence that others will cooperate rather than free
ride, and reduce the costs of collective action.' Although much attention
has been focused on the procooperative influence of strategies such as
repeat playing, communication, and credible threats against free riders,
there is also a large role for the choice of regulatory instruments to play in
overcoming free riding. Regulatory instruments can help overcome free
riding if they raise the benefits of collective action or reduce the costs of
collective action. 5 Regulatory tools that are more costly to implement or
promise fewer collective benefits can exacerbate free riding and hence be
self-defeating. 6
of cooperation by each player are 8, the benefits of noncooperation are 0, and the costs of
cooperation (abatement of the externality) by each player are 5. If both cooperate, each gains 8 at
a cost of 5, for a net of 3 each. If neither cooperates, each gains 0 and loses 0. If one cooperates
while the other defects, they share the nonexclusive benefit of 8 for a gain of 4 each, but the
defector enjoys a net gain of 4 while the sole cooperator pays the cost of 5 for a net gain of-1. The
choice matrix shows each player's net outcome:
If Player B:
If Player A: Cooperates Defects
Cooperates A: 3, B: 3 A: -1, B: 4
Defects A: 4, B: -1 A: 0, B: 0
Each player's preference ordering is DC > CC > DD > CD (where C denotes "cooperate"
and D denotes "defect," and the first letter in each pair denotes the player's own behavior while
the second letter in each pair denotes the other player's behavior). In the example above, DC = 4,
CC = 3, DD = 0, and CD = -1. If the other player cooperates, defecting yields the higher reward (4
> 3); and if the other player defects, defecting again yields the higher reward (0 > -1). The result is
that both players defect and fail to abate, DD. This occurs even though their combined result, if
they could agree on mutual cooperation (CC = 3+3 = 6), would be preferable to mutual defection
(DD = 0 + 0). Indeed, the collective preference ordering is CC > (DC = CD) > DD (here, 6 > 3 >
0). See MUELLER, supra note 221, at 9-12; Aronson, supra note 11, at 2150 & n.38.
254. See AXELROD, supra note 58, at 124-51 (identifying strategies to promote cooperation);
Barrett, supra note 58, at 275-82 (applying cooperation-promoting strategies to international
environment agreements). The same applies to all collective action problems, not just global
cooperation. The establishment of legal regimes to manage local resources that had previously
been treated as open-access can be viewed as a problem of creating institutional arrangements that
yield gains from cooperation exceeding the costs of cooperation. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 347-48, 350, 350-57 (1967); Robert 0.
Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE,
supra note 234, at 1-4, 13-15, 22-23.
255. For example, if the cost of cooperation (abatement) by each party in the example supra
note 253 were only 2 instead of 5, then for each player CC = 6, DC = 4, CD = 2, DD = 0. In this
case, CC > DC > CD > DD for each player. The reduced cost of abatement makes cooperation the
attractive strategy for both players, regardless of the other player's choice. The result is CC, the
collective optimum outcome.
256. Note that there might also be first movers, for whom the preference ordering would be
CC > CD > DC > DD. These players are sources who would rather have mutual cooperation but
who would still act in the absence of cooperation because they perceive gains to acting first. For
example, they might believe the Porter hypothesis that first movers in regulation will gain a
technological edge over later movers. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a
New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1995);
Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, Sci. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168. For criticism of the
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In addition to free riding by potential net beneficiaries of mutual
cooperation, a second obstacle to international successful regulation is
recalcitrance by potential net losers. Recall Figure 1. Those in Group V (the
pure victims of the global externality) are obviously especially keen to
promote global action to limit sources. The other two groups (S and S&V)
involve sources that will have to bear some costs if the global environment
is to be protected. Cooperation by members of Group S&V (reciprocal
sources/victims) is easier to achieve than cooperation by Group S (pure
sources) because the reciprocal source countries also stand to gain from
collective regulation."sl Nonbeneficiary sources (Group S) do not gain from
collective regulation. They bear net costs. (In addition, some countries in
Group S&V may also bear net costs if their benefits of cooperative
abatement are less than their costs of cooperation.) These "cooperative
losers" in Group S (and some in Group S&V) are worse off if they
participate in the regulatory regime than if they do not." An extreme
Porter hypothesis, see Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of
U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132 (1995);
Karen Palmer et al., Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost
Paradigm?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 119 (1995); and Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy
Being Green, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1994, at 46. Cf Richard A. Clarke, The Challenge of
Going Green, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1994, at 37 (involving 12 experts debating Porter and
his critics). Whether or not the Porter hypothesis is valid, if some players believe in it they could
face a first mover preference ordering and hence engage in abatement, even if others do not. First
movers might also be motivated by a strong belief in exercising leadership for its own sake, by a
very "green" electorate, or by other factors. Several European countries, including Germany and
the Netherlands, seem to be acting as first movers on climate protection, aggressively limiting
their GHG emissions. The United States was a first mover on stratospheric ozone protection,
limiting CFC emissions by unilaterally banning the use of CFCs on aerosol spray cans in 1978.
See Hammitt & Thompson, supra note 29.
257. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 279; Barrett, supra note 85, at 70, 72 ("A
country has no incentive to abate its emissions if the externality is unidirectional (provided side
payments are ruled out) .... Not so if the externality is reciprocal in nature. For then the emitting
country will have strong private incentives to control its own emissions.").
258. See Aronson, supra note II, at 2150-51; Merrill, supra note 51, at 974-75, 981, 1017-
18. The cooperative loser has a preference ordering of DC > DD > CC > CD. This preference
ordering makes cooperation even more elusive in the "cooperative loser" game than in the
"prisoner's dilemma" game. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2151 n.44 (explaining the distinction
between prisoner's dilemma and cooperator's loss). Thus, the cooperative loser prefers total
noncooperation (DD) to mutual cooperation (CC). This is in contrast to the free rider, whose
preference ordering is DC > CC > DD > CD and who prefers mutual cooperation (CC) to total
noncooperation (DD). See id. The Cooperative Loser is worse off with cooperative abatement
because the cooperative loser's costs exceed her benefits even if others cooperate. For example, if
mutual pooperation gives Player A benefits of 14 at a cost of 8, while giving Player B benefits of 4
at a cost of 6; if cooperation by one party alone yields half the benefits to each (i.e., 7 for A, 2 for
B); and if defection costs 0; then the matrix shows:
If Player B:
.If Player A: Cooperates Defects
Cooperates A: 6, B: -2 A: -1, B: 2
Defects A: 7, B: -4 A: 0, B: 0
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example is the group of countries that perceives a gain from the global
environmental externality-for example, countries that would welcome a
warmer planet. 9 These countries would oppose cooperation by others.260
Whereas free riders are potential net beneficiaries who would cooperate if
confident that others will reciprocate, "cooperative losers" must receive
additional compensatory side payments to secure their participation. 261
2. Benefits and Costs of Securing Participation
The Voluntary Assent rule thus introduces a new attribute that is not
relevant under Fiat and that is less relevant under Majority rule:
"participation efficiency." Participation efficiency is the ability of a
regulatory instrument to secure participation at the least cost. All other
attributes being equal, the optimal regulatory instrument will minimize the
sum of the costs of securing participation and the costs of enduring
nonparticipation (i.e., the forgone benefits of participation).
To begin with the latter item, the benefits of securing participation
include: (i) more effective control of globally dispersed sources; (ii)
reduced leakage; (iii) a wider set of abatement opportunities, implying
lower marginal costs of abatement; and (iv) reduced free riding as others
increasingly cooperate reciprocally. Reducing leakage is particularly
important because, with globally mobile sources and globally spread
impacts regardless of the sources' location, leakage can offset or reverse the
The preference ordering forA is DC= 7, CC= 6, DD = 0, CD = -1, that is, DC> CC> DD>
CD, reflecting the prisoner's dilemma incentives to free ride unless the other party will cooperate.
The preference ordering for B is DC = 2, DD = 0, CC = -2, CD = -4, that is, DC > DD > CC >
CD, reflecting a cooperative loss: B would rather have mutual defection (DD) than mutual
cooperation (CC). See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2155-56 & fig.3. The collective preference
ordering is CC = 4, DC = 3, CD = 1, DD = 0, so mutual cooperation is the global optimum. To
persuade B to find CC preferable to DD, Player A would need to transfer to B just more than 2,
say 2.1, so that for A, CC = 3.9 and for B, CC = 0.1. See id. at 2156-57 & fig.4. Then for both A
and B the preference ordering would be DC > CC > DD > CD, so that both would prefer mutual
cooperation to mutual defection, as in the prisoner's dilemma game, and cooperation could
succeed if free riding were deterred.
259. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
260. See SANDLER, supra note 56, at 114 ("The possibility [exists] that some nations may
gain from global warming .... Potential gainers will resist any international treaty on global
warming.").
261. [A] noncooperative strategy always dominates for the [non-beneficiary] source
state: failure to agree upon a regime of regulation corresponds to a victory for the
source state .... Joint social welfare may be maximized by collective action, but the
[non-beneficiary] source state stands only to lose from participating in such a regime.
Thus, [a non-beneficiary source state] will refuse to cooperate unless some other
benefit or advantage of greater value can be linked to its agreement to participate in a
collective action regime.
Merrill, supra note 51, at 981; see also Ud at 934-35, 1017 (noting that a source state has no
incentive to participate in a regulatory regime unless it receives compensation).
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environmental benefits of the regime. 2  In addition, leakage increases the
externality-intensiveness of the initially unconstrained group, making it
increasingly difficult over time to attract unconstrained parties to join the
constraint group. 3 Finally, leakage raises the specter of competitiveness
losses in the constraint group, which increases the ex ante incentives to free
ride.2" Thus, securing widespread participation (especially by present and
future large emitters) can be a prerequisite to the success of global
environmental law. Reducing marginal abatement costs through wider
participation (especially by developing countries) is also a prerequisite to
obtaining the estimated fifty to seventy percent cost-effectiveness gains of
global incentive instruments.265
The costs of securing participation include: (i) the out-of-pocket
expense of making side payments; and (ii) the costs of foregone policy
stringency or other modifications to the regulatory regime that are the price
of attracting participation. Further, they include (iii) the distortionary costs
of the method used to secure participation.265
In principle, participation efficiency can be just as important as the
more conventionally analyzed attributes of instrument choice, such as cost-
effectiveness, performance under uncertainty, and revenue recycling. If an
instrument has very low participation efficiency, it may fail to secure
262. See supra Section II.B.
263. See Schmalensee, supra note 75.
264. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Subsection II.C.I.
266. It may be useful to contrast these three kinds of participation costs to Professor
Michelman's famous classification of the costs associated with takings of private property. See
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-16 (1967); see also Fischel & Shapiro,
supra note 102, at 277-86 (explicating Michelman's model). Michelman takes the case of a
government action being imposed by a state with coercive power (Fiat or Majority rule), thereby
creating some losers, and asks whether the state nevertheless ought to pay compensation to the
losers. Michelman labels the costs of compensating the losers "settlement costs" and the costs of
not compensating the losers "demoralization costs." He argues that the state should pay the losers
if demoralization costs exceed settlement costs-that is, if the costs of not paying exceed the costs
of paying (assuming that the government action is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, i.e., retains social net
benefits after paying the losers). But it should not pay if settlement costs exceed demoralization
costs. See Michelman, supra, at 1214-16.
Under the Voluntary Assent voting rule, the power to coerce the losers is lacking. In this
case, uncompensated losers do not suffer "demoralization costs" from the government action;
instead, they simply avoid these costs by declining to be regulated. The costs of not compensating
losers under the Voluntary Assent rule are therefore "costs of nonparticipation" rather than
demoralization costs. As one moves along the spectrum in Figure 2 toward decreasingly coercive
voting rules-from Fiat to Unanimity-the costs of not compensating losers will shift from
demoralization costs (falling with decreasing coercion) to nonparticipation costs (rising with
decreasing coercion).
Meanwhile, Michelman's "settlement costs" are analogous to my "costs of securing
participation." Notably, as Fischel and Shapiro clarify, these costs of paying losers include not
only the out-of-pocket side payment, but also the moral hazard problems thereby created that may
perversely induce increased risk-making. See id. at 284-85. On moral hazard created by
international side payments, see infra Subsections IV.B.4 and IV.B.5.
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widespread participation--entailing all the environmental and economic
disadvantages of partial coverage and leakage-or it may secure
participation only at such a high cost that the direct benefits of the
environmental regulatory regime are erased or outweighed by the social and
environmental costs of the inefficient method for securing participation.
Participation can be a function of instrument choice, because different
policy designs create different costs and benefits for different actors and for
the group as a whole. Game theoretic approaches that treat participation as
binary--either cooperate or not, with a stipulated net payoff for
cooperation-obscure the fact that the choice of the instrument to be
adopted via cooperation can also affect the payoff schedule.267 In the
standard cooperation game-a prisoner's dilemma-the choice of
instrument can facilitate cooperation by reducing the costs of participation.
Thus, cost-effective instruments such as taxes and tradeable allowances can
be more participation-efficient than high-cost conduct (technology) rules or
fixed quantity limits. The cost-effective instruments enlarge the zone for
mutually agreeable contracts (i.e., voluntary assent to treaties). 26 In the
more difficult game involving a "cooperative loser," the choice of
instrument must be compatible with participation-efficient side payments. If
China and Russia perceive costs to limiting fossil fuel emissions and
benefits to agriculture from allowing warming to occur,269 they would
demand compensatory side payments as the price of assenting to global
GHG emissions regulation. Or, in the effort to protect global biodiversity
against deforestation, a country like Brazil might demand side payments if
it sees itself as a cooperative loser that would bear major domestic costs but
share only a fraction of the global gains.27
If global environmental protection is a normal economic good with a
long time-horizon, poorer countries with more immediate local priorities
and high demand for industrialization are especially likely to be important
sources and cooperative losers under global environmental regulatory
267. Cf. Barrett, supra note 58, at 277 (criticizing as "caricature" analysis that portrays
choices as binary and arguing that most choices are continuous).
268. See KEOHANE, supra note 233, at 83-84 (arguing that international law can succeed in
constraining state behavior under the Voluntary Assent rule, through the creation of institutions
that lower the costs of collective cooperation); Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY
226,249-50 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986).
269. See supra note 81.
270. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 111, at 163 (" [l]f there is to be a [global forest convention]
it is clear that the developing countries will expect economic concessions from the developed
countries."); SANDLER, supra note 56, at 95-97 (arguing that industrialized countries must pay to
conserve forests for their global environmental value); Stone, supra note 55, at 613-26 (noting
that biodiversity conservation will require industrialized countries to pay developing countries).
See generally TIMOTHY M. SWANSON, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF EXTINCTION
(1994) (stating that protecting global biodiversity will require that industrialized countries pay
developing countries to conserve species habitats).
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regimes.27 If these players do not participate, given their large and growing
share of global GHG emissions and forest loss, an international regime to
limit GHGs or deforestation would be practically futile. It would also be
much more costly, because the opportunities for low-cost abatement in
those countries would be missed. Worse, under a regime not covering
China, Russia, India, or Brazil, leakage of emissions-intensive and forest-
clearing activities might have net perverse effects if the emissions or
biodiversity losses per unit of economic activity were higher in those
countries than they would have been in the participating countries. Such
leakage would also make the nonparticipating countries even larger sources
over time and hence even less likely to agree to cooperate. And the prospect
of leakage of employment opportunities could undermine ex ante incentives
of industrialized countries to act. Thus, the participation inefficiencies of
omitting major cooperative losers from global environmental regulation
could be easily large enough to wipe out or even reverse the net benefits of
such a regime. On the other hand, if side payments to these countries are
structured in ways that invite moral hazard and other distortions, the
participation inefficiencies of including major cooperative losers in global
environmental regulation could also be daunting. Maximizing participation
efficiency under Voluntary Assent by minimizing the sum of the costs of
nonparticipation and the costs of securing participation requires careful
selection of regulatory instruments and associated side payments.
3. From "Polluters Pay" to "Beneficiaries Pay"
The greatest challenge in global environmental law may not be
overcoming free riding among the industrialized countries (surmounting the
perennial spats among the United States, Europe, and Japan over who will
exercise leadership), but rather securing the participation of the developing
countries (such as China, Brazil, Russia, and India). On this analysis, a
North-South bargain is needed not only for reasons of distributional equity,
but also to secure participation in an efficient global regime that delivers
valuable net benefits to the North, without putting the South in the
recalcitrant position of cooperative loser. Like any bargain, this deal could
be mutually beneficial if the cooperative losers received compensation that
made them net better off while not costing so much that the cooperative
winners' net environmental benefits were eliminated. As the IPCC noted,
"International transfers.., are likely to serve as both the building blocks of
globally optimal action and the cement of global cooperation."272
271. See supra Section II.C.
272. K.J. Arrow et al., Decision-Making Frameworks for Addressing Climate Change, in
IPCC ECON. 1995, supra note 6, at 53, 71; see also Stavins, supra note 6, at 298 (stating that
because in some countries, "costs of control may exceed benefits," a "central challenge for any
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Most of the discussion of global regulatory instrument choice has
ignored this point. It has proceeded as if a global instrument could be
imposed by Fiat or Majority vote on all sources. Proposals for global GHG
emissions taxes or agreements to undertake globally coordinated national
taxes273 collide with the problem that cooperative loser countries will
decline to participate. The same is true of global conduct instruments, such
as mandatory CO. scrubbers or fuel efficiency standards, and of fixed
national quantity limits. Each of these instruments would impose costs on
sources, only exacerbating the cooperator's loss problem. 4 Under the
Voluntary Assent voting rule, the conventional instruments for regulating
externalities cannot cover cooperative losers. If major sources are
cooperative losers (which is quite plausible since major sources-especially
poorer industrializing countries such as China-would often face greater
costs than gains from control), the conventional instruments employed
under Unitary Fiat are, instead, a recipe for widespread nonparticipation.
Perhaps the proponents of global taxes and conduct instruments are
implicitly willing to tolerate the costs of nonparticipation (including
leakage) inherent in leaving major countries out of the regime. Or perhaps
they fear high costs of securing participation. Or perhaps they are not
considering the impact of the global voting rule on regulatory instrument
choice. If so, they may be thinking about regulatory instrument choice from
the standard analytic perspective of rational autocratic Fiat, or from the
international policy instrument" is to "include a mechanism for transferring gains to countries
that would otherwise not benefit from joining an agreement").
273. See sources cited supra note 9.
274. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2161-62. Similarly, a price/liability instrument
administered judicially-that is, strict liability--confronts the same obstacle that, under Voluntary
Assent, many sources will simply decline to be bound by such a regime. See Merrill, supra note
51, at 974-75, 992-97. Merrill's critique of strict liability for international pollution is thus a
special case of my more general argument that cost-imposing regulatory instruments will be
participation-inefficient under the Voluntary Assent voting rule. Advocates of taxes might reply
that if countries could retain the tax revenues themselves under a coordinated set of national GHG
taxes (rather than paying taxes to an international body), countries might perceive net gains from
the revenue-recycling effect of the GHG taxes and would therefore participate. But such GHG
taxes would still impose economic costs on each country due to internal shifts in investment
patterns. See MABEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 32. The revenue-recycling studies still show net
costs from GHG taxes. See, e.g., GOULDER ET AL., supra note 200, at 20-21 (finding revenue-
recycling taxes to be 35% more costly than ideal taxes). For a country gaining low or negative net
benefits from reducing global warming, these tax costs likely would be more than enough to
motivate nonparticipation. Otherwise, the logic must be that countries gaining nothing from global
warming abatement (zero global externality reduction) would still like to tax their GHG
emissions, as long as their trade rivals do too. This reduces to an argument that gaining purely
domestic benefits (such as local environmental or fiscal recycling benefits) through GHG taxes
would be worthwhile to each country but is obstructed by a "race-to-the-bottom" prisoner's
dilemma. For a criticism of this rationale for imposing overarching standards, see generally
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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perspective of national Majority rule, either of which can compel
participation by dissenters. 5
Under Fiat, the standard conclusion is that taxes are the superior
instrument. But under Voluntary Assent, taxes may be the least
participation-efficient and therefore potentially the lowest ranking
instrument. This is because taxes impose the highest costs on sources and
will therefore induce the greatest rate of nonparticipation under Voluntary
Assent. Whereas fixed quantity targets and conduct instruments impose the
cost of abatement on sources, taxes (or allowance auctions) oblige the
source to pay not only the cost of abatement but also the additional cost of
the tax rate applied to all the source's remaining emissions. 6 Under
Voluntary Assent, a global GHG tax or coordinated set of national taxes (or
an allowance auction) will attract the least participation by cooperative
loser countries.
A clear implication of this analysis is that the "Polluters Pay Principle"
cannot succeed under the Voluntary Assent rule. Under such a voting rule,
polluters will simply decline to participate in a regime that imposes net
costs on them. Trying to establish such a regime will encounter stalemate.
The "Polluter-Pays-Principle is ... inconsistent with our insistence [under
a voluntary assent rule] on a Pareto-improvement .... In fact, the Polluter-
Pays-Principle is more likely to constitute reason for delay and evasion than
for an effective program to control transnational pollution." 277
Under the Voluntary Assent voting rule, regulatory instruments must
instead follow a "Beneficiaries Pay Principle." The beneficiaries of global
environmental protection must attract non-beneficiary sources to
participate, because the former cannot compel the latter to comply under
Voluntary Assent." This is the converse of the standard approach in
275. i one paper, Richard Cooper does acknowledge the importance of securing the assent
of nations for global environmental regulation to be successful. See Hollick & Cooper, supra note
81, at 170. But Cooper does not follow the logic to the need for side payments to potential
cooperative losers such as China and Russia, nor does he compare the ability of taxes and
allowance trading to secure such nations' assent. See Cooper, supra note 9; Hollick & Cooper,
supra note 81.
276. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 281; Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 417-18; Buchanan
& Tullock, supra note 203, at 139-41.
277. BAuMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 281,283; see also MABEY ET AL., supra note 70, at
11-12 (noting that international cooperation "contradicts the [Polluters Pay Principle]," which
depends upon "coercion"); Aronson, supra note 11, at 2150-51 (noting that there is no incentive
to cooperate if a country's costs of abatement exceed its gains); d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 54,
at 441, 449 (noting that the "Polluter Pays Principle" is not workable in the global context);
Merrill, supra note 51, at 974-75, 980-81, 1017-18 (arguing that placing burdens on source states
removes incentives for cooperation).
278. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 281 ("Mutual gains to the countries necessarily
require the victim country ... to make some payments to [the source country]."); id. at 283 (" []t
is our judgment that feasible and effective mechanisms for the control of transnational pollution
will require cooperation and cost-sharing on the part of victim nations as well as polluting
countries."); Merrill, supra note 51, at 935 ("Thus, the source state has no incentive to
participate ... unless it receives compensation of some sort from the affected state.").
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national regulatory law. In the national context, we customarily think of
forcing sources of externalities to internalize the external costs of their
activities. But when the sources can choose whether to internalize their
externalities, they might often choose not to do so. Our conventional
notions of pollution regulation are built on the crucial unstated premise that
Fiat or Majority rule enables sources to be compelled to participate. Under
the Voluntary Assent rule, this coercive power is missing, and instrument
choice must be differently conceived. Instead of forcing the source to pay
for the external costs of its activities, the beneficiaries must pay for the
external benefits of restricting the source's activitiesY 9
Beneficiaries will want to make such side payments as long as the
marginal dollar of side payment yields more than one dollar of benefits in
externality control." Sources will demand side payments of no less than
the net losses imposed on the source country by the control regime. The
smaller the source country's benefits and the larger its costs under the
regime, the larger the compensatory side payment must be to render the
global regime a net benefit for this country." 1
279. It is now widely agreed that wealthy countries will have to pay poorer countries to
persuade them to engage in global environmental protection efforts. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY,
GREENING TiE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 84-85 (1994); HAHN, supra
note 83, at 31 (" [D]eveloping countries have no incentive to sign an agreement now unless the
developed countries foot the bill .... ); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION 14 (1998) ("And if we want to keep the Chinese from letting their
emissions grow .... in the short run-that is, within twenty-five years-we have to pay for it.");
Arrow et al., supra note 272, at 71; Jacoby et al., supra note 76, at 60 ("[I]f the relatively rich
participating countries want to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, they will
have to pay at least some poor countries to reduce their emissions."); Bruce M. Russett & John D.
Sullivan, Collective Goods and International Organization, 25 INT'L ORG. 845, 863-65 (1971)
(arguing that because international law lacks coercive power, international environmental
protection will often require rich nations to pay poor nations' costs); Stone, supra note 55, at 613.
This notion is not new. Pigou envisioned both charging pollution taxes and paying bounties
to polluters in return for reduced emissions. See PIGOU, supra note 3, at 192-95. Calabresi and
Melamed showed that a court might want to impose the Victims Pay Principle in some situations.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1116-21; cf. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev., 494
P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (ordering victims to pay a feedlot for the cost of abating a nuisance). There
may, of course, be important wealth effects and fairness consequences involved in the Victims
Pay Principle. Calabresi and Melamed suggest that with poorer polluters and wealthier
victims-an assumption that seems apt in the global environmental context-the Victims Pay
Principle is more fair than the Polluters Pay Principle. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at
1121.
280. Hence, beneficiaries will only want to offer side payments to countries that would
otherwise be important sources of the externality. A cooperative loser that is not an important
source, such as a country that gains agriculturally from global warming but emits few or no
GHGs, would be unlikely to attract side payments from beneficiaries. This point illustrates again
an important difference between the Voluntary Assent voting rule and a strict Unanimity voting
rule: Under the latter, every holdout would have to be paid to assent, lest the entire regime fail,
whereas under the former, less important sources would be neglected.
281. The point is not limited to climate change policy. A treaty taxing Brazil for the damage
that Amazon deforestation does to global biodiversity and global climate would require some way
to compel compliance by Brazil. Under the Voluntary Assent rule, without such coercion, Brazil
would demur. The beneficiaries of biodiversity protection and climate protection-presumably the
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 677
In general, the greater the fraction of voters needed to adopt a
regulatory instrument, or, in other words, the less coercive the voting rule
(moving to the right on the spectrum in Figure 2), the more participation
efficiency matters in selecting among regulatory instruments. Between the
assumption of full coverage under single-decisionmaker Fiat at one end of
the spectrum, and the imperative of securing participation under Unanimity
or Voluntary Assent toward the other, lies the intermediate case of Majority
rule. Inducements to cooperate are needed under Majority rule to build the
majority coalition and to mollify potential blocking coalitions. Securing
adoption of legislation under Majority rule may therefore require some
compensatory side payments from beneficiaries to losers, if those losers'
consent is important to facilitate passage of the legislation by the requisite
majority. That such majority coalition politics help shape environmental
regulation is widely observed.282 The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, for
example, involved numerous deals to compensate potential opponents in
order to assure adoption of the legislation. 3 By contrast, the coercive
majoritarian imposition of bans on hazardous waste disposal (without side
wealthier countries-would have to pay Brazil to secure its assent to conserve the Amazon. See
sources cited supra note 270. The experience of the Montreal Protocol is illustrative. China and
India initially refused to join the Protocol. Presumably they saw it as imposing on them the costs
of CFC control-including the public health risks of food spoilage, hunger, and food-borne
disease from which inexpensive refrigeration with CFCs could deliver their poorer populations-
and providing them only lesser and more distant gains. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Protecting the
Global Environment, in RISK VS. RISK 193, 197-98 (J. Graham & J.B. Wiener eds., 1998). China
and India joined the Protocol only when they were promised financial compensation by the
beneficiary countries. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Achievements and Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 78, 95 (Mats Rolen et al. eds., 1997) ("India and
China would not become parties to the Montreal Protocol until the agreement about compensatory
financing had been reached at the London meeting in 1990.").
282. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL / DIRTY AIR 42-58
(1981); E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 316-17 (1985);
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60-61
(1992); Keohane et al., supra note 202, at 325-26; Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the
Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 103, at 1253;
Donald N. Dewees, Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 53, 53 (" [lf
we are to understand why policies are not adopted and to develop policy designs that may be both
efficient and politically attractive, we must analyze the essence of political decisions: the
distributional effects of policies." (emphasis added)); Robert W. Hahn, The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework, PUB. CHOICE, Apr. 1990, at 21, 23-
24.
283. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years
of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 249, 285-86 (1991) (reciting special favors
incorporated in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments); Heinzerling, supra note 151, at 328-32
(describing the allocation of extra SO2 allowances in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments). But
see Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J. L. & ECON. 37, 80-81 (1998) (finding
the mix of burdens and favors in the acid rain program of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to
be quite complex, with most high-emitting states doing well in Phase I of the program but several
high-emitting states doing poorly in Phase I).
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payments to the waste disposal industry) has resulted in widespread
"nonparticipation costs" manifested by illegal dumping;2' 4 side payments
to encourage proper disposal could be more effective.28 Side payments may
also be necessary where regulations are adopted by consensual mechanisms
such as "regulatory negotiation" 116 and neighbors' restrictive covenants.
The "Beneficiaries Pay Principle" is far more important under Voluntary
Assent than under Majority rule because under Majority rule a majority
coalition can ultimately coerce a dissenting minority, whereas under
Voluntary Assent every loser must be paid to play.
4. The Participation Efficiency of Regulatory Instruments
Under the Voluntary Assent rule, then, collective regulation must be
regulation guided by the Beneficiaries Pay Principle. Much of this payment
may be accomplished directly by the environmental benefits of the treaty
itself, but for some important sources these direct benefits will be
inadequate to motivate participation, and side payments will be necessary.
Not all regulatory instruments, however, accomplish the beneficiaries pay
arrangement in the same way. As Merrill notes: "The principal problem is
how to devise the means of providing offsetting compensation to the source
state as consideration for its agreement to cooperate in a contractual
solution."" The problem is to choose the regulatory instrument that
secures participation at the least cost.
a. Carrots (Subsidies)
The most straightforward strategy to achieve the Beneficiaries Pay
Principle would be to offer nonbeneficiary source countries (cooperative
losers) a pure payment to cover their cost of abatement.28 9 But making
284. See Hilary Sigman, Midnight Dumping, Public Policies, and Illegal Dumping of Used
Oil, 29 RAND J. ECON. 157, 157-78 (1993).
285. See id. at 175-76.
286. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994); Philip Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Lawrence Sussldnd & Gerard McMahon,
The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985).
287. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1533-39 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
906 (1988).
288. Merrill, supra note 51, at 1018. Merrill poses the question but does not answer it;
instead, he argues that strict liability impedes such contractual solutions and that a set of" golden
rules" of behavior could at least do better than strict liability. See id. at 1018-19. But Merrill's
"golden rules" would still not compensate source states for their cooperation.
289. See BAUIOL & OAThS, supra note 3, at 279-81 (discussing direct payments from victim
to sources); CLINE, supra note 9, at 356 (" [I]mportant emitters could still refuse to cooperate. The
first and most desirable response to this situation would be to proffer the positive incentive of
international assistance ..." ); Stone, supra note 55, at 613, 619-20 (advocating direct payments
for biodiversity conservation). Direct financial assistance through centralized funds could perform
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actual payments to enlist the cooperation of nonbeneficiary sources is
essentially a subsidy for abatement, and in like fashion it creates moral
hazard-the perverse incentive for increased emissions or resource use that
is the basic problem with both domestic290 and international pollution
abatement subsidies.291 The subsidy for abatement-paying the source's
costs of externality control-induces recipients to increase their risk-
making activities. It improves the profitability of the externality-associated
activity and thereby encourages entry into the global polluting industry
group.29z In effect, the side payment reintroduces the problem of "leakage":
Even though the source country is now participating in the treaty, the side
payment relieves the source of the costs of abatement while abatement costs
are imposed on sources in other countries. Compounding these effects on
aggregate industry output is the strategic incentive for countries that would
actually be cooperative winners to posture as cooperative losers in order to
position themselves to demand side payments by increasing their emissions
or resource use.
293
Taken together, these perverse incentives can be quite potent. A recent
study of climate protection regimes under the Voluntary Assent voting rule,
with and without side payments for participation, found that "side
payments... reduce the incentive to join an agreement .... [initially and]
might not even be desirable from an environmental point of view, because
they might decrease the degree of cooperation sufficiently to result in
higher total emissions., 294 A treaty meant to prevent global warming or
this role. Joint implementation, or payments through the Clean Development Mechanism created
under the Kyoto Protocol, if delivered without any constraint on aggregate emissions in recipient
countries, would also resemble a pure subsidy for abatement.
290. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 211-13,234; supra Subsection LIM.C.2.
291. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 281; Chang, supra note 188, at 2154-59.
292. See supra Subsection 1I.C.2.
293. See d'Arge & Kneese, supra note 54, at 428, 436-37 (noting that the Victims Pay
Principle has a "basic flaw" in that "the externality-generating country may threaten... to
discharge materials as an incidental aspect of the production of other goods simply to obtain
compensation for not doing so"); cf David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big
Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 993,
1026-42 (1991) (proposing that wealthy countries use development aid to pay for the global
public good of disarmament by poorer countries such as the former Soviet Union); id. at 1041
(warning that such payments could "become counterproductive in the long run by instituting a
perverse incentive to 'build up to build down' (citation omitted)).
294. Hoel & Schneider, supra note 232, at 165. Hoel and Schneider's quantitative model for
one illustrative case suggests that offering side payments for emissions abatement results in fewer
countries participating in the regime without earning side payments (that is, more countries
insisting on side payments as a condition of participation) and in higher total emissions than does
a similar regime that does not offer such side payments-even though some countries would not
participate at all in abatement if side payments were not offered. See id. at 164-67. That is, the
perverse incentives are so strong that they overwhelm the environmental benefits of attracting
more countries to limit emissions. Note that Hoel and Schneider's Table 1, idL at 166 tbl.1, and the
characterization of the number of countries participating, must be interpreted with care, because
Hoel and Schneider define "participating" to mean reducing emissions without receiving side
payments even if side payments are offered, see id. at 167 n.2. Thus, the trivially low number of
756
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biodiversity loss could turn out not to remedy these problems as much as
intended, or even to worsen them.
Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism (JI/CDM)
investments in uncapped countries could amount to unconstrained subsidies
for abatement. Sources in capped countries would be paying the abatement
costs of sources in uncapped areas. If so, JI/CDM could have the perverse
consequences of pure subsidies. Instead of being a stepping stone to formal
allowance trading under a global cap, JI/CDM could unintentionally turn
out to increase aggregate emissions by attracting greater investment into the
emitting industries in recipient countries. Without national caps, there
would be no constraint preventing the emitting industries receiving JI/CDM
payments from growing overall. Project-level baselines and monitoring
would not reveal the aggregate dynamic. Given the imminence of JI/CDM
trades "for credit," this possibility deserves prompt quantitative
assessment. If it is serious, JI/CDM credits should be discounted
accordingly, and the transition to full formal allowance trading under global
caps should be pressed even more urgently (as described below).
b. Sticks (Trade Sanctions)
Instead of being subsidized, participation could be coerced. Holdouts
could be shamed into joining the treaty or threatened with trade sanctions.
In effect, free riders and cooperative losers would be induced to cooperate
not by promises of compensatory side payments to make these countries net
better off, but rather by threats that non-cooperation would invite even
higher net costs than would cooperation.29s
A coercive strategy might be superior to a pure subsidy strategy
because the latter introduces perverse incentive effects and thus has high
costs of securing participation.296 But coercive strategies also pose high
countries listed as participating when side payments are offered-three out of 100 in the last line
of Table 1-means that only three countries reduced emissions without requiring a side payment,
but the countries that did receive side payments also reduced emissions. The more salient and
troubling result is Table 2b, showing total emissions increasing when side payments are offered.
See id. at 166 tbl.2b. Note also that Hoel and Schneider do not include any "cooperative losers"
in their model; all countries are taken to be cooperative gainers with positive environmental
benefits. See id. at 153, 156. The three who participate without requiring side payments are thus
close to "first movers," and the others are free riders. This limitation of their model probably
understates the emissions-control benefits of offering side payments and thus overstates the
perverse effect on total emissions of offering side payments, because cooperative losers would
never reduce emissions without compensation, whereas free-riding cooperative gainers might do
so. These limitations also suggest the need for further modeling of climate protection regimes with
different forms of side payments, different regulatory instruments, and different combinations of
national net benefits.
295. See BARRErr, supra note 238, at 25-26; Barrett, supra note 58, at 280-82.
296. See supra Subsections III.C.2, IV.B.4.a; see also Sean Fox, Note, Responding to
Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral Trade Measures To Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84
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costs. Compared to a Pareto-improving regulatory regime that avoids the
perverse incentive effect, there are several reasons to think that coercive
measures would be undesirable.
First, coercion may not be effective in changing the behavior of target
countries. Trade sanctions may make little impact on target countries'
policies, or they may counterproductively hurt the target country's
population (especially its lower-income population) while shoring up the
target government's relative power against its domestic opponents and even
giving aid to its efforts to rally patriotic fervor in defiance of the
sanctions.297 Trade sanctions seem especially unlikely to change the basic
development ambitions and economic policies of large countries like China,
Russia, Brazil, and India.29
Second, threats of coercion may not be credible. Trade sanctions
impose costs on the country adopting the trade barrier as well as on the
target country. It is hard to imagine the industrialized countries imposing
trade sanctions on goods from China that would be sufficiently restrictive to
coerce China into substantial GHG abatement, because such trade sanctions
against a major exporting country would carry high costs to consumers in
the industrialized countries.299
Third, trade sanctions can distort trade and thus impair global economic
efficiency. Their imposition may even spur retaliation, opening a
destructive trade war.300 But because global environmental externalities also
GEo. L.J. 2499 (1996) (advocating trade sanctions); cf Chang, supra note 188, at 2154-60
(preferring trade sanction "sticks" to side payment "carrots").
297. See Richard N. Haass, Sanctioning Madness, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 74, 77-
80.
298. Advocates of trade sanctions might respond that sanctions should be just as effective as
subsidies. Why should the trade penalty needed to internalize the global cost of a unit of emissions
not be equal to the subsidy payment required to internalize the global benefit of abatement of that
unit of emissions (and thus to motivate the same degree of abatement effort)? One answer is that
the coercive trade penalty may evoke defiant opposition, muting its incentive effect. Resentful
defiance may be especially intense when the penalty is sought to be imposed on an ostensibly
sovereign nation by ostensibly coequal nations. By contrast, subsidies, or a cooperative regulatory
regime with side payments, would not spur such defiance. And trade sanctions imposed laterally
by coequal sovereign nations are quite different from taxes imposed top-down by a superior
governmental authority recognized to have the legitimate power to regulate its citizens coercively
for the collective good; such taxes can be expected to evoke less (though obviously not zero)
defiance. Analogously, a child may accept parental discipline but bridle at the same sanctions
imposed by a sibling. Put another way, whereas top-down coercive regulation may force the
regulated population to endure "demoralization" costs, see Michehman, supra note 266, at 1214,
attempts at lateral coercive regulation by nation against nation, from a starting point of Voluntary
Assent and in the absence of a central state enforcement mechanism, may motivate the targets of
the coercion to avoid demoralization costs via noncompliance. The evidence, marshaled by
Sigman, supra note 284, that coercive sanctions on hazardous waste disposal yield perverse
noncompliance-even when imposed within a strong majoritarian state-suggests that this result
would be even more likely in the international arena without strong central monitoring and
enforcement.
299. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2160 & n.94; Barrett, supra note 58, at 281-82 (finding
some trade sanctions to enforce global environmental protection not to be credible).
300. See Chang, supra note 188, at 2162-63.
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represent a market failure, the question is whether trade restrictions help
more than they hurt," 1 compared to other available regulatory instruments.
Fourth, where they do influence target countries' behavior, coercive
trade sanctions may perversely inhibit environmental compliance by target
countries. As compared to side payments that enrich an erstwhile dissenter,
trade sanctions to induce compliance would injure a dissenter until it agrees
to comply. If financial and institutional capacity is an important constraint
on countries' actual compliance, then side payments may accelerate
compliance whereas further weakening of a poor dissenter through trade
sanctions may impede its ability to comply effectively once it grudgingly
decides to accede to the treaty. 2 Given that cooperative losers are more
likely to be poorer countries (because lower-income countries value global
environmental protection less highly) and that poverty itself is likely to be a
prime cause of some contributions to global externalities (such as forest
clearing), coercive trade sanctions that further impoverish erstwhile
dissenters could be seriously counterproductive.
Fifth, trade sanctions imposed by wealthy countries on poor countries
would cut sharply against principles of fairness. Because poorer countries
tend to see global environmental protection as a low priority compared to
more pressing needs for eradicating poverty," 3 coercing their compliance
with a global environmental regulatory regime would be regressive,
transferring wealth from the worst off to the more wealthy. It would also
conflict with principles of self-determination only recently secured by
developing countries emancipated from colonial rule.3" Clearly, such a
strategy would not be globally Pareto-improving. Moreover, the perception
of this unfairness may further undermine the enthusiasm that poor countries
bring to the job of eventual compliance. 5
Thus, trade sanctions cannot guarantee effective participation and
attempting to use them could be costly. The mere threat of inchoate trade
sanctions may be useful for nudging free riders into action.0 6 But actual
coercion of cooperative losers, especially poorer countries, is a different
story. The use of coercive measures to corral poor cooperative losers is less
attractive than the use of an appropriately designed Pareto-improving
301. See id. at 2201.
302. See GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL FINANCE: THE CASE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR ENvIRONMENTAL SETrLEMENTS 16 (U.N. Dev. Program Office
of Dev. Studies Discussion Paper No. 10, 1997) (arguing that global policies burdening poor
countries could yield more environmental degradation); Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 281, at 109
(maling a similar argument).
303. See supra Section II.C.
304. See Hurrell & Kingsbury, supra note 234, at 7-8.
305. See Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 281, at 95.
306. See Barrett, supra note 58, at 280-82 (showing that the threat of trade sanctions can bind
free riders).
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regime.0 7 Coercive trade sanctions on poor source countries could well be
ineffective, non-credible, unfair, distorting of global trade, and ultimately
destructive of poor countries' capacity to help solve the environmental
problem.
c. Taxes
A straightforward global environmental tax is a Polluters Pay
instrument that would confront high costs of nonparticipation. Many
countries would decline to be bound. An alternative approach would be to
design a regime employing a global tax to limit emissions or resource use,
and then to add side payments to attract cooperative losers. This approach
would impose a global tax on sources and match the tax with a set of
international side payments that would assure individual net benefits to
those who would be cooperative losers under the tax.3"' This amounts to
Polluters Pay plus side payments, or a "tax-and-pay" approach.
309
This strategy has the superficial attraction of suppressing emissions
through the tax. But the nonbeneficiary source country will not assent
unless its net costs of compliance with the tax-including both its cost of
abatement and its cost of paying the tax on its residual emissions (net of
any environmental or other benefits)-are at least covered by the side
payment. The side payment will therefore have to be proportionately larger
under the tax-and-pay approach than under the pure payment approach.
Furthermore, the side payment will have to be proportionate to the taxed
country's total emissions. The influence of the tax on emissions will
therefore be vitiated by the need to repay the costs of the tax: At the margin,
the nonbeneficiary source country will have to be paid back for every
additional dollar of abatement cost or tax obligation it incurs. Precisely
because a tax instrument does not constrain total emissions-it only
307. Baumol and Oates conclude that:
[Such a set of tariffs] is a desirable policy measure only if a more direct attack on the
problem [via a global regulatory agreement] is not possible.... [But b]ecause the
record of international cooperation on other critical matters hardly inspires confidence
in the prospects for efficacious multilateral measures for the protection of the
environment, it may be essential to design instruments whose effectiveness does not
require the unanimous consent of those involved.
BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 276.
308. See CLINE, supra note 9, at 377 ("Some portion of revenue from carbon taxes should be
channeled to developing countries prepared to take measures limiting [emissions].").
309. It is worth noting that this tax-and-pay strategy would mean using a potentially large
fraction of the tax revenues for side payments to the cooperative losers, rather than recycling the
revenues to offset preexisting distortionary taxes. The logic of the Voluntary Assent voting rule
greatly inhibits or precludes domestic revenue-recycling of global externality taxes. Hence, taxes




constrains the maximum marginal cost of abatementl---the side payment
reimbursing the cost of the tax will undercut the ability of the tax to inhibit
emissions in the recipient country.
11
Consider the depiction in Figure 3. Assume two countries: one a pure
source (S) and the other a pure victim (V). The horizontal axis shows
emissions increasing from left to right, so that abatement involves moving
back from current emissions at point C toward zero emissions at the origin.
In this depiction, abatement is all cost to S and all benefit to V.312 In this
simple example, V would prefer zero emissions, which assures zero
damages to V. But that would not be globally optimal because it ignores the
cost to S. Indeed, globally optimal abatement would be at the point (P, Q).
But reducing emissions from C to Q is all pain and no gain to S.
Under Fiat and the Polluters Pay Principle, S could simply be required
(or taxed) to abate for the collective benefit of the society (i.e., S and V), up
to the globally optimal point (P, Q). This is the familiar standard analysis. If
S abates its emissions from C to Q, it incurs the abatement cost represented
by the area CEQ. V gains (in damages avoided) the area CZEQ. The
collective global net gain is the area CZE.
Under Voluntary Assent, however, S will refuse to abate without
compensation. S will decline to adopt a treaty setting a global tax (or set of
coordinated national taxes) at P, or setting a global quantity limit at Q,
because these treaties impose cost on S for no gain to S. In order to get S to
310. This is the basis for the advantage of taxes over quantity limits under uncertainty: Taxes
fix the upper-bound of abatement costs but do not fix the level of abatement. See supra Subsection
ll.C.3. The very advantage of taxes over allowances in the face of cost uncertainty (and Fiat)
turns out to be the tax instrument's chief weakness under the Voluntary Assent voting rule.
311. This inefficiency of the tax-and-pay approach is analogous to the more familiar
inefficiency of paying compensation to polluters for the costs of "regulatory takings." Promising
compensation for environmental regulatory takings of land can give rise to moral hazard
(excessive risk-making) by landowners and perversely attract greater investment into the regulated
industry, thereby offsetting or possibly even overwhelming the protective effect of the regulation.
See Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J.
ECON. 71, 82-84 (1984); Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 102, at 284-85; Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. Rnv. 509, 528-31 (1986); Louis Kaplow,
Government Relieffor Risk Associated with Government Action, 94 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 525,
528-29 (1992). This literature on regulatory takings advances the proposition that compensation
should not be paid. By contrast, compensation is unavoidable (or else high costs of
nonparticipation must be tolerated) under the Voluntary Assent voting rule, so the question is how
best to pay compensation while suppressing its perverse incentives. Given the requirement for
compensation in the U.S. Constitution, the analysis in this Article of how to pay compensation
while suppressing its perverse incentives could be useful at the domestic level as well.
312. V is a zero-emitting "beneficiary" of abatement and S is a zero-beneficiary source. This
is "unidirectional" transboundary pollution, not a reciprocal global externality, but it illustrates
the problem at the limit. Reciprocal global externalities involve a less extreme case of the same
problem-that is, one in which both V and S are both victims and sources, but to different degrees,
so that abatement yields net gains in V and net costs in S. V is then a beneficiary source-a
cooperative winner-and S is a non-beneficiary source-a cooperative loser.
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agree to the abatement treaty, V must pay S an amount no less than the cost
imposed on S.313
FIGURE 3. ABATEMENT OF GLOBAL EXTERNALITIES
Q C
Emissions (Current Level)
Under the pure payment approach, V must pay S an amount at least
equal to S's cost of abating down to Q, which is the triangular area CEQ-
the area under S's marginal cost curve as emissions are reduced from C to
Q. This subsidy of CEQ will initially reduce emissions in S. But as a
subsidy, it will also increase the profitability of operating an emissions
source in S compared to other uses of capital and thus will induce an
increase in the size of the emitting industry in S and attract more countries
to emit.314 Moreover, the prospect of such side payments may also induce
strategic posturing by countries who increase their emissions to look like
cooperative losers and hence to attract side payments. The composite effect
is to offset the subsidy's efficacy in reducing global emissions, or even to
yield a net increase in emissions.
313. In the more general case in which S is also a partial victim and V is also a partial source,
S will still demur whenever the treaty imposes net cost on S, and V will have to pay S an amount
no less than the net cost imposed by the treaty on S.
314. See supra Subsections Ill.C.2, IV.B.4.a; cf. BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 218-24
(explaining this outcome in a domestic competitive industry context).
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If a global tax of P is imposed, S incurs the cost of abating down to Q
(the triangular area CEQ). In addition, S also incurs the cost of paying the
tax on all its residual emissions below Q (the rectangular area OPEQ).
These are the emissions for which S's marginal cost of abatement exceeds
P, so that S would rather pay the tax on these remaining emissions than
abate further. To get S to assent to this tax, V must now pay S a sum at least
equal to both S's cost of abatement down to Q (the area CEQ), plus S's tax
obligation for all residual emissions below Q (the area OPEQ).315 The tax
reduces emissions from taxed firms in S. But the side payment repays the
tax dollar for dollar and thus vitiates the effect of the tax in S, letting S's
emissions rise again.316 The same problems of strategic posturing arise as
well.
17
Thus, the uncompensated Polluters Pay approaches (conduct
instruments, taxes, or quantity limits, so long as imposed without side
payments) are participation-inefficient because they have high costs of
nonparticipation. The pure subsidy approach (including direct aid and
uncapped financing through joint implementation and the Clean
Development Mechanism) is participation-inefficient because it has high
costs of securing participation. It induces perverse behavior that can worsen
the very environmental problem that the regulatory regime was meant to
abate. And even the tax-and-pay approach is participation-inefficient
because it must offset the incentive effect of the tax with compensatory side
payments that at least undercut the corrective effect of the tax and possibly
even worsen overall environmental quality.
d. Tradeable Allowances
By contrast, quantity-based instruments offer a way to engage
participation while suppressing the perverse incentives of subsidies. The
essential feature of a quantity instrument is that it caps the total quantity of
emissions. A quantity-based instrument plus side payment-a "cap-and-
pay" strategy-can attract participation without inducing a perverse
315. This may not be worthwhile for Vif the area CZEQ is smaller than the area OCEP-i.e.,
if V's gain is less than S's cost of abatement plus the cost of residual taxes.
316. If the side payment could be lump-sum, it would not directly influence S's marginal cost
of emitting and would not directly induce S to increase emissions. But it is difficult to see how the
side payment could be lump sum because it must vary proportionately with S's emissions,
abatement costs, and residual tax obligation on unabated emissions. The higher S's cost of
abatement and residual tax cost, the more V must pay S to abate. Cf. Hanson & Logue, supra note
14, at 1275 (noting that taxing smokers and rebating the tax ex ante, in order to make smokers no
worse off, would vitiate the incentive effect of the tax).
317. The side payment from V does not act as a tax in V that reduces emissions in V because
by assumption there are no emissions sources in V. Even if there were sources in V, the side
payment would not act as an extra tax on sources in V because it responds to the quantity of
emissions in S, not to emissions in V.
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influence on the total level of emissions. Thus, a cap-and-pay strategy can
be more participation-efficient than the pure payment, the tax alone, the cap
alone, or the tax-and-pay strategy.31
In Figure 3, if a global limit of Q emissions is imposed, S incurs the
cost of abating down to Q (the area CEQ). (If the quantity allowance is sold
to S at the price P instead of issued to S for free, then S also incurs the cost
of purchasing the remaining emissions units up to Q, that is, the area
OPEQ, just as under the global tax.) To get S to abate, V must pay S at least
all of this cost. This is the same wealth transfer to S as under the pure
payment (or the tax-and-pay strategy, if S must purchase the allowance).
But now there is a key difference. The quantity limit prevents emissions in
S from rising above Q. The perverse effect on emissions is avoided. (Some
ex ante posturing might still occur as countries seek to win side
payments.)
3 19
Several variations on the cap-and-pay strategy are possible. The cap-
and-pay instrument could employ fixed quantity targets coupled with a
financial reward for participation. This is the approach taken in the
Montreal Protocol, 32° which limits each country's quantity of CFC
consumption and also provides financial aid to secure the participation of
key developing countries through the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund
paid for by the beneficiary countries. 21 This approach puts a lid on the
perverse effect that side payments can have on the total level of the
externality. But fixed quantity targets do not attain the cost-effectiveness
advantages of tradeable allowances. That means higher global costs, and it
also means lower incentives for cooperative winners to cooperate in the
first place.
318. After criticizing subsidies for their perverse incentives, Professor Robert Kohn notes:
An alternative approach that combines the political feasibility of subsidy, the economic
efficiency of the Pigouvian tax, and requires no cash payments by the government, is
the assignment to existing polluters of an efficient quantity of transferable discharge
permits. This policy approach ... is a quasi-subsidy because the freely given permits
can be sold by their recipients. It appears that economists' continuing interest in
subsidizing pollution abatement and their interest in transferable discharge permits may
usefully coalesce.
Kohn, supra note 187, at 86.
319. From this perspective, the perverse inefficiencies of compensating for regulatory
takings, see supra note 311, are able to arise because the regulation itself acts as a conduct
requirement or tax on the risky activity and does not impose a national quantity cap on the risky
activity. Conduct requirements and taxes do not limit the quantity of risk-making, so the
compensation payment can perversely increase investment in risk-making. If the regulation were a
national quantity cap, then compensation for the regulatory taking would not attract more
investment to the risky activity because investors would be constrained by the quantity cap. This
suggests that quantity caps may be a possible route to more efficient regulation given the
compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
320. Montreal Protocol, supra note 34.
321. See Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 281, at 95.
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A second cap-and-pay instrument would employ tradeable allowances,
coupled with a financial assistance reward for participation. This instrument
would attain the cost-effectiveness advantages of trading and supply the
payments from beneficiaries to secure the participation of important
cooperative losers. It avoids the perverse effect of side payments on the
total level of the externality.
A third cap-and-pay approach would employ tradeable allowances but
would embed the compensatory side payments in the allowance trading
system itself. In this "cap-and-trade" approach, important source countries
that would otherwise be cooperative losers are initially assigned more
allowances than would be required to cover their activity levels. These extra
("headroom") allowances represent a valuable asset that the country can
use to accelerate its economic growth or sell to earn profits in the allowance
trading market. To keep the total global level of externality from expanding
when these extra allowances are assigned to cooperative losers, this
approach necessarily implies lower initial allowance assignments to the
cooperative winner countries than those countries would have received if
the cooperative losers did not need to be compensated. The lower allowance
assignments are costly to the cooperative winner countries, which must
either further reduce their emissions, or purchase additional allowances in
the allowance trading market. The cooperative winners are, of course, the
beneficiaries of the collective protection regime. Thus, under this approach,
the beneficiaries are paying the costs of persuading the cooperative losers to
participate by purchasing the headroom allowances assigned to the
cooperative losers.3" The assignment of extra allowances to midwestern
electric utilities as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act reflects this approach
under Majority rule.3" The Kyoto Protocol utilizes this approach to engage
322. Aronson nicely demonstrates the ability of a tradeable allowances approach to achieve a
game-theoretic solution for global GHG emissions control. In his illustration, the cooperative
losers are attracted to participate by the assignment of extra allowances, and the cooperative
winners buy back extra allowances at a price that still leaves them net gainers from the global
environmental protection. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2152-58, 2161-66. But Aronson neglects
the option of a tax-and-pay compensation system and does not recognize or analyze the dynamic
incentive effects of compensatory side payments on total emissions.
323. Indeed, the acid rain title of the 1990 Clean Air Act is illustrative. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651-7651o (1994). Imagine that the Congress had not capped SO, emissions at 8.9 million
tons per year, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (1994), but instead had adopted an SO2 emissions
tax estimated to achieve the same level of emissions. Then imagine that compensatory side
payments were made in the bill to midwestern states (low-beneficiary sources and hence
cooperative losers) in order to buy their assent to the majority coalition needed to pass the bill.
The result would have been to tax emissions nationwide, except to rebate that tax in the Midwest,
leading to higher rates of industrial growth in the Midwest than elsewhere and to leakage of SO-
emitting investment to the Midwest, increasing emissions there. By contrast, the real acid rain title
conferred side payments in the form of extra quantity allowances, subject to a quantity-based
emissions cap, thereby preventing the perverse effect of increased emissions due to the side
payments. See supra note 283; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(a)(3) (1994) (allocating additional
allowances to midwestern sources). Thus, the quantity-based approach may be preferable under
19991
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participation by Russia, but has not (yet) used the cap-and-trade approach
with headroom allowances to engage participation by the major developing
countries.
The difference between the two tradeable cap-and-pay approaches just
mentioned is the currency they use to make compensation payments:
financial rewards versus extra tradeable allowances. Both approaches place
the same aggregate cap on global emissions or resource uses, which
contains the perverse upward pressure of the subsidy component. The
difference in compensation currencies is basically the difference between
foreign aid and international trade.324 In the climate policy context, aid
would involve cash flows from donor government to recipient government,
while trade would involve the investment by industrialized emitters in the
transfer of low-emissions technologies to firms in host countries in return
for some of the allowances freed up by the attendant emissions reduction.
Several considerations suggest using trade rather than aid to deliver
compensatory side payments. First, for beneficiary countries making side
payments, trade may be less costly than aid where trade generates collateral
benefits such as increased employment in the exporting industry, a more
fruitful ongoing economic relationship between the two countries, or
supplementary improvements in correlated environmental conditions such
as regional air quality or biodiversity.as Second, aid may be subject to more
domestic political opposition than trade; making side payments in official
government aid could entail massive outright transfers, whereas allowance
trading would entail numerous small transfers from private sources in
industrialized countries to lower-cost abaters in developing countries.
Although political visibility of the costs of environmental protection is
often seen as a desirable characteristic,326 higher political visibility may be
less efficient if the political system is distorted (e.g., by xenophobic
obstacles to foreign aid). Third, for developing countries, foreign aid may
appear to be subject to more bureaucratic constraints and less responsive to
Majority rule as well. In general, it might be preferable whenever participation has to be attracted
with side payments.
324. Another method of compensation might be the provision of political rewards. For
example, China might agree to quantity limits on its GHG emissions in return for being admitted
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This kind of linkage is plausible in high-stakes
international diplomacy. But such a compensation method is "lumpier" and may yield more
errors of over- or undercompensation, or other undesirable consequences outside the
environmental protection arena, than would financial or allowance-denominated compensation
provided in the environmental protection treaty itself. Still, there might be synergistic benefits of
such a deal, because getting China to play by the WTO's free trade rules could be quite important
to the success of a tradeable quantity allowances instrument for global environmental protection.
See infra Section V.C.
325. See Dallas Burtraw & Michael A. Toman, Equity and International Agreements for CO2
Containment, 118 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 122, 131 (1992).
326. See Keohane et al., supra note 202, at 364.
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the local needs of the recipient country than international trade.3 27 Fourth,
private trade transactions are likely to be more cost-effective and creative
and to generate more sustainable investments that benefit host countries
than the projects funded by government aid bureaus. If aid is provided by a
centralized fund, its cost-effectiveness may be even more impaired relative
to competitive private investors, and problems of market power may distort
aid choices."2 Fifth, trade may also be more attractive because it inhibits
strategic posturing; monetary payments might be more likely than in-kind
technology exports to entice potential recipients to exaggerate the amount
of compensation they seek.329
The need for Pareto-improving compensatory side payments to engage
full participation under the Voluntary Assent voting rule suggests a
straightforward approach to the initial assignment of global regulatory
burdens. Instead of working out complex formulae combining ability to
pay, population, GDP, and other factors, the Pareto-improving approach
would assign burdens in proportion to national net benefits of cooperation.
The less net benefit (i.e., net of compliance costs) that a country reaps
directly from the global environmental protection regime, the less burden it
can be expected to undertake initially and still want to participate. If the
regime employs tradeable allowances, the initial assignment would need to
give extra allowances to countries with lower direct net benefits from the
environmental protection regime and fewer allowances to countries with
higher direct net benefits.30 In this way, the initial assignment would match
national costs to national benefits. If burdens were assigned to correspond
to other typical burden-sharing criteria, such as ability to pay or population,
a country could face costs exceeding its benefits, which would lead it to
327. This factor could ironically be an obstacle to developing country governments' assent to
an international emissions trading system. Trade in environmental allowances and technologies
might better serve the interests of private firms in developing countries, whereas aid might better
serve the interests of government elites in these countries.
328. See supra Subsection uI.C.2.
329. See Burtraw & Toman, supra note 325, at 132.
330. Along these lines, one analysis argues that the only way to achieve a Pareto efficient
global solution is through a tradeable allowances approach in which extra allowances are allocated
to countries with lower marginal social valuations of consumption. See GRACMLA CHICHILNISKY
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS PERMITS: EQurry AND EFFICIENCY (Stanford Univ. Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research Publication No. 381, 1993). The argument is that because countries place
different valuations on global environmental protection, as described supra Section II.C,
equalizing marginal costs of abatement across countries (e.g., through a tax or ordinary tradeable
allowance system) will not be welfare-improving for all countries. Instead, the only initial
assignments of allowances that will be welfare-improving for all countries are those that equalize
the ratio of marginal benefits to marginal costs across countries. This requires assigning
additional wealth (in the form of extra allowances) to countries with lower marginal social
valuations of climate protection. The authors argue that allowance trading could then attain a
Lindahl equilibrium, in which all parties are not merely no worse off but are first-best off. See id.;
see also Robert Dorfnan, Protecting the Transnational Commons, in TEE ECONOMICS OF
TRANSNATIONAL COMMONS, supra note 81, at 210 (describing an initial assignment that attains a
Lindahl equilibrium).
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decline to participate. Many of these factors would still play a role in the
calculus of national net direct benefits. For example, historical emissions
would matter in this exercise not as a fixed star for grandparenting
allowances, but as an input to the calculation of each country's cost of
abatement. Likewise, a country's population and wealth would influence its
costs and benefits of restraining emissions. Of course, this inverse-net-
benefits approach to burden assignment is not simple; the calculation of
national net direct benefits, and the judgment of the number of allowances
to assign to a given country, will be complex and hotly contested. But this
approach is a key-or perhaps even the only-way toward efficiently
engaging global participation.
5. A Calabresi and Melamedian Analysis
The argument can also be stated in the Calabresi and Melamed
terminology of liability rules and property rules. The status quo ante-no
limit on emissions-represents a default pure property rule entitlement to
emit. It is conceivable in theory that the status quo could reflect the
opposite implicit assumption, namely that victims have an entitlement to
zero externality-such that the global environment were a "closed access"
resource rather than an open-access resource. 33' An externality itself is an
involuntary exchange forced on the victim by the source,3 2 so it can hardly
be said that victims have voluntarily assented to giving emitters the
331. On "closed access" or "anticommons" property, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in
Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22 (1993); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621, 667-79
(1998); and Michelman, supra note 221, at 6 (referring to an anticommons property regime as a
"regulatory regime"). A "closed access" regime for the global environment might be possible
where the resource has not yet been exploited in the status quo and the law gives every party a
right to exclude all others. Historical examples of such a situation include the Moon Treaty, see
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. II, 610 U.N.T.S.205 (entered
into force Oct. 10, 1967) (barring appropriation of rights to outer space, including the moon), the
Antarctic Environmental Protocol, see Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. IV, 12 U.S.T. 794;
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991, art. 7, 30 I.L.M. 1461
(barring mineral extraction in Antarctica), and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 48, each of which limited resource extraction before exploitation had begun. The global
atmosphere and global biodiversity, however, are far past that point. Emissions and extraction
have been ongoing for centuries, and the entitlements of the sources of global externalities are
only now being challenged. Cf. Ellickson, supra note 121, at 731 (noting that Pigou focused on
abatement subsidies rather than emissions taxes, since in the era in which he wrote, notions of
"normalcy" assigned the initial entitlement to polluters).
332. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 17-18 (defining an externality as an
uncompensated change in A's utility chosen not by A, but by others who are not considering the
effects on A); BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 56, at 71 (defining an external cost as a loss
imposed on an individual against which he has no legal recourse); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
5, at 772 ("A harmful externality can often be described as the taking of a thing; for example, a
firm that pollutes someone's air can be said to have taken clean air or an easement from the
victim.").
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entitlement to emit.333 Perhaps in a first-best world, the entitlement to be
free of global pollution would be held by victims. But in the real world, the
status quo does not reflect an implicit entitlement in victims to zero global
pollution because externality generation is difficult to block ex ante (i.e.,
the source can physically seize the entitlement by emitting domestically).
Victims cannot physically block emissions, or, put another way, victims
face prohibitive costs to doing so. They would have to invade the
sovereignty of the source country and somehow seal up emissions outlets.
The standard problem of open-access resources is that they remain open-
access, subject to the "race to capture" by harvesters or polluters, until
"mutual coercion" is "mutually agreed upon."" So, as a practical matter,
like it or not, the present system starts from an implicit entitlement in
sources to emit.
Under Fiat, the state can dictate the legal rule: a property rule
entitlement in either source or victim, a liability rule requiring payment of
damages by source to victim, or a reverse liability rule requiring payment of
damages (cost of abatement) by victim to source.35 Under Fiat, the state
could modify the sources' ex ante entitlement to emit by imposing a tax or
quantity limit on emissions. Under Voluntary Assent, however, the source
will not agree to relinquish its entitlement without being compensated. As
Professor Dorfman puts it, the crucial "complication" of international
environmental problems is that "the world is divided into entities called
'sovereign nations,' each of which is entitled to use, or misuse, the
transnational commons in whatever way it considers advantageous, unless it
agrees voluntarily to forgo some or all of these rights." 336 If the status quo
represents a property rule to emit, then the victim (the "beneficiary") must
333. A "true" Voluntary Assent rule, starting from an unrealistic neutral status quo, would
imply neither the right in polluters to emit nor the right in victims to prohibit emissions. Behind
Rawls's veil of ignorance, see generally RAWLs, supra note 172, people would be uncertain as to
whether they would emerge as sources or victims or both. They might rationally choose, under a
Voluntary Assent voting rule, a regulatory rule that gives the right to emit neither entirely to
polluters (risking losses to victims), nor entirely to victims (risking costs to consumers of
polluters' products), but rather might choose a "divided" entitlement that optimizes these
conflicting costs (as well as the costs of decisionmaking and other attributes). Under a real-world
Voluntary Assent voting rule, however, people have more complete information regarding their
actual situations and the net payoffs for moves proposed from the nonneutral status quo.
334. Hardin, supra note 57, at 1247.
335. A reverse liability rule (Calabresi and Melamed's "fourth rule")-taxing the victims-
may be more efficient than a liability rule-taxing the sources-where the government has better
information about the source's cost of abatement than it does about the victim's damages. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1116; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 725 n.37, 742
n.89. Under Voluntary Assent, a liability rule (either direct or reverse) may be more difficult to
establish than a property rule because of the lack of an external coercive force (i.e., a court) to set
the price that the victims will pay. Calabresi and Melamed note that, compared to a property rule,
a liability rule requires an additional element of state intervention not just to assign the entitlement
but also to impose its price. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092.
336. Dorfman, supra note 330, at 210 (emphases added).
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negotiate to purchase the entitlement at a price high enough to cover the
source's cost of abatement.337
There are then three ways for a victim to make payment to a source: as
a direct payment, as compensation for adopting a price constraint
(tax/liability rule), or as compensation for adopting a quantity constraint
(partial property rule). The quantity constraint approach is best because it
avoids the perverse effects of subsidizing the source directly or under a
price constraint. The direct payment or the payment for adopting a price
constraint will act as a subsidy-necessarily covering the source's full costs
of abatement (and the price constraint on unabated emissions) and
necessarily proportionate to the source's emissions-hence, attracting
increased investment to the source industry. This perverse effect is the
"polluter's behavior" moral hazard counterpart to the standard "victims'
behavior" argument, which asserts that actual payments to the victim can
be inefficient where the victim's behavior is important because the
compensatory payment acts as a subsidy to the victim's risk-taking
behavior.33' Likewise, actual payments from the victim to the source can be
inefficient where these rules act as a subsidy to the sources' risk-making
behavior and thereby increase the size of the group of sources.339 A quantity
337. Assume arguendo that global environmental law could somehow start from the
assumption of an implicit entitlement in emissions in victims to be free of harm ("closed access,
zero emissions"). The analysis in Part IV would still apply. Under a Voluntary Assent voting rule,
the principle would still have to be "beneficiaries pay," now understood to mean the beneficiaries
of the change from the status quo ante baseline assignment of entitlements. These beneficiaries
would now be the emitters rather than the victims. Victims of GHG emissions who are not also
sources (e.g., small coastal and island states) would not agree to incur any environmental harm
unless they received compensatory side payments. (Victim countries that are also sources of
emissions might agree to allow some emissions because they would also gain from the right to
emit.) The compensatory side payments to victims would amount to insurance against their
damages and could thus invite inefficient risk-taking behavior by victims (e.g., building new
facilities on coasts vulnerable to rises in sea level or failing to adopt low-cost measures to adapt
agriculture to rising temperatures). This is the standard problem of the perverse "victim's
behavior" moral hazard, induced when actual compensation is paid to victims. See BAUMOL &
OATES, supra note 3, at 23-25; Coase, supra note 4, at 2, 12-13, 42; Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 5, at 720-21; see also supra Subsection III.C.2 (describing the perverse incentives to pollute
introduced by subsidies). In a Fiat regime, emissions victims could be forced to accept incomplete
compensation under a policy that limits or taxes emissions to some non-zero level but leaves
victims incurring the damages caused by the residual allowed emissions. Under Voluntary Assent,
reducing the compensation paid to victims would not work because victim countries would not
agree to relinquish their entitlement to be free of harm unless they were fully compensated for
their net losses. Adding a tax on victims' risk-incurring behavior (e.g., coastal development)
would not help because pure victims would have to be compensated for the costs of paying the tax
as well, which would offset the incentive of the tax. The solution must be to pay victims
compensation for their assent to allowing some harmful emissions, but only if victims accept a
quantity-based limit on their exposure to harm, such as a tradeable quantity limit on coastal
development. This is the analog to the "cap-and-trade" approach discussed in the text.
338. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 23-25; POSNER, supra note 100, at 169-75, 177,
377; Coase, supra note 4, at 2,42; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 720-21, 738-39.
339. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 64 (criticizing "fourth rule" payments to sources as
likely to induce excessive risk-making by sources). This possibility is also hinted at by Kaplow
and Shavell, who remark that "property rule protection of injurers' right to cause harm ... [may]
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constraint adopted by the source (with side payments to cover the source's
net cost of abatement) solves this problem. It suppresses the distortionary
effect of the side payments on sources' behavior.
The standard solutions to the "victims' behavior" problem under Fiat
are to reduce the compensation to the victim, such as through doctrines of
contributory negligence or mitigation of damage,M ° or a Pigouvian tax
approach in which the source pays the liability to the state rather than to the
victim. 341 But these remedies are unavailable at the global level under
Voluntary Assent to deal with the converse "polluter's behavior" problem.
Under Voluntary Assent, limiting or denying compensation to the source
will result in the source declining to agree to abate. Some means must be
found not only to pay compensation to sources, but also to inhibit the
perverse incentives this payment creates for sources. The divided property
rule-tradeable allowances with extra assignments to cooperative losers-
is the best instrument for achieving this result.
C. Additional Considerations
1. Compliance
Although compliance is a general problem of regulation under any
voting rule, it is especially challenging under the Voluntary Assent voting
rule, where sources cannot be compelled to comply but must be attracted by
the continuing desirability of participation.3 2 A common criticism of
international tradeable allowances is that assuring compliance would be
difficult.343 Yet the problem of compliance is not unique to tradeable
come[] at the price of a dilution of injurers' incentives." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 739.
They do not specify, however, whether they are referring to the problem that transaction costs
may obstruct victims' ability to purchase from injurers the rights to emit, such that injurers would
face inefficiently low incentives to abate risk, or whether they are referring to the problem
identified here, of "polluters' behavior," that, even if victims can pay injurers' abatement costs,
this very payment would act as a subsidy to the risky industry.
340. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 738 (identifying such doctrines and criticizing
them as inadequately tailored to victims' options and incentives).
341. See id. at 738 & n.77; see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 3, at 29 (favoring
Pigouvian taxes over tort liability because the taxes do not yield actual compensation to victims
and thus avoid the perverse incentives for victims to incur excessive risk).
342. See BARRETT, supra note 238, at 7; Barrett, supra note 58, at 282-83.
343. See, e.g., DAvID HARRISON, JR., CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING
AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS TRADING PROGRAM 2 (1997) ("National
trading programs are organized by governments that have the legal authority to impose regulatory
requirements. In contrast, there is no international organization that could require participation of
individual countries."); id. at 43 ("In summary, taken as a whole, the [difficulties arising from the
absence of a supervening legal authority] constitute major, if not insurmountable, barriers to the
successful implementation of an international trading program for greenhouse gases."); see also
Jeffrey C. Fort & Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond a National Program?:
Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 463, 470-71
(1997) (doubting the ability to enforce compliance with international tradeable permits); Climate
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allowance policies. Any regulatory constraint must be backed by some form
of monitoring and verification of national abatement claims and some form
of enforcement against noncompliance? 4
The question is the relative ability of the regulatory instruments to
maintain compliance. In general, national compliance with conduct
instruments, taxes, fixed quantity caps, and allowance trading would all be
judged in the same way: by reference to the national emissions inventories
of the countries subject to the global constraint. 45 Thus, compliance should
be no more difficult to police with allowance trading than with other
instruments. The criticisms of weak enforcement of trading systems 46 are
really criticisms of the weak ability of the international system and its
Voluntary Assent voting rules to assure nation-states' compliance with any
regulatory obligations. The real root of the problem is the incentive to free
ride.m7 Because compliance is costly and benefits of abatement are globally
nonexcludable, countries have incentives to defect." Noncompliance
amounts to partial or full free riding. "Once free-riding has been deterred,
compliance enforcement comes free of charge."" 49
Allowance trading offers significant ways to reduce free riding and
improve compliance compared to alternative instruments. First, it reduces
the probability of free riding and noncompliance by reducing the cost of
compliance and expanding the group of participants 50 The improved cost-
effectiveness of allowance trading itself translates into much less free
riding, and hence much less non-compliance, than under more costly
regulatory instruments.Y Second, it adds useful enforcement tools, such as
the ability to debit the violator's allowance account for past excesses and
the ability to halt trading in the violator's accounts or even expel the
Change: Electric Utilities See Major Difficulties in Establishing Global Emissions Trading, 28
Env't Rep. (BNA) 368 (June 20, 1997) (reporting an electric utility industry spokesman's concern
that an international emissions trading system would be enforced weakly); Steve Pedery, Sierra
Club Blasts Administration Global Warming Plan, (visited Jan. 13, 1998)
<http://www.sierraclub.org/news> (reporting on an environmental group's concern that the
system of international tradeable allowances proposed by the United States in the Kyoto talks is
"unenforceable").
344. See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 56, at 40-41 (describing taxes, tradeable allowances, and
other instruments for internalizing global externalities and concluding that the success of each
these instruments "faces severe obstacles because the required infrastructure does not currently
exist to implement the standard remedies" at the global level).
345. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 26-30.
346. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
347. See BARRETT, supra note 238, at 16 & n.7.
348. See supra Section II.A.
349. BARRE-I, supra note 238, at 7. Barrett also shows that the mere threat of trade
sanctions can be sufficient to deter free riding among cooperative beneficiaries. See Barrett, supra
note 58, at 280-82.
350. See supra Subsection JIl.C.I.
351. See supra notes 255,268 and accompanying text.
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violator from the market. 52 Third, debiting the violator's allowance account
may create new domestic political constituencies pressuring for
compliance: investors in the allowance futures and options markets, and
prospective buyers of allowances, who stand to lose if future allowances are
cancelled. The domestic advocates of compliance would include not just
environmental groups but a new swath of financial investors and industry
members. 53 Fourth, compared to taxes, allowance trading would be much
easier to monitor; nations' compliance with GHG taxes might be essentially
unverifiable.354
The question remains whether allowance trading might generate special
risks of noncompliance. The problem might be fraudulent sales: Country B
might sell its allowances to Country A, pocket the cash, and then continue
to emit in excess of its remaining allowances (either snubbing the treaty's
requirements or formally withdrawing from the treaty). Under a treaty
without allowance trading, of course, Country B might also fail to comply
(continue to emit in excess of its target, or emit without paying its tax), but
Country A would not also have purchased allowances giving it the right to
increase its emissions as well.
The fraudulent sale scenario, however, seems doubtful. First, it assumes
that B plays once and for all. Because B could earn continued revenues
from selling allowances in future years, and noncompliance (or treaty
withdrawal) would trigger penalties including prohibition of future
allowance sales, repeated allowance trading provides Country B an
incentive to remain in compliance. Without allowance trading, Country B
sees compliance as costly, whereas with repeated allowance trading,
Country B sees compliance as a profit opportunity. Second, this profit
opportunity would attract more Country Bs of the world to subject
themselves to the treaty and its monitoring regime; allowance trading
thereby helps the treaty to expand its coverage and monitor and manage a
larger fraction of global emissions than would a treaty without allowance
trading.355 Third, if the allowances sold by Country B were deemed invalid
upon B's default, then Country A would have no right to increase its
emissions (though this remedy would carry its own transaction costs).
3 56
352. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 44-46. An offsetting debit against the emitter's
future allowance allocation is one penalty provided under the U.S. SO2 trading system. See 42
U.S.C. § 7651j(b) (1994). This penalty is in addition to a financial penalty of $2000 per ton of SO2
emissions in excess of allowances held. See id. § 7651j(a).
353. See STEVART ET AL., supra note 146, at 45.
354. See infra Part V.
355. At the same time, the cost-effectiveness gains of allowance trading would attract more
"buyer" countries (high-cost abaters) to participate in the treaty.
356. The question is how to allocate the risk of nonperformance in allowance markets.
Making allowance buyers "liable" for sellers' nonperformance could encourage buyers to
monitor sellers and prevent fraudulent sales. But it could also raise the transaction costs of the
allowance trading market and drag down its cost-effectiveness gains. The alternative is to treat
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Fourth, the possible incentive to engage in fraudulent sales would almost
surely be dominated by the reduced incentive to free ride under allowance
trading.
Informal trading (joint implementation or Clean Development
Mechanism (JI/CDM) transactions), where seller countries are not subject
to national quantity caps, raises special concerns. One is the "domestic
leakage" that might occur within the seller country. For example, the
carbon stored in trees spared from the axe in one locale and sold as
abatement credit to a capped country could be offset by increased logging
next door within the same uncapped country. But what matters is the net
leakage: The leakage from a JI/CDM project within an uncapped country
must be compared to the leakage that would have been induced if the same
abatement had been required to be undertaken in the domestic economy of
the capped country. Net leakage could well be reduced by JI/CDM
transactions; for one thing, the incentive for emitters in capped
industrialized countries to relocate to uncapped countries would be reduced
by the abatement cost savings offered by JI/CDM.357
The more serious concerns about JIICDM transactions in uncapped
countries relate to dynamic incentives. If uncapped developing countries
can sell JIICDM credits to buyers in capped wealthy countries at the same
price they would sell cap-and-trade allowances, there would be little
incentive for the uncapped countries to join the cap regime. As argued
above, the prospect of selling formal allowances to higher-abatement-cost
countries provides the pivotal incentive for cooperative loser developing
countries to participate in the treaty cap; and without their participation, the
entire treaty may be futile or worse. If they can earn just as much outside a
cap, why should they accept caps? Perhaps the informality and high
transaction costs of the JIICDM markeet58 will by themselves make JI/CDM
credits less valuable to buyers, so that formal allowances would
automatically sell at higher prices than JIICDM credits. Some discounting
of JI/CDM credits could still be needed to reflect their lesser effectiveness
allowance buyers as bona fide purchasers for value holding good title to their allowances, and
penalize the nonperforming seller. This approach would enable allowances to be a "global
currency" that is not denominated by the country of sale, greatly reducing transaction costs. It
would mean that international institutions, rather than buyers, would bear the administrative costs
of monitoring sellers' emissions and enforcing compliance through the national inventory reports
and independent verification. This is precisely the way compliance would be enforced under
regulatory instruments other than allowance trading, so even if compliance assurance is difficult,
it could not be more difficult under allowance trading. For discussion and endorsement of the
latter approach, see STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 13 & n. 17, 44-47.
357. The price-driven leakage effect could also be less acute in less market-oriented
developing countries than in highly market-oriented industrialized ones. In other words, high
transaction costs in the domestic economy could inhibit leakage.




(compared to formal allowances) in achieving actual global abatement.359
The problems are keeping such discounting tied to actual effectiveness and
preventing such a discounting exercise from being hijacked by those who
oppose trading altogether. Excessive discounting would forfeit the social
gains that JI/CDM could bring in lower-cost global abatement, and in initial
participation by developing countries in any abatement at all. These social
gains could be large enough to justify a combined approach in which there
is both a formal allowance trading market and a recognized but less
valuable currency in JI/CDM credits.
2. Decisionmaking Efficiency
Because the Voluntary Assent rule typically has higher decisionmaking
costs than more coercive voting rules,360 the ability of regulatory
instruments to inflate or economize on decisionmaking costs could be
particularly important at the global level. One kind of decisionmaking cost
is the administrative cost of operating the regulatory system. Some argue
that a tradeable allowances system could not work at the global level
without a central agency like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to
operate the system.36' Although allowance trading would surely involve
some central monitoring and recordkeeping, the issue is the relative
administrative cost compared to other regulatory instruments. As discussed
above, the administrative costs for conduct instruments can be as high or
higher than the costs for incentive instruments.362 Moreover, it is
technology-based regulation, not incentives, that depends on a central
agency to collect data on sources' abatement costs. Command-and-control
regulation works cost-effectively, relative to incentives, only under systems
with coercive central planning and information collection.163 It is in part
because of the Voluntary Assent voting rule that international
environmental law lacks a strong central administration?' Thus, since
359. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (discussing leakage); supra Subsections
III.C.2, IV.B.4.a (discussing perverse effects of pure payments to abate).
360. See supra Section V.A.
361. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Chilton & Christopher Douglass, Kyoto Debriefing: Emissions
Trading Undercut, J. OF COM., Dec. 16, 1997, at 7A.
But the [U.S.] acid rain trading program and any [international] greenhouse gas cap-
and-trade system have some important differences. Perhaps the most important
difference is the ability to administer and monitor the two programs. The acid rain
trading scheme is... overseen by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. That
agency has a team of inspectors, administrators and expensive monitoring equipment
already in place to ensure... that companies honor their commitments.
Id.
362. See supra Subsection III.C.l.
363. See supra note 164; cf. Stewart, supra note 166, at 337 (comparing command-and-
control regulation to central planning).
364. See supra note 243.
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gathering detailed firm-level information to set technology standards is
difficult for a national government, it would be even more difficult for an
international institution. The comparative weakness of central
administration at the global level renders the relative advantage of
incentives over alternative instruments even greater in the international
setting.
A second kind of decisionmaking cost is the cost of negotiating the
initial assignment of regulatory burdens. Critics of GHG allowance trading
often argue that it requires a divisive negotiation over how to assign the
allowances among countries. 5 But the initial assignment issue cannot be
avoided under any regulatory instrument. Even seemingly neutral targets,
such as holding all countries to 1990 emissions levels, or imposing a
uniform tax, would result in widely varying social costs for countries with
differing economic growth rates, different opportunities to employ
substitute fuels and products, and other factors. Some allocation of burden,
implicit or explicit, is unavoidable. There is no way to avoid negotiating
over these distributional impacts. Every regulatory instrument requires an
initial decision on how the regulatory constraint on emissions or resource
use will be assigned across regulated entities.366
Allowance trading, however, can uniquely ease the initial assignment
problem. Formal allowance trading makes the initial assignment of burdens
explicit, which can make the assignment easier to discuss and resolve. More
importantly, a market-based allowance trading policy allows post-
agreement reallocations through market trades. A country fearing that a
target might prove more expensive than predicted knows that, with trading,
it will be able to look to abatement opportunities in lower-cost countries,
easing its predicament. This is a version of the Coase Theorem: Where
transaction costs are low, voluntary reallocations of entitlements can make
the initial legal assignment irrelevant to the ultimate assignment.3 67 Where
transaction costs are significant, such reallocations would be frustrated.
Hence, to maximize cost-effectiveness and ease the allocation impasse, a
primary goal of the market-based policy should be to keep transaction costs
low. Without trading, there is no way to reallocate burdens once adopted, so
365. See, e.g., HARRiSON, supra note 343, at 22 ("Unlike a national trading program in
which the legal authority exists to impose an [allowance] allocation formula.., there is no
international body that can impose a formula on independent countries.... [N]egotiations would
be difficult and complex...."); Cooper, supra note 9, at 70-72,74,78.
366. As Robert Hahn writes: "Cooper... contends that tradable permits are not feasible
because it will be politically impossible to agree on a baseline. Cooper's critique of international
tradable permits also applies to his own tax proposal. It is hard to see how a taxation approach
would be feasible in the short term for the developing world .... " HAHN, supra note 83, at 43.
367. See generally Coase, supra note 4. The distributional impact of initial allowance
assignments could be significant and could affect subsequent transactions among the regulated
entities if the wealth effects are large enough to influence their preferences, such as their
willingness to pay to acquire an additional tradeable allowance.
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an inflexible initial assignment is seen by the parties as determinative, and
this realization obstructs negotiations and agreement. The prospect of post-
adoption allowance trading could thus substantially defuse the initial
assignment impasse.
A third kind of decisionmaking cost is the ability to adjust the
regulatory constraint as conditions change. Different instruments imply
different abilities to adapt regulations to changing circumstances. Conduct
rules require a central agency to update requirements as technologies,
substitutes, and other factors change; incentives allow private actors to
make such choices continuously.36 Monetary inflation erodes taxes and
requires them to be adjusted or indexed to maintain the same environmental
effect; and quantity constraints can become more costly with industrial
growth. Outside the world of Fiat, the political constituencies interested in
the regulatory constraint can also influence adjustability. Allowance holders
might resist subsequent proposals to tighten the regulatory constraint if that
would mean canceling or expropriating their allowances without
compensation. The government could assert the authority to rescind
allowances without compensation,369 but the risk of confiscation might
impair the ability of the allowance trading market to control emissions
efficiently. Yet compensating for rescinded allowances would require
raising revenues or deficit spending. So, whether compensation is paid or
not, tightening the constraint under an allowance trading policy will
confront political opposition from some quarter. Meanwhile, similar
political obstacles to tighter stringency would arise under a tax because
tightening policy stringency would mean raising the tax rate over the
protests of taxpayers. Relaxing the constraint, on the other hand, would
please taxpayers and potential new allowance purchasers. But current
allowance holders might resist relaxing the constraint because such
relaxation would devalue currently held allowances.37 ° Thus, tradeable
allowances may be less amenable to subsequent relaxation than taxes.
368. See Bohm & Russell, supra note 5, at 400,416,426,447-52.
369. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1994) ("An allowance allocated under this subchapter is
a limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide in accordance with the provisions of this
subchapter. Such allowance does not constitute a property right. Nothing in this subchapter...
shall be construed to limit the authority of the United States to terminate or limit such
authorization.").
370. This has been the experience with taxicab medallions in New York City. The city
allocated just fewer than 12,000 taxi medallions in 1937, and, despite growth in demand for taxi
rides as the city's population grew, pressure from current medallion owners to retain their
advantaged position forestalled the issuance of any additional medallions until 60 years later,
when the city added a paltry 400 (less than a 4% increase) in 1996. See A Revolution! New York's
Cabs, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1996, at 21.
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3. Fairness
As indicated above in Part Ell, fairness is especially important at the
global level because of the wider wealth gap between rich and poor and
because of the comparative lack of redistributive mechanisms at the global
level.37 1 In addition, fairness is especially important under the Voluntary
Assent rule because countries' perceptions of whether an agreement is fair
will substantially influence whether they agree to participate. Under
Voluntary Assent, fairness is thus itself a key determinant of adoption. This
aspect can be ignored under Fiat and neglected under Majority rule.
If wealthy countries value global environmental protection more highly
than poor countries (which place higher priority on local and immediate
needs), then the Beneficiaries Pay Principle implied by the Voluntary
Assent voting rule will usually be consistent with considerations of fairness.
It will entail wealthier countries paying poorer countries to generate global
environmental protection services such as GHG abatement and biodiversity
conservation. Applying the Polluters Pay Principle will often mean asking
some poorer but industrializing countries, such as China and Brazil, to bear
the cost of not developing for the benefit of wealthier countries. Poor
countries are unlikely to consent to these regressive requests.372
There are some cases where poorer countries benefit more from global
environmental protection, such that the Beneficiaries Pay Principle would
be regressive. For example, the beneficiaries of preventing climate change
include both wealthy environmentalist countries (such as the members of
the European Union) and poorer coastal countries (such as the members of
the Association of Small Island States, or AOSIS). The Beneficiaries Pay
Principle implies that the EU and AOSIS might have to pay China, or even
the United States, to abate GHG emissions.373 At some point this problem
could become a recognition that the net global payoff from climate
protection is negative and that the treaty regime is not worth pursuing. Yet
there could clearly be situations in which global protection is desirable but
the Beneficiaries Pay Principle is at odds with distributional equity. No
single fairness criterion will be universally recognized 74 The promise is
371. See supra Subsection III.C.1. The lack of redistributive mechanisms is in part the result
of the Voluntary Assent voting rule itself: Coercive majority voting facilitates redistribution,
whereas a unanimity rule precludes pure redistribution. See MUELLER, supra note 221, at 103-08.
372. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 111, at 162-71; SANDLER, supra note 56, at 95-97; d'Arge
& Kneese, supra note 54, at 443; supra Subsection IV.B. In the case where the same countries are
both the beneficiaries and the sources, such as in the CFC phaseout, then the BPP and PPP
approaches may yield the same result.
373. It is debatable whether the United States would suffer a cooperator's loss under a GHG
limitation regime and therefore require compensatory side payments if it is to be engaged in
emissions limitation. See Aronson, supra note 11, at 2158-60 (suggesting that the United States
might be a cooperative loser in GHG control); Nordhaus & Yang, supra note 60, at 762.
374. See Burtraw & Toman, supra note 325, at 122.
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that the Beneficiaries Pays Principle will yield fair transfers more often than
the Polluters Pay Principle, so long as the priority put on environmental
protection correlates with wealth.
As described in Part III, a system of tradeable allowances could be
more fair to developing countries than alternative regulatory instruments
because allowance trading with extra allowances assigned to developing
countries would guide technology and resource flows to developing
countries, and the associated cost savings to industrialized countries would
mitigate a reduction in industrialized countries' purchases of product
imports from developing countries. Moreover, under the Voluntary Assent
voting rule, the explicit attention to initial assignment invited by the
tradeable allowance instrument may help ensure that poorer countries
obtain a more equitable share of global assets in international negotiations.
Where the assignment is implicit, unfairness can go unnoticed. For
example, in the Law of the Sea treaty, exclusive fishing rights were
extended from twelve miles to 200 miles from coasts. This amounted to an
assignment of partial geographic property rights in what was formerly the
unowned oceans, in a way that favored coastal countries while removing
large fishing areas from the global commons.375 Although privatization of
global fisheries may well be desirable on efficiency grounds to prevent
overharvesting, the assignment of those fishing rights implicates fairness
considerations. If the fishing zones had been made tradeable, it would have
been clearer that any country-even a noncoastal country-could acquire
such rights. This would have invited a more equitable initial distribution of
the new exclusive zones. Noncoastal countries could have sought a share of
the fishing rights, even if they only meant to trade that entitlement to
coastal countries in return for other valuable consideration. If the rights to
fish in the currently unowned high seas are privatized in the future, explicit
assignment of tradeable high seas fishing rights would similarly benefit
noncoastal countries.
4. Morality
The Voluntary Assent rule adds further reasons to eschew the moralist
claim, reviewed in Part III, that one should not buy or sell the right to
pollute. First, the state's moral authority to teach an antipollution message
is less potent. Fiat or Majority rule can compel bad actors to live by a moral
creed, but under the Voluntary Assent rule, there is no such power to
enforce public morality. To the extent that the moralist position depends on
the ability to compel right behavior by bad actors, pressing the moral
message under the Voluntary Assent rule could be seen as a sham: touted
375. See Hollick & Cooper, supra note 81, at 143; supra note 149.
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but flouted. This may only serve to delegitimize the moral message. The
message ultimately communicated could be the irrelevance of morals, not
their sanctity.
Second, at the global level there are multiple national cultures and
moralities. Placing blame may accomplish less in this plural setting than it
could within one society under Majority rule. Enforcing an antipollution
moralism against developing countries, for example, will undoubtedly
confront the rejoinder that ecoimperialism is itself immoral and that poor
countries have a moral right to develop as industrialized countries did. The
clash of moralities would be difficult to resolve and ultimately would be
unproductive in protecting the shared global environment.
Third, under Voluntary Assent, the moralist stance against tradeable
allowances and in favor of condemning polluters would raise the costs of
pollution control and effectively forfeit participation by the cooperative
losers. The irony of moralism376 would be heightened because strictly
punitive regulation would virtually guarantee less global control of
pollution, making the moralist herself the "person to blame for causing
pollution." The moralist position would yield incomplete coverage,
leakage, and continuing or increasing net pollution; or it would have to
employ side payments to attract cooperative losers, in which case the
moralist would be paying polluters not to pollute, in violation of the
original moral claim. In sum, the moralist stance does not get very far under
a Voluntary Assent legal system.
D. Implications
The argument presented in this Part strongly suggests that tradeable
allowances enjoy a presumptive advantage over other instruments under the
Voluntary Assent voting rule that prevails at the global level. All other
policy attributes hypothetically held equal, the less coercive the voting rule,
the more important "participation efficiency" becomes. As participation
must be attracted instead of compelled, taxes become less effective, side
payments become more essential to securing participation, revenue
recycling becomes less feasible, the risk of perverse incentive effects due to
side payments rises, and, consequently, the advantage of quantity-based
tradeable allowances grows.
The other attributes of regulatory instruments examined in Part I must
also be considered. The presumptive advantage of tradeable allowances
could be rebutted by showing that cooperative losers are unimportant or
that other attributes (such as abatement cost uncertainty) weigh more
heavily in favor of another instrument (such as taxes) than participation
376. See supra Subsection I.c.I.
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efficiency weighs in favor of tradeable allowances. All I have sought to
establish here is that the Voluntary Assent voting rule at the international
level substantially changes the comparison of regulatory instruments. At the
very least, the legal framework obtaining at the international level requires
that we envision ways to make all regulatory instruments compatible with
participation-securing side payments. A complete comparative analysis of
instrument choice must account not only for such policy attributes as cost-
effectiveness, dynamic innovation, administrative cost, fairness,
performance under uncertainty, and revenue recycling, but also for what I
have termed "participation efficiency." Whether the ultimate champion of
the regulatory Olympics will be tradeable allowances or taxes must await
such a comprehensive, multi-attribute analysis, based on the empirical
realities of particular global environmental problems. Here I argue only that
the important role of participation efficiency at the international level, as a
consequence of the Voluntary Assent voting rule, gives tradeable
allowances a prima facie head start for global environmental regulation.
Picking the winning instrument for global environmental regulation without
paying attention to participation efficiency is a bad bet-one that may yield
serious policy errors.
The argument in this Part suggests that the adoption of quantity-based
instruments rather than taxes in the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol,
and the U.S. acid rain program may have been prudent. In each case,
substantial side payments seemed necessary to obtain the requisite
participation. The U.S. acid rain program assigned extra tradeable
allowances to midwestern sources, instituting side payments to secure
majority coalition support while capping aggregate emissions." The
Montreal Protocol adopted quantity limits and direct financial side
payments, but it sacrificed cost-effectiveness by not adopting formal
tradeable allowances.378 Although the Kyoto Protocol did appear to employ
tradeable allowances with extra "headroom" allowances as quasi-side
payments to secure the participation of Russia and the Ukraine,"7 it failed
to do so to attract major developing countries such as China to adopt
quantitative GHG emissions limits."' The prospect is that GHG emissions
will grow in developing countries (perhaps even perversely spurred by
uncapped joint implementation and Clean Development Mechanism
subsidies) and emissions-intensive activities will "leak" from capped
industrialized countries to uncapped developing countries. If efficient
377. See supra notes 283, 323 and accompanying text.
378. See Bohm, supra note 132, at 30, 317, 325-30.
379. Rather than seeing this headroom as illegitimate "hot air," analysts should recognize the
assignment of extra tradeable allowances to Russia as the compensation price that had to be paid
to secure participation by a major nonbeneficiary source (cooperative loser).
380. See supra note 72.
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climate protection is the goal, the Kyoto treaty should be amended or
renegotiated with a new simultaneous assignment of formal tradeable
allowances to both industrialized and developing countries, constraining
global emissions at some level while conferring Pareto-improving
compensatory side payments on developing countries.
The presumptive advantage of quantity-based instruments will also
apply in other contexts in which the Voluntary Assent voting rule operates.
For example, assume that a neighborhood homeowners' association wanted
to limit noise but had to secure the voluntary assent of all concerned
members to a set of restrictive covenants." 1 Paying dissenting (noise-
loving) owners their costs of noise abatement (to gain their assent to the
noise-limiting covenant) would create perverse incentives for more noise-
lovers to move into the neighborhood and for neutral members to posture as
noise-lovers. Imposing a tax on noise would yield nonparticipation by
noise-lovers. A tax combined with side payments to noise-loving owners
would undermine the tax and create similar perverse incentives to
overinvest in noisiness. But imposing a limit on the quantity of noise (say, a
maximum decibel level) and making the same side payments would not
vitiate the quantity limit.
8 2
This analysis may also reveal a more deep-seated reason for the
difference between the Pigouvian and Coasean approaches than has been
previously recognized.383 The crucial dividing line may be the different
voting rules assumed by Pigou and Coase. Pigouvian taxes or liability rules
assume the existence of a regulatory state capable of imposing external
social costs on unwilling sources . 84 The entire premise of liability rules and
taxes is that the price of the entitlement can be set by a third party, namely
the state sitting as adjudicator or regulator.38 But Coasean property
entitlement bargains assume voluntary agreements among the parties.
Indeed, Coase pointedly contrasted his vision of efficient entitlement
transactions with the coercive world of Pigouvian taxes and state
381. See supra note 287.
382. A similar analysis could be developed for consensus-based "regulatory negotiations."
And an analysis of this dynamic could be relevant even under Majority rule. On the case of the
1990 U.S. acid rain trading program and the efficiency of tradeable quantity-based side payments,
see supra note 323. Cf. Sigman, supra note 284 (arguing that pure coercion yields midnight
dumping and that side payments with quantity limits would be more effective).
383. For different perspectives on this question, compare A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v.
Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1996), with R.H. Coase, Law and Economics and
A.W. Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1996), which responds to Simpson.
384. See supra Section IlI.A, notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Pigou was explicit. In the
midst of his famous passage on taxes and bounties to internalize externalities, he wrote: "No
'invisible hand' can be relied on to produce a good arrangement of the whole from a combination
of separate treatments of the parts. It is, therefore, necessary that an authority of wider reach
should intervene and should tackle the collective problems of beauty, of air and of light.
PIGOU, supra note 3, at 195.
385. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1092.
[Vol. 108: 677
Global Environmental Regulation
intervention.386 Coase's framework of trade in property rights is most at
home under Voluntary Assent where no coercive state is available to
intervene. Stepping back from debates over liability rules versus property
rules under different degrees of transaction costs or judicial accuracy,387 we
can see that a fundamental distinction between the Pigouvian and Coasean
approaches is the voting rule under which each is the presumptively
appropriate remedy: Pigouvian price constraints work best under Fiat, while
Coasean quantity entitlements work best under Voluntary Assent. At the
least, no comparison of regulatory instruments is complete if it neglects the
implications of the underlying voting rule.
V. CHOICE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS UNDER
ALTERNATIVE IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES
A second fundamental characteristic of the international legal context is
its implementation structure. A polity may implement its regulatory edict
through unitary, federalist, or jurisdictional structures. This Part shows that
the implementation structure, taken as given, significantly affects the choice
of the optimal regulatory instrument. 8 In particular, this Part shows that as
the polity moves from a centralized unitary structure to a jurisdictional
structure, the relative desirability of quantity instruments over price
instruments grows.
A. The Range of Implementation Structures
Most analyses of instrument choice assume that regulation can be
imposed directly on sources with no intervening level of government. This
is a "unitary" implementation structure. But global regulatory instruments
cannot be imposed directly on sources; they must be implemented through
subsidiary political jurisdictions-nation-states. I call this a highiy
"jurisdictional" structure. An intermediate framework is "federalist,"
386. See Coase, supra note 4, at 39-44.
387. See POSNER, supra note 100, at 57; Ayres & Talley, supra note 209.
388. I take the implementation structure as given-as an independent variable. I do not argue
in favor of one or another implementation structure. There is a voluminous literature comparing
the merits of different implementation structures, such as decentralized state and local control,
centralized national or global control, and mixed versions such as federalism. See, e.g., Engel,
supra note 74; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570
(1996); Revesz, supra note 56; Revesz, supra note 274; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental
Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64
J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 193 (1974). I assume here that the implementation structure, like the voting rule, is a fairly
permanent feature of the legal framework that does not change quickly.
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involving an overarching federal state within which subsidiary jurisdictions
still play important roles.389
It is helpful to see regulatory implementation as a principal-agent
relationship. In a unitary polity, regulatory instruments chosen by the
legislature are implemented by the executive. The legislature then has
several mechanisms available to monitor and manage the executive's
implementation efforts.39 In the international legal framework, nation-
states act as both principals and agents in global environmental regulation.
They are the principals who adopt the regulatory regime, and they are also
the agents who must implement it. Each nation-state is an agent for the
collective of all nation-states. Even assuming that every country qua
principal agrees to adopt a global regulatory regime, each country qua agent
also faces incentives to implement the regime domestically in a way that
maximizes its economic position relative to other countries (even while
remaining in facial compliance with the global regulatory agreement). The
collective countries qua principals (or an intergovernmental organization
acting as the go-between) face high costs of monitoring and controlling the
internal conduct of each powerful nation-agent.
As a result, in a highly jurisdictional structure, the regulatory regime is
more vulnerable to impediments and distortions introduced by the
intermediate national governments qua implementing agents. The analysis
in this Part shows that these jurisdictional impediments pose problems for
both tradeable allowance and tax instruments, but that these problems are
389. National law typically involves important subsidiary jurisdictions-states, provinces,
and local governments. See Farber, supra note 223, at 1315 (explaining that in the United States,
national environmental policy often requires negotiating implementation by the states); Stewart,
supra note 388, at 1196 ("The federal government... is dependent upon state and local
authorities to implement [environmental] policies .... "). Hence, the problem of implementation
by intermediate state agents can be important at all levels of governance, and my analysis in this
Part has implications for national instrument choice as well.' Still, the global legal framework is
clearly more significantly "jurisdictional" than most or all national systems. The United States is
a federalist system in which the states possess much authority, but many environmental
regulations are imposed directly by the national government on private sources without much or
any role for the states. At the least such a unitary approach to implementation is within the legal
power of the national government under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
An example is the SO2 emissions trading system created in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments,
which operates directly on emitters without respect to state lines, treating the nation as a unitary
polity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o. By contrast, at the global level, environmental law can
rarely if ever operate directly on private sources of externalities. International law must in general
be adopted and implemented by nation-states. Beyond this official sovereign autonomy, the
practical power of nation-states to thwart or distort international legal requirements is far greater
than the practical power of states within the United States or even the European Union to act at
variance with the laws of their federal governments. Compared to the member states of the United
States or the European Union, nation-states have far greater financial, technical, informational,
and military resources than the international institutions set up to govern them.
390. See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies,
75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A
Principal-Agent Perspective, 44 PUBLIC CHOICE 157 (1984).
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more serious and intractable for tax instruments. Thus, the jurisdictional
implementation structure at the global level is another legal parameter
furnishing a presumptive advantage to quantity-based allowance trading
instruments over price-based tax instruments.
To date, most analyses of global environmental law have paid little or
no attention to the role that the jurisdictional implementation structure may
play in making the choice among regulatory instruments. Analyses of the
cost savings of global allowance trading, for example, typically assume
fluid transactions across national borders among profit-maximizing private
sector allowance holders, and take no account of interjurisdictional trade
barriers or transaction costs, or of the jurisdictional exercise of market
power.391 Likewise, most analyses comparing liability and property rules
assume that the choice occurs within one political jurisdiction; they do not
address the problems of imposing such rules across jurisdictions to deal
with multijurisdictional externalities. The choice among regulatory
instruments at the global level requires much further examination of these
issues.392
B. Jurisdictional Baniers to Taxes: Fiscal Cushioning
A jurisdictional structure introduces a problem of local circumvention.
Under a global GHG tax or set of nationally coordinated GHG taxes, for
example, countries would have incentives to counteract the burden of the
global regulatory regime on domestic high-emitting or resource-intensive
industry sectors by adopting offsetting tax cuts, subsidies, and new taxes on
substitute products. The complexity of national tax codes could make it
very difficult for outsiders to monitor these domestic cushioning
strategies.393 Each country qua agent for the global collective regulatory
regime could engage in opportunism that remains facially faithful to the
global regime but distorts the regime's effects. As the chief U.S. negotiator
at Kyoto, Stuart Eizenstat, argued:
391. See sources cited supra note 155.
392. See generally PARSON & FISHER-VANDEN, supra note 156 (discussing regulatory
instruments in light of host-government policies and politics). An analogous problem in national
implementation of environmental markets is that new national systems of tradeable allowances
have to be grafted onto the preexisting system of state-by-state regulation. See Hahn & Noll,
supra note 154, at 65.
393. I am grateful to David Bradford for discussion of this point. See also MABEY Er AL.,
supra note 70, at 25 (noting that GHG taxes are "open to verification problems, because any
increases could be potentially offset by reducing existing domestic energy taxes leading to free-
riding while in full compliance with the treaty!" (citation omitted)); Stavins, supra note 6, at 322
(arguing that global taxes could be frustrated by domestic tax and subsidy changes). Mabey et al.
also point to other problems in harmonizing global GHG taxes with the very diverse tax systems
of nation-states (in order to achieve efficient equalization of marginal abatement costs across
countries). See MABEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 331.
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[A] common international tax is a bad idea. Countries with existing
energy taxes could reduce them while a new international carbon
tax was imposed on countries without preexistent energy taxes. The
net effect would be little, if any, reduction in
emissions.... [C]ountries could offset the impact of a new carbon
tax indirectly, through other changes in tax or subsidy
policies ... while ostensibly maintaining their existing energy
taxes. Distinguishing permissible from prohibited policies would be
extraordinarily difficult and could bring unacceptable international
scrutiny to domestic tax decisions.394
In Thomas Heller's view, "The strongest argument in favor of trading over
taxes is that with multiple, uncoordinated fiscal and regulatory policies
affecting the price of energy, changes in other policies may offset the
effects of the carbon-energy tax." 395
Of course, such tax relief and subsidy games might be played to
cushion domestic industries from the costs of complying with any
instrument-technology requirements, taxes, or tradeable allowances. But
whereas these strategies could not influence the total emissions or resource
uses of the country under a quantity-based regime, they would influence the
total emissions or resource uses under an international tax or technology
regime. Precisely because the tax does not limit the total quantity of
emissions, the domestic cushioning strategy would dilute both the economic
and the environmental effects of the global tax. Under a global quantity
rule, by contrast, although the domestic cushioning strategy could ease the
competitiveness burden facing the country, it could not generate perverse
increases in the contributions to the global externality, because the quantity
limit would set an upper ceiling. In addition, because taxes cost regulated
firms more than do conduct standards and issued allowances, 396 the
incentive for domestic industry to lobby for cushioning would also be
higher under taxes than under alternative instruments. Just as important, the
ability to monitor the global impact of domestic cushioning would be
greater under quantity instruments than under taxes. Under a quantity
instrument, the group of nations qua principals need not monitor all the
domestic evasive tactics being practiced in each country (as would be
394. Stuart Eizenstat, Stick with Kyoto: A Sound Start on Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF.,
May/June 1998, at 119, 120 (rebutting the advocacy of an international greenhouse gas tax in
Cooper, supra note 9).
395. Thomas Heller, The Path to EU Climate Change Policy, in GLOBAL COMPETITION AND
EU ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY 108, 122 (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998). Robert Stavins reaches a
similar judgment, concluding that "the weight of evidence would appear to favor.., a permit
scheme over a charge system at the international level," based largely on concern about nations'
internal efforts to circumvent the effectiveness of a global tax. Stavins, supra note 6, at 323.
396. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 281; Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 203, at 141;
Keohane et al., supra note 202, at 347-51.
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needed to assure the global effectiveness of a tax). Instead, the group of
nations qua principals need only monitor the aggregate national emissions
and compare them to the country's allowed total. Thus, real effectiveness
(as opposed to facial compliance) would be much easier to monitor under
globally tradeable allowances than under a global tax.
C. Jurisdictional Barriers to Tradeable Allowances
The greater disjunction of jurisdictions at the international level may
also pose problems for global allowance trading that are less relevant or
absent for national allowance trading systems. Within the United States,
there is a national market: States' interference in the national market is
constrained by the federal Constitution; property rights established under
the law of one state are valid in other states; and although transactional law
varies somewhat from state to state, a high degree of uniformity is fostered
by the Uniform Commercial Code and the national education provided in
law schools. The U.S. dollar and federally issued SO 2 emissions allowances
are examples of nationally created commodities that transcend state law. At
the international level, by contrast, there is a collection of national and
regional markets. Interference with international trade is commonplace,
national property rights are not always recognized in other countries, and
transactional law varies considerably across jurisdictions. There are as yet
few or no instances of globally created commodities that transcend national
law.
This Section shows that such obstacles to international allowance
trading, while important, can be mitigated by the careful design of
international allowance trading systems and by the momentum toward open
global markets in general. Thus, these obstacles are less insuperable for
allowance trading than is the problem of domestic cushioning for taxes.
1. Interference
Nations may meddle in the global allowance trading market to secure
competitive advantage. They might tax allowance sales or purchases, limit
compliance options, expropriate allowances or abatement projects, or
undertake other schemes. The experience of the U.S. SO2 trading system is
instructive. Allowances were assigned to the emitters directly rather than
assigned to the states. Nonetheless, several states attempted to distort the
national market in SO2 allowances. Some tried to limit fuel-switching to
out-of-state low-sulfur coal397 but were generally rebuffed under the
397. See Pollution Control: Unshackling the Invisible Hand, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1992, at 66
(reporting that in response to the 1990 acid rain trading program, Ohio, Kentucky, and West
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dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.39 Other states tried to
limit allowance sales to upwind out-of-state sources.399
At the global level, this problem would be more acute. First, even
assuming that global environmental protection allowances would be created
under international law rather than national law,4°° they would initially be
assigned to national governments. Perhaps there would be a treaty
obligation on national governments to subassign the allowances to private
sources, but this might be left up to each nation. Thus, national
governments would initially control the allowances and might not
undertake subassignment. Unlike private allowance holders, governments
might not maximize profits and might instead use allowances in inefficient
ways.
Second, even if subassignment to the private sector did occur, national
governments could seek to interpose obstacles to free trade in allowances
across borders, just as they do now in ordinary markets. National meddling
in an international GHG emissions allowance market might be rebuffed
under the law of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO), but this depends on untested legal
questions about how trade in GHG abatement is classified: Is it a
commodity, a service, an investment; or even covered under the GATT?"'
Virginia threatened to prevent in-state electric utilities from switching to out-of-state low-sulfur
coal).
398. See, e.g., Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (striking
down an Illinois law subsidizing the use of coal with high sulfur content enacted in response to the
1990 acid rain SO2 trading program); see also ELIZABETH BAILEY, ALLOWANCE TRADING
ACTIVITY AND STATE REGULATORY RULINGS: EVIDENCE FROM THE US ACID RAIN PROGRAM,
(MIT Ctr. for Energy and Envtl. Policy Research Working Paper No. 96-002, 1996) (discussing
states' efforts to obstruct SO2 allowance trades, and judicial review of such efforts).
399. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, State Reactions to the Trading of Emissions Allowances
Under Title IVof the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201,209-
10 (1995) (describing legislation proposed in New York and Wisconsin); Al Baker, LILCO To
Curb Sales of 'Pollution Credits,' NEWSDAY, Apr. 30, 1998, at A33 (reporting on an electric
utility's agreement with Governor Pataki of New York not to sell allowances to power plants in
15 mostly upwind midwestern states, including Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky);
Pollution Control, supra note 397, at 66 (reporting that in response to the 1990 acid rain trading
program, "meddling regulators" in New York tried to limit sales of allowances to upwind
emitters).
400. It is hard to imagine a country agreeing to have its economy constrained by property
rights that are subject to definition and interpretation according to another country's national laws.
For example, suppose the U.S. economy could emit up to the total of its allowances held, but the
definition and enforcement of the allowance as a property right was a matter of French law, or
vice-versa. It is far more likely, perhaps inevitable, that the allowances would be created and
defined under the international treaty itself.
401. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 35-40. Note that some countries that would be
potentially important members of a GHG allowance trading market, such as China and Russia, are
not yet full members of the WTO and thus might not be bound by the GATr/WTO restrictions on
interference with international trade.
Another possible basis for ensuring free trade in environmental allowance commodities is
protection under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Apr.
11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668. For discussions of this convention, see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM
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It is also unclear whether the GATT/WTO applies to trade in commodities
defined under international rather than under national law.
This problem is the converse of the traditional "trade and
environment" debate. The traditional "trade and environment" argument is
that global free trade rules may undermine national environmental
protection efforts. 2 But here the concern is that restrictions on trade in
environmental regulatory commodities, such as GHG emissions
allowances, would obstruct global environmental protection efforts. Instead
of worrying that free trade in ordinary products would undermine national
environmental protection laws, the worry is that global environmental
protection would be undermined by national trade-protection laws. Thus,
GATT/WTO free trade rules applied to international trade in environmental
allowances could enhance, not impair, effective and efficient global
environmental protection.
2. Transaction Costs
High transaction costs can impede the efficient functioning of
environmental allowance trading markets.4"3 Allowance trading markets
confront at least six kinds of transaction costs: searching for partners,
negotiating deals, gaining regulatory approval, monitoring performance,
enforcing deals, and insuring against the risk of nonperformance or project
failure.
As compared to a unitary polity, a jurisdictional implementation
structure raises several kinds of transaction costs. Greater diversity in the
legal and economic systems across countries will raise negotiation and
LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1991);
Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
279 (1997); and Note, Unification and Certainty: The United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1984 (1984).
402. See, e.g., GURUSWAMY & HENDRICKS, supra note 67, at 402-03 ("The WTO['s]
existence and active presence accentuates the reality that international free trade and
environmental protection are competing paradigms."); Stewart, supra note 68, at 2071-84
(examining empirical evidence of conflict between free trade and environmental regulations). The
trade and environment conflict is argued to arise where free trade law prevents nations from
regulating the flow of industrial goods and services, so that nations are disabled from barring
imports of environmentally-unfriendly products and deterred from regulating mobile industries
that might relocate to avoid burdensome national regulations. Cf. Revesz, supra note 274
(doubting that interjurisdictional mobility induces jurisdictions to reduce their environmental
protection standards).
403. See DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206, at 19; Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn,
Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19,
33 (1995); Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGIrr. 133, 133-48 (1995).
404. See DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206, at 15, 20 (distinguishing these six types of
transaction costs); see also Ayres & Talley, supra note 128, at 1036 (emphasizing the need to
focus on the type of transaction costs).
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enforcement costs.4"5 Greater diversity in the spoken languages and cultures
of doing business across countries than within countries will raise search
and negotiation costs. Special requirements or bureaucratic procedures in
different countries may raise approval costs. The political risk of
confiscatory or other adverse actions by abatement project host
governments will raise insurance costs.
The transaction costs of joint implementation and Clean Development
Mechanism (JUCDM) activities under the Climate Change Convention and
Kyoto Protocol seem likely to be particularly high. Partners are difficult to
identify, each negotiation is novel, and each project must be pre-approved
by both the host government and the investor government (and perhaps the
Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board or its agents as well)." 6
Moreover, JI/CDM investors support entire abatement projects, so that each
investor bears a large risk of project failure.40 7 Furthermore, joint
implementation credit is unavailable during the pilot phase. These
transaction costs may well be the dominant reason for the paltry record of
joint implementation to date."S The transaction costs of JIICDM could be
reduced through private brokers (some of whom are already active),
information exchanges, streamlined approval processes, official credit (as is
available under the Clean Development Mechanism), accredited monitoring
agents (e.g., environmental nongovernmental organizations), and the
creation of mutual funds and other means of risk diversification."'°
The transaction costs of a formal GHG allowance trading market would
be much lower, especially if fungible allowances are traded on organized
exchanges. Fungible allowances, not bearing issuer designations, would
reduce insurance costs; their trade on organized exchanges would reduce
search, negotiation, and approval costs. If fungible allowances are valid for
bona fide purchasers, rather than depending on the underlying abatement
performance of the allowance seller, then monitoring and enforcement costs
would be reduced.410 Indeed, reducing transaction costs would be a central
purpose of establishing a formal allowance trading system.
Even with a formal international allowance trading system, national
diversity could raise transaction costs in global markets. Many countries
have legal systems that are far less "market-friendly" than the United
States's. Witness the recent difficulties in spreading currency markets
405. See supra Subsection ll.C.3.
406. See DUDEK & WIENER, supra note 206, at 41-53.
407. Seeid. at41-53.
408. See id. at 52.
409. See id. at 52-53.
410. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 13 & n.17. Compliance by the seller would be
monitored and enforced through national emissions inventories, just as under a non-trading
system. See id. at 44-47.
[Vol. 108: 677
1999] Global Environmental Regulation
around the globe." Markets may be coming gradually to China, for
example, but market-based environmental law will confront obstacles in
China in the near term.412 Even some industrialized democracies are
considerably less market-friendly than the United States.413 And even some
otherwise market-friendly countries may find the idea of environmental
markets to be jarring; the popularity of market-based tradeable allowances
for environmental protection took many years of nurturing even in the
market-oriented United States.414 It is highly likely that a system of
internationally tradeable allowances will not be matched by parallel
domestic allowance trading systems-at least not immediately. Domestic
implementation will use diverse instruments, and tradeable allowances at
the global level will confront continuing jurisdictional encumbrances.415
This news is not all bad. Rather than nonmarket societies opposing
globally tradeable environmental allowances, perhaps nonmarket societies
might come to view international environmental markets as an entr6e into
participation in global markets generally. Through environmental
commodity trading and associated technical assistance, these countries
411. See Bhushan Bahree, Asian Ills Stall WTO Talks To Open Financial Markets, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 19, 1997, at A8; David E. Sanger, Asia's Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary
Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al; David Wessel, The Outlook: Developing Nations
Require Open Markets, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at Al.
412. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's
Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 136-37 (1997).
Mhe establishment of a workable system of tradable discharge permits [in China]
presume[s] more in the way of market mechanisms... than is now available in China
or likely to be in the foreseeable future.... IM]any Chinese economic entities continue
to operate in ways inconsistent with such market principles. Large national state-owned
enterprises still occupy a prominent role in the economy [and] such enterprises include
many of China's biggest polluters.
Id. The mass privatization announced at the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress in September of
1997 may have accelerated the transition to markets, but it remains to be seen whether this
privatization will include sectors relevant to global environmental problems, such as the energy
sector. See CHINA: POWER SECTOR REGULATION IN A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY at xiii, 3-6
(World Bank Discussion Paper No. 361, 1997) (noting that the Chinese electric power sector
remains centrally organized and state-ran, and lacks well-defined property rights or market
incentives for efficiency).
413. Recall the recent decision of the French Government to retain Air France as a
government-run enterprise, precipitating the resignation of the Air France CEO who had sought
privatization. See Socialist Insider To Take Helm at Air France, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1997, at
AS.
414. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 2, at 3-4. Anti-environmental market rhetoric still crops
up from time to time, as in Hoppe, supra note 217, at 39, and Sandel, supra note 181, at A23.
415. This is a particularly vexing problem when the market needs to be nearly universal in
coverage, as would be the case for GHG allowances and other global environmental regimes.
Today's international markets in currencies and capital have grown incrementally, realizing gains
from trade as more countries have joined the system. But a GHG regime that did not cover most
or all countries from the outset would risk significant GHG emissions leakage, with consequent
adverse impacts on the regime's environmental effectiveness, on the economic competitiveness of
constrained countries, and on the willingness of countries to constrain themselves in the first
place. Thus, a market-based approach to global GHG control must find a way to mesh promptly
with the culture and legal approach of important national governments.
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could improve their capacity to participate and succeed in global markets
for all kinds of commodities, services, and investments. Instead of being an
obstacle to international environmental markets, confronting generalized
market-unfriendliness could turn out to be an opportunity for international
environmental markets to assist market-wary countries and to open the way
to broader global market participation.
One way or another, the success of market-based global environment
regulatory instruments will be affected by the interplay of such global
markets with national legal, cultural and economic systems. Tradeable
allowance systems can be expected to perform less cost-effectively in
highly jurisdictional polities than in unitary polities. Still, they may perform
better in jurisdictional polities than do other regulatory instruments, notably
taxes. With careful design of the tradeable allowances system and with the
general expansion of global markets, transaction costs can be reduced.
3. Market Power
The problem of market power is exacerbated in a jurisdictional
implementation structure because both private firms and jurisdictions
themselves can attempt to distort the market. For example, a large country
with very low GHG abatement costs-say, China or Russia-might be the
low-cost seller of the great majority of GHG allowances offered for trade.
This country, if its allowance sellers acted as a coordinated bloc (or were
formally state-owned), could exert upward pressure on allowance prices,
resulting in fewer trades (but at more profit to this monopolist seller) and in
less GHG abatement per aggregate expenditure than if the market were
competitive. Similarly, a single large buyer of allowances, such as a single
purchasing agent for a buyers' cartel, could exert downward pressure on
allowance prices.
Concern about market power in domestic environmental markets is
often dismissed.416 The international GHG market would seem to be even
"thicker" and more contestable than a national market, preventing the
successful exercise of market power. It might look something like the U.S.
SO2 allowance trading market multiplied several-fold worldwide. But
416. See CLINE, supra note 9, at 352 (stating that the exercise of market power in a global
GHG tradeable allowances system is possible but "barely conceivable" and likely to be
"considerably less feasible than the only modestly successful past efforts of OPEC"); Robert W.
Hahn, Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, 99 QJ. ECON. 753, 764 (1984) (citing
others' dismissal of market power concern); Walter S. Misiolek & Harold W. Elder, Exclusionary
Manipulation of Markets for Pollution Rights, 16 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 156, 164 (1989)
(stating that others have dismissed the potential for strategic market manipulation by dominant
firms). Both the Hahn and Misiolek articles demonstrate, however, that market power can, in fact,




concentrated power over allowance prices could arise on the sellers' side
(e.g., a large single seller, a "GHG OPEC," or a G-77 sales agent) or on the
buyers' side (e.g., a central sole purchasing agent for industrialized
countries). Models of international GHG allowance trading markets suggest
that Russia would be a dominant seller of allowances in an Annex I
(industrialized country) GHG trading system, and that China would be a
dominant seller in a global GHG trading system.417 One recent study
suggests that in an Annex I trading system, Russia and the Ukraine could
raise allowance prices by about ten percent above the competitive
equilibrium.41 The problem of market power would be especially severe if
a country that is a dominant player had a state-ran energy sector, so that the
world faced a monopoly actor with a political agenda. This could be the
case with China, if it retains de facto state supervision of its energy
sector.419
Market power could also distort the incremental expansion of an
initially subglobal treaty using tradeable allowances. Every new country
admitted to the treaty could have an effect on allowance prices. For
example, suddenly adding China or Brazil to an initially Annex I only
market could depress allowance prices (or it might remedy Russian market
power). Opt-ins might need to be brought on board in sets of countries
whose demand and supply profiles would be neutral with respect to prices,
or would redress imbalances in prices.42" Hence, there would likely be some
voting procedure for the admission of opt-ins, and group members might
have strategic incentives to enlist or exclude different opt-ins. Ordinarily,
additional countries can accede to an existing treaty without any say from
current treaty members, but in a market-based treaty in which new members
could substantially affect the price of allowances, this prospect would invite
some method for managing entry to the market. The voting rules for
allowing opt-ins might need to require less than consensus, in order to
417. See Hourcade et al., supra note 70, at 341 & fig.9.28 (showing China as a dominant
seller in a global market); Hege Westkog, Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2 Quotas, 17
ENERGY J. 85 (1996) (showing Russia and the Ukraine as dominant sellers in an Annex I market).
418. See Westkog, supra note 417, at 99 n.14.
419. See Edward A. Gargan, Weakness Seen in China's Economic Boom, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
19, 1997, at A5; supra note 412. Official state ownership of many businesses in China may be on
the wane. See Seth Faison, Major Shift for Communist China: Big State Industries Will Be Sold,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at Al (reporting plans of Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the 15th
Communist Party Congress to privatize more than 10,000 of China's 13,000 state-owned
enterprises). But the energy extraction and power generation industries may remain state-owned,
or at least de facto state-controlled and monolithic. See supra note 412. Even in the United States,
electric utility deregulation is quite recent and controversial. See Edward A. Smeloff, Utility
Deregulation and Global Warming: The Coming Collision, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 280,
284-85 (1998). The lucrative nature of GHG allowance sales could make them a tempting asset
for state control. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text (describing potentially large
financial value of international trade in GHG allowances).
420. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 48.
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avoid one country exercising market power through its ability to veto a
candidate opt-in.421 An alternative approach would be for opt-ins to be
admitted automatically upon satisfaction of certain objective criteria, rather
than to be subject to individualized votes. Better yet, every country could be
included from the outset, with a sliding scale of increasing constraints as,
say, national income rose over time.422 Or the treaty's coverage could be
global from the outset, as favored in Part II above.
A different form of market power could arise if certain parties possess
asymmetric information about abatement options or about how to play the
market. Countries with fewer trained economists and less active domestic
markets may fear being outmaneuvered by countries with hordes of
economists and robust, aggressive market sectors. This problem may be at
the root of developing countries' fears that an international market in
allowance trading would enable "carbon colonialism" as industrialized
countries "skim the cream" by buying up the best abatement options at low
prices, leaving developing countries only less attractive options to
employ.423 This fear counsels investment by neutral parties in capacity
building to assist developing countries toward effective participation in the
allowance trading market.424
There may also be a tension between efforts to reduce transaction costs
and concerns about market power. Some have suggested reducing
transaction costs, particularly search costs, by putting all joint
implementation investment funds in the hands of a single central investment
manager, such as the World Bank.4" The Kyoto Protocol's coronation of
421. There is some precedent for incremental modification of treaties without universal
assent. "Adjustments" to the phase-out schedules and relative ozone-depleting potential ratings of
controlled chemicals under the Montreal Protocol require separate 2/3 votes of industrialized and
developing countries, but the decisions are then binding on all parties. See Montreal Protocol,
supra note 34, at art. II(9)(c), 26 I.L.M. at 1554. By contrast, "amendments," which can add new
chemicals to be controlled or change the trade restrictions on controlled chemicals, require a 2/3
vote but cannot bind dissenters. See Vienna Convention, supra note 32, at arts. 9(3),(4),(5), 26
I.L.M. at 1533. Of course, dissenters from "adjustments" could withdraw from the entire treaty,
but the costs of full withdrawal may typically exceed the costs of acceding to the adjustments.
422. See William Nordhaus, Climate Allowances Protocol (CAP): Comparison of Alternate
Global Tradeable Emissions Regimes 10 (Aug. 13-14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with The Yale Law Journal).
423. See Harvey & Bush, supra note 162, at 14, 39 (stating that developing countries fear that
joint implementation "might exploit the weakness of developing countries or perpetuate
neocolonial relationships"); Laura H. Kosloff, Climate Change Mitigation and Sustainable
Development, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1997, at 93, 95 (noting that many countries are
"concerned that industrialized countries will absorb the most cost-effective mitigation
opportunities, many of them in developing countries, thereby reducing those countries' future
mitigation options when they then need them as part of their economic development plans").
Absent asymmetric capacity to participate in the allowance market, the fear of "cream skimming"
seems illusory: Countries would not sell allowances for less than the present value of the future
opportunity to emit. If abatement options would be more valuable in the future, the price of the
allowance would rise today to cover that option value. Thus, asymmetric capacity is the real issue.
424. See supra note 180.
425. See, e.g., Fisher et al., supra note 70, at 419.
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the Clean Development Mechanism as the exclusive route for purchasing
GHG credits from developing countries, run by a central Executive
Board,426 threatens to achieve just such a result (though the World Bank
may not be the manager of the Clean Development Mechanism). A single
sales agent for developing countries is also conceivable; perhaps this is
what the Clean Development Mechanism will become. But such moves to
funnel allowance trades with developing countries through a central
gatekeeper could create a bottleneck in abatement investments and stifle
competition among investors and hosts. The central role and market power
of the Clean Development Mechanism, either as a monopolist for
developing countries or a monopsonist for industrialized countries, will
likely foster an intense and wasteful political struggle over its leadership
and operation.
A better route is to use formal fungible allowances to reduce transaction
costs and to manage market power by ensuring a "thick" market of
numerous participants with a wide range of abatement costs. Article 12(9)
of the Kyoto Protocol does authorize private parties to be involved in the
Clean Development Mechanism,427 so-short of abolishing the Clean
Development Mechanism and including developing countries in formal
allowance trading-the best path for the Clean Development Mechanism
would be for it to serve a "market maker" role: publicizing opportunities
for hosts and investors, ensuring that developing countries are well-
informed and well-equipped to participate in the market, and acting as the
registry for transactions in "certified emission reductions" from developing
countries. This "market maker" role would sidestep the problems of delay
and market power that could arise if the Clean Development Mechanism
tries to exercise decisionmaking authority over project selection,
investments, and credit transfers.
Market power is more of a concern in the international arena under a
jurisdictional implementation structure for a final reason: the lack of
antitrust law to remedy the emergence of market power. Unlike domestic
antitrust or competition law, there is no international legal framework to
combat market power-there is no international antitrust law.428 In the
426. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 41, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 38.
427. See id.
428. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L LAW
1, 3 (1997). Even under U.S. antitrust law, market power exercised by the subsidiary political
jurisdictions (the states) is largely exempt from federal control under the "state action" doctrine.
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of
Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714-15 (1986). The analog at the global level would
be to prosecute market power exercised by private monopolies and cartels but to leave nation-
state-run enterprises immune from antitrust liability. Such an exemption would immunize the
nation-state-run energy and forestry sectors, such as the Chinese state-run energy sector, which
might exercise distortionary market power in global environmental markets.
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domestic setting, antitrust law can remedy market interference.429 It can also
be politically salient in reassuring decisionmakers ex ante that market
power will be held in check. For example, when market power was voiced
as a concern in the design of the U.S. SO 2 trading market, the response was
that the market would be thick enough, and that in any case the antitrust
laws would be available.43 At the international level, perhaps a new global
competition law could be created,431 or perhaps a customized competition
law could be drafted to govern just the GHG allowance market.432 Without
effective international antitrust laws, safeguarding open competition in an
international allowance trading market would have to rely on thickness (as
other international markets must), on extensions of national antitrust laws,
and on bilateral agreements to reciprocate under national antitrust laws 33
Though market power is a more serious concern in a jurisdictional
structure than in a unitary structure, the relevant question for global
environmental regulatory policy is the effect of market power on tradeable
allowances compared to the effect of the jurisdictional structure on
alternative instruments, chiefly taxes. The exercise of market power in
quantity-based environmental allowance markets is not as serious a
problem as the distortions of tax instruments introduced by domestic
cushioning strategies. Market power affects only the price of allowances
and not the quantity of emissions,43 4 whereas domestic cushioning affects
both costs and emissions. Moreover, market power may be mitigated by a
"thick" market and by the development of specific or generic international
antitrust law.
D. Implications
This Part has shown that the move from a unitary polity to a
decentralized jurisdictional implementation structure poses problems for all
429. See Revesz, supra note 103, at 468 (asserting that monopoly behavior in tradeable
allowance markets "would certainly be illegal under the antitrust laws").
430. Congress deemed this backstop function important enough that it specifically provided
for the applicability of the antitrust laws to the SO trading market in the Clean Air Act
amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(i) (1994).
431. See The Borders of Competition, ECONOMIST, July 4, 1998, at 69 (reporting on initial
explorations of a multilateral antitrust law through the WTO).
432. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 146, at 34-35. But see Fox, supra note 428, at 4
(expressing concern about a "patchwork of antitrust policies ... devised to fit specialized
instruments of trade").
433. See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764,769-70 (1993) (holding that U.S. civil
antitrust law can apply extraterritorially); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st
Cir. 1997) (holding that U.S. criminal antitrust law can apply extraterritorially); Fox, supra note
428, at 13-15 (identifying four possible ways to construct international antitrust rules); Eleanor M.
Fox & Janusz A. Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law, 19 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & EON. REv. 5 (1995).
434. See Revesz, supra note 103, at 468 (" [E]ven if polluters collude to lower the prices of
permits, environmental quality will not be damaged [under a quantity-based constraint].").
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regulatory instruments. Taxes are vulnerable to circumvention by the
jurisdictions' internal cushioning strategies-subtle and essentially
unmonitorable changes in domestic tax and subsidy rules that shield
regulated industries. Because technology standards and taxes do not cap
total emissions, such cushioning strategies can distort not only local costs
and international competitiveness but also the level of global externalities.
Although cushioning strategies could also be attempted under tradeable
allowances, the quantity constraint inherent in this instrument would
prevent such cushioning from distorting the level of global environmental
protection. Meanwhile, although the problems posed by a jurisdictional
implementation structure for tradeable allowances-such as protectionist
barriers to trade, higher transaction costs of trading across jurisdictions, and
market power exercised by jurisdictions' governments or state-run
enterprises-are significant, they are much more amenable to generic
institutional reforms intended to promote open global markets. And because
these reforms are valuable for facilitating global markets generally, with or
without the advent of global environmental markets, they can be expected
to be adopted in any event as the globalization of world markets
progresses.43 Indeed, whereas global free trade has been alleged by some to
be a threat to national environmental protection,436 it can be an important
supportive element in the emergence of efficient global environmental
protection regimes.437
In the choice between price and quantity instruments, a jurisdictional
implementation structure is likely to be more problematic for price
instruments. The problem of unmonitorable domestic fiscal cushioning
strategies is far more intractable than are the problems of interjurisdictional
trade barriers and market power, and the latter will likely be eased in any
case by the ongoing globalization of general market institutions. Here
again, the underlying legal framework significantly affects the choice of
optimal regulatory instrument, and tradeable allowances enjoy a
presumptive advantage over taxes at the global level.
435. In addition, choosing the most participation-efficient regulatory instrument, as discussed
in Part IV, may have a helpful symbiotic effect on the jurisdictional problems discussed in Part V.
As shown in Part IV, tradeable allowances with quantity-based side payments would help
maximize participation without perverse results. As participation expands, the market for
externality abatement becomes thicker. A thicker market, in turn, helps reduce the global marginal
cost of abatement, reduce leakage, reduce transaction costs, and prevent the exercise of market
power. Thus, to some extent, adoption of allowance trading to meet the demands of the Voluntary
Assent voting rule would also help ameliorate the potential problems of jurisdictional
implementation.
436. See supra note 402.
437. From this perspective, admitting China to the WTO might be more than a possible
partial side payment to help attract China to sign on to GHG emissions constraints; it might also
be a crucial move to ensure that China's participation in a global GHG allowance trading market
does not bring with it barriers to allowance trades, high transaction costs, and Chinese exercise of
market power.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The debate in law and economics over regulatory instrument choice-
command-and-control technology requirements, price-based liability rules
and taxes, and quantity-based property rules and tradeable allowances-has
to date been conducted within the comfortable confines of a single legal
framework. In that assumed world of "Unitary Fiat," the regulatory
instrument is chosen by a single rational actor who can impose regulation
directly on sources. Where the legal framework allows direct coercion of
sources, then taxes and liability rules may be superior to tradeable property
rule entitlements. This is the standard result of much law and economics
analysis.
Global environmental regulation, however, occurs under a quite
different legal framework, in which regulation is adopted by the voluntary
assent of the regulated entities and is implemented through intermediary
political jurisdictions. When comparing regulatory instruments for global
environmental problems, we need to think "outside of the box" of Unitary
Fiat. The central finding of this Article is that the underlying legal
framework powerfully affects the choice of optimal regulatory instrument.
In particular, the Voluntary Assent voting rule and the jurisdictional
implementation structure both confer important presumptive advantages on
quantity-based tradeable allowances over taxes, subsidies, or conduct-based
technology instruments. Under the Voluntary Assent voting rule,
"participation efficiency" becomes a central attribute of regulatory
instrument choice. With diverse net benefits of cooperation across sources,
instruments such as technology requirements, fixed quantity standards, and
taxes are all likely to yield high costs of nonparticipation. Subsidies to
attract participation (or combined tax-and-pay approaches) will yield high
costs of securing participation, notably perverse moral hazard incentives
toward increasing overall environmental damage. Quantity-based tradeable
allowances, with side payments built into the allowance assignment can
attract participation while suppressing these perversities, and are thus more
participation-efficient than the other instruments. Meanwhile, under a
jurisdictional implementation structure, taxes are comparatively more
vulnerable to unmonitorable domestic fiscal cushioning games. Quantity-
based tradeable allowances avoid the environmental distortions of these
cushioning strategies.
Global environmental protection should, therefore, presumptively favor
quantity-based tradeable allowances, unless other policy attributes, such as
performance under uncertainty or high transaction costs, persuasively
overcome the presumptive advantage of the cap-and-trade approach. The
Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol should be reevaluated in terms of
participation efficiency. Future international environmental accords should
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typically employ quantity-based tradeable allowances to engage widespread
participation without inducing perverse behavior.
The implications of this analysis extend beyond the global context to
any polity in which the voting rule and implementation structure vary from
Unitary Fiat. Participation efficiency is relevant to the regulation of
nuisances in neighborhood associations that require voluntary assent to
restrictive covenants, and even to regulation under Majority rule when side
payments are necessary to build the majority coalition or defuse opposition.
Indeed, this analysis may reveal a new explanation for the choice between
Pigouvian and Coasean remedies. Corrective taxes and liability rules may
be superior in a direct and coercive legal system, but tradeable property
entitlements may be superior in a decentralized and consensual legal
system. The "law" in law and economics deserves closer attention.
The modem terms "ecology" and "economics" are both derived from
the ancient Greek word "oikos," meaning "house.""43 Ecology and
economics are society's disciplines for managing our collective household.
We now live in a global house, bound together by both global ecological
interdependence and global economic interdependence. But despite the
wisdom that "a house divided cannot stand," our two modem versions of
oikos are often cast as adversaries and seldom united in a mutually
reinforcing structure. Reconstituting ecology and economics is the project
of economic incentive instruments for environmental protection. These
instruments seek to harness market forces in the service of environmental
protection and incorporate environmental values into market transactions.
Market-based global environmental law could add a new global property
law dimension to the world economy-a "green currency" that could
transform international financial flows toward financing environmentally
friendly development in poorer countries. By bringing market economics to
global environmental protection and bringing environmental protection to
global economic markets, market-based international environmental law
could help heal the rift between environment and development, north and
south, environment and trade-in short, oikos versus oikos.
We may be in the midst of a Demsetzian transition439 at the global
frontier. Formal global environmental allowance markets can be seen as a
438. See NASH, supra note 185, at 55. The term "oecologie" was coined by the evolutionary
biologist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, and the spelling "ecology" appeared in the 1890s. See id.
439. See Demsetz, supra note 254, at 350-52, 357-58 (describing how and why property
rights regimes emerge); Merrill, supra note 51, 1017-19 (invoking Demsetzian thesis in the
context of transboundary pollution); see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTTUTIONS,
INSTItrnONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFOPMANCE 83-104 (1990) (describing institutional
change as typically comprising marginal adaptations to the "complex" of rules, norms and
enforcement that constitute the institutional framework); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979)
(discussing the need for adaptation to changing market circumstances).
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next step in the Demsetzian process of developing property market
institutions to internalize the externalities of overuse, conserve the value of
unowned social resources, and thereby improve social well-being. The
heretofore open-access global atmosphere is being transformed into a
limited-access transferable property rights regime. The creation of tradeable
allowances--" regulatory property" -represents a legal parceling of the
property rights to use valuable resources. 4 They are a meta-market
response to the incompleteness of status quo markets. As Demsetz
observed, demand for the institution of environmental property rights rises
as the value of controlling externalities grows and the cost of establishing
and enforcing such a property rights regime declines." But the Demsetzian
transition does not occur exogenously, a deus ex machina arriving on the
scene just in time to avert environmental tragedy. It is an endogenous
process that depends on our own decisions and creativity.442 As we are now
beginning to construct global property institutions, such as internationally
tradeable allowances, to fence and protect the global commons, we must
choose our institutional architecture with care. The success of this
construction project-of rebuilding our global oikos-will depend critically
on our choice of regulatory tools.
440. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folktales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 163-66 (1998); Richard B. Stewart,
Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 93 (1990).
441. See Demsetz, supra note 254; Keohane, supra note 233; Merrill, supra note 51, at 972-
73.
442. See NORTH, supra note 439.
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